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# ***JPRS Report***

## **Soviet Union**

***Political Affairs***

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# Soviet Union

## Political Affairs

JPRS-UPA-91-005

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### Participant Comments on DPR Congress

91UN0681A Moscow MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA  
in Russian 18 Dec 90 p 2

[Interview with People's Deputy Arkadiy Murashev by Ye. Osharina; place and date not given: "Garri Was Simply Playing Chess"]

[Text] Of course, it is possible to argue about how Communists should react to anticommunism and whether or not they should, in general, have contacts with anticommunists. And if they should, in what form? But the fact that today anticommunism is a reality and that parties with this kind of orientation do exist is indisputable. Of course, they cannot help but attract the attention of those around them, or fail to provoke at least a purely cognitive interest associated with the question "Who is who?"

One such party is the Democratic Party of Russia [DPR], which is often still called the Travkin Party. Its first congress (not counting its constituent congress) took place recently in Moscow. Today, a participant of that congress, People's Deputy A. Murashev, answers our correspondent's questions.

[Osharina] Arkadiy Nikolayevich, how, specifically, are the anticommunist sentiments of the DPR seen, and what kind of numerical strength does your party have today?

[Murashev] First of all, in the rejection of communist ideology and the utopian ideas of communism. However, while giving the highest priority to the right of each person to hold his own convictions, we do not transfer this rejection to specific people. And the numerical strength of the DPR today is 25,300 according to our figures.

[Osharina] In summing up the results of the congress, both N. Travkin and you assessed it as a congress of like-minded people. Notwithstanding, some delegates believe that the congress has demonstrated a sharp divergence of views rather than unity. It is also being asserted that it was almost an open struggle between the supporters of N. Travkin and the supporters of A. Murashev. The thought that the party might split was even voiced...

[Murashev] In fact, trends can now be clearly seen in the DPR that in the future may lead to a split. Even before our party was created contradictions were found in views on how it should be. During the period of the constituent congress in May, the DPR was in fact split: A large number of the organizers in Moscow and Leningrad who were unable to agree with the organizational principles enunciated by N. Travkin quit the party. In my opinion, this was also augmented by some people's personal hostility toward N. Travkin.

These contradictions remain. As far as Garri Kasparov and I, as the spokesmen for the other trend in the party are concerned, we have remained in the party because, despite the profound differences with those who think

otherwise, we are nevertheless more united than disunited with them. And I, for example, am totally loyal to Travkin.

[Osharina] Nevertheless, at the congress you were obviously hampered in your desire to set forth the fundamental differences in your position and the position of N. Travkin. At particular moments the impression was even created that they were simply trying to drive you from the dais. Could you briefly tell us about these differences now?

[Murashev] I must emphasize immediately that Nikolay Ilich sees our party as a mass political organization that should actively oppose the CPSU in the country's political life. And with respect to forms of activity and how he sees the role of the new party in the political arena, he makes no special distinctions between the DPR and the CPSU. In other words, he, as it were, wants the DPR to replace the CPSU by being better than it is. And in confirmation of this, there is his desire to have his own party committees and primary party organizations in the labor collectives, in the army, in institutions, in the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and so forth. That is, his desire to have the same kind of structure as the CPSU.

At the same time, in order to make the DPR a truly mass party, Travkin is proposing a wishy-washy program for it that is thus more attractive to all strata of society. On the other hand, however, he wants the party to acquire ability and he intends to compensate for this wishy-washiness and heterogeneity in the party by employing a strict discipline that is very close to democratic centralism.

Garri Kasparov and I hold firmly to a diametrically opposed viewpoint, namely, trying to achieve a situation in which the DPR occupies its own niche in today's broad political spectrum as a party with liberal-conservative principles, and defends those principles in a consistent way.

[Osharina] On the second day of the congress a Political Declaration from A. Murashev, that is you, was circulated to its participants. What is this—some alternative document on the subjects of program principles that were distributed to the congress delegates for initial debate in the primary party organizations and subsequent adoption at a second congress? Why did this happen?

[Murashev] Yes, it was an alternative. And it did not happen by chance. The program principles make a quite strange document. For example, it states that the main direction in DPR activity is a struggle against violence. But just try to explain the principle on which our party is based that distinguishes it from all others. Both the Communists and the leftists and rightists oppose violence. Moreover, the document contains propositions borrowed from the programs of other movements and parties. In particular, the extension of glasnost, reorientation of the economy toward the individual, and so on



and so forth. In short, it seems to me that such a program is more similar to that of the communist reformers than to the DPR.

And in general, it is a somewhat strange situation: All the versions of the program principles were first discussed by us, and from our standpoint were totally acceptable. Then suddenly a different text appears. That is why in short order—literally a few hours on the first day of the congress—it was necessary to write an alternative document—the DPR Political Declaration. It was supported by a group of delegates and adopted as a declaration from the liberal faction of the DPR. In other words, it confirms once again that the party is not homogeneous.

[Osharina] Your party is called a democratic party, and according to the program principles bases its activity on the Declaration of Human Rights. It seems to me, however, that at the congress there was constant violation of those principles. This was seen particularly when N. Travkin was in the chair. He conducted himself not as a democrat but, let us be candid, something like a dictator. Unfortunately, to judge from everything, most of the delegates were obviously impressed. Might it not happen that other parties will have every justification for accusing the DPR of dictatorship and dictatorial attitudes?

[Murashev] There are grounds for concern. In democratic circles the DPR is regarded by many people precisely as a potential threat to democracy. But that is at the center. In the provinces things are different. There,

as before, the party apparatus rules the roost and deals with everything despotically, and violates the laws. The DPR, therefore, is perceived as almost the only safety-valve for democratic forces. And there is something else to which we should be paying attention, namely, the fact that what happened at the congress itself does not have any immediate or direct bearing on democracy. It is extremely difficult to consider such important issues in just one day. And passions inevitably become heated.

[Osharina] Arkadiy Nikolayevich, some delegates are at a loss because Garri Kasparov did not send a message of greeting to the congress. What was the reason for this?

[Murashev] Nothing special. It was simply that Garri was playing chess. The main thing is that he won. He wanted the congress to take place in January, and he asked N. Travkin to do that. But Nikolay Ilich would not meet him halfway and accelerated events, despite the fact that the program documents had not been prepared.

[Osharina] A final question. What specific tasks now face your party?

[Murashev] The first is to explain and propagandize the documents of the first congress. The second is to prepare basic, well-considered program documents. And in general, the party's only political task is write a program that is attractive enough for the voters. Why does a party exist? Only in order to win voters' votes in the elections and become structured within the legislative organs. It needs nothing else.

## Baltics

### **Iraqis Leave Riga; Libyans Being Trained**

91UN0512A Riga SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH  
in Russian 5 Dec 90 p 1

[Unattributed item in a set "based on SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH, TASS, and LETA reports": "Iraqi Servicemen Have Left Riga"]

[Text] A group of Iraqi servicemen have left a training center of the USSR Navy located in Riga. They have completed a full course of study at the Navy training center in keeping with an intergovernmental agreement signed by the two states several years ago, before the Iraqi aggression against Kuwait. As LETA has already reported, the Riga Training Center trains specialists in shipboard materiel.

Captain First Rank Vasiliy Tkachenko, deputy chief of the training center, told a LETA correspondent: "At present, there is not a single Iraqi servicemen at the training center. A group of navy sailors from Libya are completing their training here at present."

### **Estonian Independence Talks Continue**

91UN0399A Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA  
in Russian 31 Oct 90 p 1

[ETA report by A. Birov: "Will Consultations Be Able To Decide the Fate of the Soviet Army in the Estonian Republic?"]

[Text] Yesterday, 30 October, the latest meeting took place between experts from the Estonian Republic Supreme Soviet and the USSR Supreme Soviet within the framework of the consultations on preparing for talks on the restoration of Estonia's state independence. As usual, the Estonian Republic Supreme Soviet delegation was led by Advig Kiris, and the USSR Supreme Soviet delegation by Yuriy Tikhomirov. The Estonian group of experts also included Klara Khaliik, Vello Vare, Reyn Tamme, Klayd Kull, and Endel Khirvlaane. The group of experts for the USSR Supreme Soviet included officials from the Ministry of Defense, the KGB, the customs department, the internal and railroad troops, and a member of the USSR Supreme Soviet Defense and Security Committee. Since many of the experts from the USSR Supreme Soviet were taking part in the consultations for the first time, one or two strange things happened: One person thought that the consultations were about the upcoming signing of a new Union treaty. For the same reason, during the course of the discussion, some of the experts started to return to issues that have already been discussed at previous sessions. This forced the leader of the USSR Supreme Soviet delegation to make certain clarifications and put everyone in his place.

A more important and interesting detail became known by the Estonian side on the eve of the meeting: It turned out that in addition to the official delegation from the

Estonian Republic Supreme Soviet, the USSR Supreme Soviet experts were also holding parallel talks with the representatives of the Interregional Council of the ND [expansion not identified] and Estonian SSR workers' delegates on problems relating to the Union treaty. And this time they submitted their own package of documents for the USSR Supreme Soviet: proposals on defense, along with notes, questionnaires, and other materials. It became clear during the course of the meeting of the official groups of experts that our colleagues had been well informed about the content of those documents and were precisely focused on them. Hence the certain misunderstandings and interpretations that moved beyond the framework of the general outline of the matters under discussion.

The sides reviewed matters of defense and state security and border and customs regimes. The focus of attention was the problem of the future of the Soviet Army on the territory of Estonia, giving due consideration to the transitional period announced by the Estonian Republic Supreme Soviet and the Republic's steady course toward state independence. There was also lively dispute about the question of the possibility of Estonian young men doing their service in the Soviet Army on the territory of their own republic during the transitional period. It was the opinion of A. Kiris that there is hope that this issue will be resolved giving due consideration to the wishes of draftees from Estonia.

Of course, within the framework of a single meeting of the expert groups such serious and global issues could not be immediately resolved. It can be noted that the sides expressed their readiness to consider their mutual interests and go halfway to meet the other. But it is obviously too soon to be talking about results achieved or mutually agreed positions.

The sides agreed that the next meeting will take place on or about 15 November in Moscow. Issues relating to foreign policy, diplomatic relations, and involvement in international organizations will be reviewed. It is being proposed that after that a working meeting will be held in Tallinn.

As far as the draft treaty between Estonia and Russia is concerned, it is ready in principle but signing is being postponed because of the absence of a Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR] Supreme Soviet chairman. We have been told that Boris Yeltsin will be starting work on 5 November. The final date set for the signing of the bilateral treaty between the RSFSR and the Estonian Republic will then be announced.

### **Estonian Defense Group Budget Defended**

91UN0399B Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA  
in Russian 31 Oct 90 p 1

[ETA report on interview with Andrus Eevel, chief of staff of "Kodukaytse," by E. Alatalu; place and date not given: "Andrus Eevel Does Not Want Controversy"]

[Text] An interview with Kalle Eller about the "Kaytseliyt" organization was published on 25 October in the newspaper PYAEVALEKHT. Today our interviewee is the chief of staff of the "Kodukaytse," Andrus Eevel.

First, he expressed his dissatisfaction with the claim made by K. Eller that the Estonian "Kodukaytse" organization has wasted a million rubles [R]. The "Kodukaytse" budget for this (from 15 May to 31 December) is R118,000. In each uyezd there are two staffed units with a monthly allowance of R300 to R400. In Tallinn, there are 10 people on the staff and also a bookkeeper on half-pay. The Tallinn organization has four VAZ-21063 vehicles that will be out on patrol beginning Monday. Its premises are being moved from the building of the Ministry of the Economy and are now being set up mainly at former law enforcement posts. The "Kodukaytse" organization is now not only in Rapla, Vyr, and Tartu, but also in Narva, although people have been found also in Kokhtla-Yarve and Sillamya who also want them. An organization exists in Ida-Virumaas uyezd.

[Alatalu] With the establishment of an economic border in Narva, not everything is clear. Militiamen from Narva and Ivangorod are on duty at a temporary state automobile inspection post. Is it intended that the border protection service set up on the base of "Kodukaytse" should be extended to Narva?

[Eevel] If it were possible to bring a thousand men to go into the city as a column that would be possible. We are therefore setting up at the exit route from Narva to Tallinn three control posts and we shall see how Narva will be supplied with goods. If the stores in Narva remain empty despite the large imports, then this means that it is the town authorities that are to blame.

It is A. Eevel's opinion that the most important thing is for there to be no controversies between Estonians. If there are differences between Eller and Eevel, this is not an excuse for civil war.

At the congress of Estonia all male citizens of the Estonian Republic of appropriate age and in good health were called upon to join "Kaytseliyt." I would put it this way: All men of Estonia, join a formation in defense of Estonia, and also the defense service for the economic borders.

#### **New Estonian Immigration Quotas Detailed**

91UN0702A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 5 Jan 91  
Union Edition p 2

[Article by Leonid Levitskiy: "Do Not Hurry to Estonia"]

[Text] Tallinn—The Estonian Supreme Soviet has adopted a decree "On Estonian Republic Immigration Quotas for 1991." Its gist: This year the republic will

accept 2,290 persons who desire to settle in it permanently, which is several times less than have been arriving until now.

The quota is allocated by cities and uyezds, and evenly by quarters. Thus, Tallinn will be able to accept 504 new residents, Kohtla-Jarve—280, Narva—480, Parnu—57, and Tartu—76. The parliament made it incumbent on the authorities of these cities, with the exception of the capital, to ensure the predominance of departures over arrivals.

I emphasize: Strict limitations have been introduced for those desiring to obtain a permanent pass or, as it is stated in the documents, a permanent residence permit. The migration affairs department was allowed to issue temporary residence permits above the quota. They are assigned to those who came to Estonia by permission of its competent organs, to embassy personnel, and to political refugees. This procedure also applies to servicemen and members of their families. But local governmental organs must apply for temporary residence permits.

And there is one more exception. The migration affairs department is authorized to issue work permits to seasonal workers. But even temporary residence permits are not provided for them... If governmental organs exceed the quarterly quota, then 100,000 rubles will be confiscated from the local budget and transferred to the state budget for the acceptance of each additional person. In any case, the migration department reserves the right to increase the quota of the second half of the year by another 600 persons.

#### **Congress of Estonia Session Viewed**

91UN0402B Tallinn MOLODEZH ESTONII  
in Russian 30 Oct 90 p 1

[Article by M. Vladimirov under the rubric "Postscript": "On the Verge of a Split"]

[Text] "Assembled in this hall are representatives of the noncommunist majority of the Estonian people." Greeted by the dutiful applause of those present, these words of Enn Tarto were to have set the tone in which the topical debate was to have been conducted. It concerned the restoration of constitutional power in Estonia. Constitutional from the standpoints of the basic law of 1938, of course. Discussion of economic strategy and the principles of the reform of ownership. Also the elaboration and adoption of a decision on urgent measures under the crisis conditions. Further, concerning the "Kaytseliyt" and, yet further, an appeal to enslaved peoples. Still further, a political declaration.

It is superfluous, probably, to speak of the rivalry of the Congress of Estonia and the Supreme Soviet. The Congress does not recognize the Supreme Soviet as the legitimate organ of state power in Estonia, but has to come to terms with it to some extent if only because the Supreme Soviet was elected quite democratically, as far

as the "conditions of occupation" permit, and also because ultimately, not counting the delegates to the Congress from the ranks of overseas Estonians, both these bodies were in fact elected by the same people. True, also taking part in the Supreme Soviet elections were soldiers and officers of the "forces of occupation" stationed in the republic and that same notorious 40 percent of the present population whose legal status the Congress intends to determine as soon as an independent Republic of Estonia has been restored. In other words, restoration of the state overthrown in 1940 is the cause and concern of the most indigenous Estonians, and it is promised that the situation of those who "have settled here illegally in the last 50 years" will be investigated when Estonia and Estonians are free.

The Congress and the Supreme Soviet not only have a common electorate, but also many common deputies. From the Popular Front, in the main. Their participation in the Congress and its permanent elective body—the Estonia Committee—is seen by the Popular Front itself as an attempt to keep the extreme radical groupings (the Citizens' Committee, the PNNE [Estonian National Independence Party], the Society for the Protection of Monuments to Antiquity and the Christian Democratic Union) in the channel of the general strategy and tactics of the struggle for restoration of the republic's independence.

The session of the Congress showed that this will not be the easiest thing in the world. The avowedly mass-meeting mood of the "noncommunist majority of the Estonian people" reached its culminating point when the delegates embarked on discussion of the political declaration of the Congress. Inasmuch as the course of discussion of absolutely all matters had been politicized, the crisis of the Congress had by the time of discussion of the declaration been well prepared.

The bone of contention was the question of confidence in the government. Had it occurred to anyone to compile a frequency-of-use dictionary of the speeches at the Congress, the name of the premier would most likely have been in the first five together with "independence," "Estonia," "occupation".... More than enough was said in the two days about a lack of confidence in the government as being too red, having plunged Estonia into enslaving economic dependence on the East, and having failed altogether to justify one iota of the hopes entrusted to it. In short, the question of no confidence was ripe. It remained only to express it and demand dismissal of the cabinet. Or, if worst came to worst, Savisaar himself, at least. A certain absurdity of the situation in the fact of the Congress not recognizing either the government or the Supreme Soviet which appointed it seemingly did not trouble any of the delegates. Nor was any effect produced by the quite serious arguments of the speakers from the ranks of members of the Supreme Soviet who attempted to impress upon the hall the fact that the resignation of the government, were the Congress to demand and achieve this, would for a long time freeze all social and political processes in

Estonia. That the negotiations in Moscow would be broken off and that there would be complications in contacts with other republics. That economic reform in Estonia itself, whose course the delegates had only just discussed, would come to a halt. That finally the West would cease to view Estonia as a worthwhile future partner. Nor was any effect produced by even so comprehensible an argument to the "noncommunist majority," it might have seemed, as the fact that no confidence in the Savisaar government would be to the benefit of Moscow and the KGB. And there then remained a final move for the congressmen from the ranks of Supreme Soviet delegates and their supporters. One which had been employed against them repeatedly in the Supreme Soviet by representatives of the so-called "Russian Party". They were left with staging a protest walkout. Which they did. True, as distinct from the Russian members of parliament, they had calculated precisely that without them there would be no quorum. And the protest also was formulated quite subtly. It transpired that it was not a question of confidence or no confidence in the government, but merely of the fact that the agenda had been supplemented in connection with that same vote of confidence mid-session, contrary to standing orders.

The Congress was altogether faced with a dilemma: either to continue business in a freedom-loving minority or to abandon the supplementary item distinguishing the issue of confidence in the government as a separate point which had only just been put on the agenda. The fear of a split proved stronger. The Popular Front delegates returned to the hall, and the declaration was entrusted for additional work to a new Estonia Committee. The Congress was thus, by virtue of internal contradictions, unable to adopt a principal document—the political declaration. This spared it a conclusive split. But those who call the tune therein would have to have been forced to reflect on what politics actually is. Some great man said that it is the art of the possible. Is the Congress, which aspires to unite just under 1 million ethnic Estonians, prepared to be guided by this principle? Some doubts are evoked if only by the fact that the word combination "realistic politician" sounds in the mouths of many people like a term of abuse. After all, in spite of all its predisposition toward shock therapy methods, that same government is today trying to proceed from current realities, of which it is in fact being accused.

A heckling comment thrown out as an aside in the lobbies by one of the delegates is indicative: "We are behaving as if we were not a million but a billion." If it is considered that there was much said at the podium—heatedly and excitedly—about the need to save the nation, what was said in the smoking room was regret not only about the lack of unity, but also warning about the dangers toward which Estonians were being pushed by certain hotheads, including from the ranks of the leaders of the political groupings united in the Congress.

Now about the "notorious 40 percent." It is hard to fully comprehend and believe in the total sincerity of those



who, with the fervor of newly converted Catholics, are not tiring of idolizing the image of national independence and are thereby buying a personal indulgence for the remission before Estonians of the historical transgressions of the System. Many of those who have "settled illegally" here over the past 50 years are starting to come and have already come to an understanding of the fact that in prewar 1939 two superpowers treated Estonia and the whole of the Baltic in a predatory and gangster fashion. But the question then arises: to which part of the settlers from other regions of the Union now living in Estonia may blame be imputed for the events of 1939, 1940, 1941, 1949, and 1950? If we begin to sort through, will this not be the start of another campaign of a search for enemies, in the camp of victims on this occasion?

It is a long way from understanding to mutual understanding, and negotiating it is easier by moving toward one another. However banal this formula and however shiny from frequent use, even today the opposite sides are still not prepared for mutual concessions. As before, it is not so much the desire to be heard as the desire to express one's viewpoint which gains the ascendancy. This is characteristic of both the supporters of sovereignty within a renewed federation and the champions of exclusively national independence to an equal extent. I will give a typical example.

"Gentlemen officers, sergeants and soldiers of the Soviet Army...! The Estonian people have always considered the Soviet Army an army of occupation, only the majority has remained silent about it. In the sixth year of so-called 'perestroyka' it must be clear even to a simpleton that the Soviet Army was such here in 1940 and is such to this day....With sincere hopes for mutual understanding and wishes for freedom for all peoples, the PNNE Council of Representatives."

This quotation with assurances of "the sincere simpleton's mutual understanding" is taken from a PNNE appeal adopted at the end of September and distributed for some reason or other at the Congress among the delegates to which, as you might suspect, there were no "gentlemen officers of the Soviet Army" or soldiers and sergeants either, not counting reservists, of course. If it is allowed that the pain to the eyes and ears is a stylistic imperfection and nothing more, it remains merely to be regretted that the not entirely officially proper word crept into the text of a document laying claim to being an official appeal.

In conclusion, I would like to mention one further document distributed at the Congress. This was the results of a sociological survey conducted as of 1 October among the republic's Estonian population. Figures are adduced for Estonia as a whole and separately for the south and north of the republic and Tallinn and Tartu. Leading in popularity among the parties is the PNNE—from 19 percent in Tallinn to 27 percent in Tartu. The popularity index of the Communist Party of Estonia was 1.1-4 percent and of the CPSU, 0.5-1 percent. On a scale

of five those polled assessed the activity of the government in the 2.69-3.48 range, and of the Supreme Soviet, somewhat lower, the maximum points being 3.17. The Estonia Committee received the same number of points also.

Some 54 percent of those polled considered the confrontation of the Supreme Soviet and the Estonia Committee too intense and alarming. And half of the respondents, what is more, believes that both bodies are to blame for this. Some 22 percent are inclined to blame the Supreme Soviet for the tension which has arisen; 24 percent, the Estonia Committee.

To whom to accord the right to participate in the elections of the Republic of Estonia State Duma? Only citizens of the Republic of Estonia and their direct descendants—23 percent. All Estonians living in the republic, regardless of citizenship—22 percent. All inhabitants of Estonia, including non-Estonians, if they have by election day declared a desire to obtain citizenship—48 percent.

Learning of Estonians' attitude toward the action of the "Kaytseliyt" on Estonia's former state border is not without interest. The installation of the border posts is approved by 21 percent (in Tartu, 29; on Saaremaa, 8 percent) of those polled. Twenty-six percent disapprove more than they approve, and 20 percent disapprove.

The question of "Kaytseliyt" formations was, as is known, studied separately at the Congress. The role of armed forces in the future republic has been prepared for this militarized organization which is being revived. Problems of the material provision of the formations with all they need are particularly urgent even today, speakers emphasized in this connection. The question of the need to send future officers overseas for training and to allocate monies and premises locally was raised. Thus representatives of Tartu are demanding that the building currently occupied by the Agricultural Academy be returned to the "Kaytseliyt" as belonging to it. The more so in that the Lenin monument which had been "flaunted" in front of it has already been cleared away.

But the creation of the Congress and it itself are suffering from one and the same ailment. The "Kaytseliyt" is also today in a fever of contradictions, the cause of which are the ambitions of its leaders. And the attitude toward its actions is, as the poll results attest, far from unequivocal.

#### **Latvian Military Electoral Okrug Deputies' Terms Limited**

*91UN0687A Riga ATMODA in Russian No 52,  
10 Dec 90 p 7*

[Article by D.B.: "Military Personnel Will Not Be Deputies"]

[Text] On 16 November a decree entitled "On the Status of Deputies" was adopted at the Fifth Session of the Vidzemeskiy Suburb's Soviet of People's Deputies. It

states that the plenipotentiary powers of the deputies elected in the 22nd, 98th, 99th, and 100th okrugs [districts] shall be terminated prior to the expiration of their terms of office. These are the so-called "closed, army okrugs," or, as stated in the official documents, electoral okrugs formed from military-service personnel (!—D.B.). But, honestly speaking, this decision, which merits greater attention and recognition, is merely the first step which the local authorities have taken in order to eliminate the absurd situation whereby representatives of an occupation army have become deputies. No less important is the fact that the elections in the closed okrugs were conducted without any actual monitoring control, even though, of course, the results were predicted. The deputies adopted their decision based on the Declaration of 4 May, the Law of the Latvian SSR entitled "On Municipal Self-Government" (Art. 26, Par. 1), and the Law entitled "On Elections of Peoples Deputies to Local Soviets of the Latvian SSR" (Art. 15).

The document also includes a call by the deputies of the Vidzemeskiy Suburb upon the Latvian Republic's Supreme Soviet to adopt a decree declaring that the status of a deputy of the Latvian Republic shall not be commensurate with service in the USSR Armed Forces, the USSR KGB, the organs of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, nor with activity in the Latvian territorial organization of the CPSU. The following military personnel are those whose plenipotentiary powers as deputies shall be terminated prior to the expiration of their terms of office: O. Chernyshenko, G. Kosinov, V. Orlov, and A. Markovskiy.

### Party 2nd Secretary Assesses Latvia's Political Situation

91UN0332A Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian  
16 Nov 90 p 2

[Interview with V.F. Rymashevskiy, second secretary of the Latvian CP Central Committee, by A. Timkov, SELSKAYA ZHIZN correspondent: "Is There a Path To Agreement?"; date of interview not given.]

[Text] For many years, this person's life has been connected with Latvia. He is completely fluent in Latvian. He has been head of the republic's Gosagroprom, a position he obtained on a competitive basis. Today, he is a party worker. The second secretary of the Latvian CP Central Committee, V.F. RYMASHEVSKIY, answers our correspondent's questions.

[Correspondent] I must admit, Vladimir Frantsevich, that I had assumed that the worst times for the Communist Party were over. Having gone through a split, it preserved its structures in the cities and rayons. Despite the gloomy forecasts, not only are people not leaving it, they are joining it. Its voice is more powerful, and its influence in political life is growing. But the opposing forces, who have frequently stated their belief in pluralism of opinions and democratization of society, do not like such a turn of events. At the third congress of the

People's Front, having come to power, it was stated directly that the communist idea must be buried and the socialist system broken. This implacability could to some extent be explained by the electoral campaign. But now, when all the leading jobs have been filled by representatives of the People's Front, such a strategic position is perplexing, to put it mildly.

[Rymashevskiy] This is because the People's Front, its fraction in the Supreme Soviet, which comprises a majority, and even the republic's government are following a preset course. It was initially kept secret. Now, the cover has been thrown off. Its goal is completely clear: to eliminate the socialist order in the republic, to destroy everything that recalls Soviet power in Latvia. Monuments to V.I. Lenin and to the Soviet Army soldiers who liberated Latvia from the fascist invaders are being systematically dismantled; streets, squares and companies are being renamed. This also involves the decision adopted by the majority faction in the Supreme Soviet to do away with Soviet holidays: the anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution, Victory Day, and March 8, International Women's Day. In short, the deputies of the People's Front, having gained 35.2 percent of the votes in the elections, are directing the fates of the entire population of the republic. The Communist Party firmly believes that withdrawal from the USSR and other important questions must be resolved not within the walls of the parliament, but by a general vote.

In supporting the socialist path of development, one which ensures citizens' protection, the Communist Party of Latvia has become a very uncomfortable political force for the separatists. For we are telling the people the truth; for example, explaining that a return of lands to their former owners will be a tragedy for the present generation of peasants. Converting state enterprises to private ones promises nothing good for the working class. We believe they should be owned not by factory owners, but by labor collectives.

Since we have mentioned property, I cannot fail to mention the government's intention to take it away from the party. Increasingly active attempts are under way to turn our raykoms out of their offices, built with party funds. The new authorities are thinking of turning the Latvian publishing house of the CPSU Central Committee, which cost 25 million rubles, into a joint-stock company. In attempting to deprive the Communist Party of the capability of influencing the masses and exposing the unsavory actions of the parliament and the government, the authorities, under the pretext that it is connected with the party of another state (meaning the USSR), are trying to declare our party outside the law. Plans are also being spun to put the Communist Party on trial, which is given the insulting name of "Nuremburg-2".

Our political opponents are not at all pleased by the fact that in contrast to the primarily mononational People's Front, the Latvian Communist Party consists of over 30 percent Latvians. So it is very questionable who in fact

defends the interests of the entire population of Latvia: the People's Front or the Communist Party?

[Correspondent] There is an opinion that the new authorities, having encountered substantial problems in converting the economy, are performing a sort of diversionary tactic, demonstrating great activity in the ideological sphere.

[Rymashevskiy] I would put it more clearly: in taking power, the People's Front did not have a clear program of action. It lacks one to this day. That is why the economy, including that in the countryside, is in trouble. The disruption in traditional links with grain suppliers has meant a drop in livestock herds and a drop in their productivity. To this is added political instability. A clear answer has not yet been given on whether kolkhozes and sovkhoses will be retained or dissolved, as short-sighted politicians have proposed. So economic specialists and managers are confused. And there is little to be expected from the farmers, who need much time to seriously state their preferences.

I will not deny that the outlines of today's problems were evident much earlier. But possibilities to somehow soften them were missed during the period of the change in power. Here is an example. Knowing about the catastrophic shortage of fodder, public farms nonetheless reduced their sowing area for grain. The harvest did not increase substantially. The state granaries now have less grain than is needed to meet the public's demand for bread and oat products. The brewing industry is also short of raw materials.

The potato situation is no better; plantings have decreased. Few tubers have been stored for winter. They are of low quality due to poor weather during the harvest.

[Correspondent] The difficulties of life depress each of us, of course. But people are saying that they can get by if only things are calm, if an interethnic conflict does not break out.

[Rymashevskiy] I would not want to be an oracle inflaming further passions, but the atmosphere in the republic is rather complex. For a long time, society has been balanced on the edge of a razor blade. Unconcealed defamation of "non-native residents" of Latvia is under way, an attempt is being made to turn them into "second class" people without the right to vote.

The third congress of the People's Front came out on the side of the Movement for the National Independence of Latvia and the Committee of the Citizens of Latvia. According to their published opinions, citizenship would only be available to residents of prewar Latvia or their descendants. For the remainder there are provided a series of limitations, while military personnel, people with communist beliefs and KGB employees would be completely unable to claim republic citizenship status.

Earlier, only extremists used the slogan "Latvia for Latvians." Now, it is seriously supported by the People's Front. In this manner, a movement which declared itself to be democratic, a defender of human rights, has turned into a thoroughly national one, and is changing into a nationalist one. The rights of the Latvian nation are placed above those of other ethnic groups in Latvia. This cannot fail to concern the Communist Party, which gives priority to a person's rights regardless of his nationality, beliefs or religious affiliation. About 53 percent of Latvia's population are Latvians; the remainder are Russians, Belorussians, Ukrainians, Jews and members of other peoples. If Latvia is only for Latvians, what will these thousands of people do? This creates uncertainty about the future and serious fears about the future of their families.

Communists share the concerns of the Latvian people for the status and development of their culture, traditions and language. The Communist Party is seeking to support a national renaissance. But we are categorically opposed to a degeneration of national into nationalistic. The interests of one nation must not be defended at the expense of another. Having come to the republic at different times and for different reasons, people rebuilt (at the request of the government of Latvia!) the plants and factories destroyed during the war; they built housing, theaters, schools. Many were assigned here by republic agencies after finishing higher education and technical schools. They include many who have lived here for 30-40 years, who have raised their children and grandchildren here and have spiritually grown to be part of the Latvian land and the Latvian people. It is to their direct credit that industrial production in today's Latvia is over 40 times higher than the prewar level.

Together with the Latvian people, the non-native peoples made their contribution to creating the nation's wealth. If they depart, as those fighting for national purity wish, they are justifiably entitled to corresponding material compensation, so that they do not have to start with nothing at their new home. But I stress that each person must decide voluntarily; otherwise, there can be no talk of a legal, democratic state.

I do not see any sense in the growing anti-Russian feelings. It is hard to foresee the consequences if, let us say, the calls to leave Latvia are answered by the Russian-speaking workers of Riga's meat and dairy firms, comprising 70-80 percent of these collectives' total workforce.

Construction organizations are already experiencing serious difficulties. According to Communist Party data, in Riga alone there is a shortage of 4000 construction workers. Some of them left the republic because they could not accept the status of "migrants," "occupiers," or by the latest definition, "colonists," who supposedly seized Latvia and created intolerable living conditions for the native population. The situation in the construction sector can only be defined as critical. The housing plan and other important projects have been disrupted.



There is also no end in sight to work on city purification facilities, which will determine the fate of the Riga bay and its unique recreation area.

The communists of Latvia cannot close their eyes to the fact that with the entry into force of the law on languages people will be divided into three categories depending on their degree of mastery of Latvian. What could be the result of this? A good doctor, for example, who does not fully command the state language, can end up without work because of the absurd idea of the law's authors.

The Communist Party, like the majority of the non-native population, understands perfectly the need for a knowledge of Latvian. But it takes time to master it, and the conditions must be created for it. These are clearly inadequate at present. There are not enough textbooks, dictionaries, teaching materials. Essentially, this has all been given over to cooperatives, most of whom, judging from the numerous complaints, provide only the rudiments of knowledge for a substantial fee.

[Correspondent] Vladimir Frantsevich, the Communist Party of Latvia has serious disagreements with the People's Front. But what are the communists' constructive proposals for overcoming the critical phenomena in the economy and in interethnic relations?

[Rymashevskiy] Above all, in supporting the sovereignty of Latvia the Communist Party sees the republic as an independent state in the Union of the SSR. In contrast to the separatist efforts of the People's Front, we believe Latvia should not break with the Union, that it should receive certain guarantees for its development and preserve existing links for supplying raw materials and selling products. The desire to cut off our neighbors, as is now occurring, is an additional burden on the state budget. Just the creation of 10 customs stations on the borders with Russia and Belorussia costs over half a million rubles.

As to the economy, the Communist Party is not at all opposed to privatization. It is possible in small-scale trade and household service firms. Large factories and plants must be owned by labor collectives, not by former owners returned from abroad.

In agriculture, communists accept the presence of various forms of management, while believing that land must not be bought and sold, but owned by the peasants working on it. We do not support the loud attacks on the kolkhozes and sovkhoses. Granted, thus far they have not been able to fully feed the people. But their dissolution will result in a greater aggravation of the food problem. We are thus proposing a fundamental change in the form of ownership in collective farms. They should be converted into shareholder farms, where each worker receives his share of profit depending on the final result.

The Communist Party is also not opposed to the formation of farms. But at the same time we are explaining to people that this process must not be artificially forced.

Let the people in the country make their own choice as to where it is better for them to work: in a kolkhoz, a sovkhos or on their own piece of land. It is important that they have identical economic conditions. Honest competition will reveal who is more promising: the private farmer or a collective farm.

[Correspondent] Thank you for this conversation.

### Latvia's Deputies, Journalists Debate Citizenship Law

91UN0646A Riga SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH  
in Russian 11 Dec 90 pp 4-5

[Article by Yevgeniy Orlov: "Citizenship Under a Damoclean Sword"]

[Text] Who is Right?

*Life is becoming increasingly precious. The President of the USSR is defending his honor and dignity. In the stores the shelves are bare. There is increasing danger of war with Iraq. Once again there are floods in the States. Young Katya lifts her skirts with her palm. A Japanese was launched into space. Everything goes on, and everything is changing...*

*The recent "round-table" meeting, when deputies and journalists met once again at the press center of the Latvian Republic Supreme Soviet, might have gone unnoticed against the background of such grandiose events. Quite a number of meetings such as this had already been held, but this time the topic chosen for discussion was truly of exceptional importance: What sort of law should there be for citizenship in the Latvian Republic? One way or another, today we are all walking under the Damoclean sword of the forthcoming law. And depending upon what kind of law it will be, and what its point of departure for building a new democratic Latvia will be—whether 1940 (for which the "moderates" are striving); or whether a sensible compromise will be found. Truly a great deal depends upon this. Not only the fate of the republic, but also the fate of every person "taken individually"—which, in my personal view, is what must be the highest criterion for us in evaluating the forthcoming Law—the individual.*

*I maintain that to this day the least of all has been done for the individual himself in this country. Alas, for us it is not the first time that the flower of human potential has been suspended by a thread.*

*The people who took part in the meeting are well-known in the republic: Boyars, Zhdanok, Zaletayev, Dozortsyev, Geydans, and Shteyns. The tone, naturally, was set by Yuris Boyars, who has been studying the Law on Citizenship for many years. He began to read a number of the basic provisions of the draft which he had drawn up (I believe that SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH is preparing separate materials with Professor Boyars), after which the rest of the deputies received the opportunity to express their own opinions.*

*I offer the reader the opportunity to independently familiarize himself with the interpretations offered at this meeting...*

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[Zhdanok] Unfortunately, I worked on the Supreme Soviet group drafting this law only at the first stage. Now only one faction of the Latvian People's Front [NFL] is working on it. But our group drew up its own version of the draft law; it was published in the newspapers SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA and CINA. The so-called "zero-based version" is the basis of our conception. But we also tried to eliminate the so-called "dual citizenship" variant, and envisaged a transitional period which begins at the moment the people of Latvia approve by referendum the existence of Latvia as an independent state in fact. At that time we must reach agreement with the other 14 republics on the union to be formed then. By that time there should be laws on citizenship in all these states. For then the people will be able to freely choose, knowing what sort of rights they will have, and what their obligations to the state will be. They will be able to freely choose Latvian citizenship, or Russian, or Ukrainian, or a new Union.

We propose a transition period of two years for this. And during the course of these two years the people will enjoy all the rights of citizenship.

That is our conception.

If Latvia signs a union agreement, citizenship in the republic and citizenship in the federation will not be considered dual citizenship.

I would like to stress once again that questions raised recently, demographic questions, and questions of the survival of the Latvian nation, are not connected with the citizenship question. The concept of citizenship exists primarily in order that the state may protect a person, in order that the state have obligations to a person. In accordance with international law, no one may take away these rights, that is, revoke one's citizenship.

[Boyers] I would like to dwell on a common approach to these questions which exist in the world.

Thus, on the difference between the rights of permanent residents and citizens. Non-citizens, or "permanent residents," are ordinarily not offered the right to take part in parliamentary elections.

What other limitations are there ordinarily? There are limitations of civil rights connected with whether or not a given person is a citizen. In such a democratic state as England there are certain professions and kinds of activity in which non-citizens may not engage. For example, they are not allowed to open notarial or legal firms; and in Scandinavian countries, non-citizens are not allowed to form their own joint-stock companies. But we cannot adopt any of this in pure form. We must deal with our own unique circumstances. We must also

deal with the fact that we cannot say to people of Russian nationality, "No, we will not give you anything." That we cannot do. Nowhere in the world do people behave like that.

We must also deal with the fact that we cannot say that we intend to place limitations on one person but not on another, while we do not know what the citizens of the republic think—both the permanent, and the non-permanent citizens. It is clear to us (and the other faction does not dispute this), that a passport of a citizen of the Latvian Republic must be issued to persons who were citizens prior to 1940. We must discuss how to deal with the remainder. We have decided that at the first stage we shall conduct a survey of all citizens of the republic, and determine which of them desires to be a citizen of the Latvian Republic, and which desire only to be permanent residents. And I would not reproach a person for the fact that he desires to be a citizen of the Russian Republic and live in Latvia permanently. We shall carry out this work during the first half of 1991. And then the entire picture will become more clear.

The other faction's approach is that something must be given to some people, that there are certain rights of man, which make it mandatory to award citizenship to everyone. But this does not happen in one single state! The right to direct citizenship in a specific state does not exist in the laws of one single country. And that includes the Soviet Union. There is only the right to citizenship in principle. And there is also the absolute right of citizenship for children.

I would also like to say that I do not have Latvian SSR citizenship; nor does Mr. Geydans; nor does Mr. Dozortsev. Not one of us even has a passport of a citizen of the Latvian SSR. We do not even have a stamp in our passport, that we are citizens of the Latvian SSR. And that means, resolving the question of Latvian SSR citizenship is not necessary.

We must also deal with the fact that about one million Russian-speaking people live in our republic; people, whose legal status we must clarify, and whose desires we must obviously consider.

[Dozortsyev] As you know, I have parted with the group drawing up the draft law, and have lost contact with them. I think that the basic reason for our difference is that, before they began drawing up the documents themselves, and before editing them, the group should have come to agreement on the principles for awarding citizenship, for granting citizenship, and on the people's right to citizenship. And now it has turned out that there are supposedly already certain documents (which probably one would not object to on the whole, since everyone understands that there must be some kind of difference between a citizen and a permanent resident); however, no one understands who will be a citizen of the Latvian Republic and who a permanent resident. It seemed to me that we cannot publish these draft laws or even discuss them until every citizen of the republic

finds his own niche and grasps what in principle lies at the basis of all this, and who he is, and which side of the line of citizenship he is on. Just imagine if everyone decides that he is, let's say, a permanent resident and not a citizen, or the other way around, and we are already publishing or discussing the details of his situation... This, you see, can cause complications.

Second: It seemed to me that this package of laws, all of its documents, ought to retain this double situation; it must be clear to everyone, THAT these laws contain a regulator for the future (that is, after adoption of these documents), and which regulators pertain to this dramatic moment in which we live now. I think that the regulators for the future, both qualifications, and quotas, and any other conditions, can be as strict as we like (This will not trouble anyone, whatever side he is on; for a person choosing a place to live, Latvia, for example, will know that such a system exists there in Latvia, and he will take this into consideration, along with taxation); but other regulators must also coincide with the existing situation, with the complex, tragic situation in which we all find ourselves. These regulators should not be like those which are being created for the future. I do not see such an essential duality in these laws. Once again: if we are able to draw up a single criterion for the future (as a legal norm), and another for this tragic present time (as a human norm), then I believe that this package of laws will not cause any conflict with anyone. And then we will be able to talk about all sorts of individual situations; for example, a permanent resident or a citizen.

Incidentally, you can imagine the effect on people who still do not know on which side they will be, of an entry, such as that which was made in one of the intermediate versions of the draft law: that citizens have the right to permanently possess weapons, but that permanent residents do not? Or, let's say to regulate the nature of strike movements... Now, I am not saying that even such simple and understandable documents—which, one would think, would not give rise to disagreement among anyone, such as, for example, the draft law on the restoration of the institution of citizenship of the first republic—were also ideally settled. Of course this institution must be restored: citizenship must be restored to 1,600,000 people; to those who lived here prior to 1940, and to their descendants. But after all, one must also give some thought to whether this instrument will work, or whether it will serve a purely declarative function. If one were to explain, for example, to this 1,600,000 people that in case citizenship in the republic is restored to them and at the same time they lose their citizenship in the Union, they will acquire a mass of problems, such as: crossing the state border, or taking trips (Many residents of Latvia have a lot of business in other republics of the Union, and a lot of hereditary and property ties); and so, I do not know whether or not they would like to lose their second citizenship for purely business considerations, no matter what kind of patriots they are. It turns out that this instrument too, which, it seemed, no one could object to, will also wind up as purely declarative, and will not work.

All these are conceptual things which have not yet been resolved...

[Zaletayev] First of all I would like to note the fact that our working group, which was created by the Supreme Soviet, is going through an obvious crisis. I see the basis of the crisis in the fact that the position of the People's Front has undergone a significant transformation, if only from the time that such prominent NFL leaders as Ivar Godmanis and Daynis Ivans spoke out in favor of the zero-base variant for resolving the problem of citizenship... It was as a direct consequence of this that our working group was forced to halt its work, and a separate group was established for working out the conception of citizenship, worked within the bounds of a faction of the People's Front. The last step in this, in my view, worsening situation was the appearance of Maris Grinblat on television (This position was formulated in his article in ATMODA), according to which a new interpretation of "permanent resident of Latvia" appeared. An altogether paradoxical situation appeared, according to which only those who had legally come to Latvia prior to 17 June 1940, but had not been granted citizenship in the Latvian Republic by that time, can be considered permanent residents of the Latvian Republic. Consequently, no matter how paradoxical and contrary to all common sense such a position appeared to be, we see that it is becoming stronger as time passes; and this is cause for alarm and a feeling of uncertainty. Here I can agree with Vladlen Dozortsyev. But our alarm is undoubtedly much greater. It concerns the very subdivision of people into citizens and permanent residents. The status of a permanent resident, even if it is not decided "according to Grinblat," causes sharp objections, because it provides no guarantees at all. They assure us: You need not be afraid, permanent residents will not have any limitations at all in the right of property, they say, and there will be no other encroachments. This is highly doubtful. I would like to remind you that the question of citizenship sprang up suddenly, specifically during the discussion on state enterprises, when an amendment was proposed that the chief of a state enterprise in Latvia may only be a citizen of Latvia. Thus, such amendments will probably arise in the future as well.

[Geydans] There are two conceptions. One proceeds from the fact that on 4 May 1990 we restored the Latvian Republic that our fathers had created, the Latvian Republic that still exists in international law; and, that we have restored citizenship in our Latvian Republic, which also still exists in international law.

According to another conception the colonization is, in principle, finished; and that means, everything must be made legal and official: create a new Latvian Republic, and then everyone here would be a citizen of the Latvian Republic. I would like to state our credo in brief as well. It was clearly stated at the Latvian National Independence Movement [DNML] conference that only those who had received citizenship prior to 17 June 1940, and their descendants, are citizens of the Latvian Republic.

Only a freely-elected Sejm could grant citizenship to the rest. All citizens of the USSR, who arrived in the Latvian Republic after the occupation—after 17 June 1940—came here illegally, taking advantage of the fact that the state organs of the Latvian Republic were incapacitated. And therefore neither living on Latvian Republic territory for many years, nor any other premise gives anyone the right to receive Latvian Republic citizenship.

What did the Citizens' Congress say? It recognized only the law on citizenship of 23 August 1919. And that means, this law is the sole legislative act in the question of citizenship. And therefore, changes to the law on citizenship are possible only after the restoration of the activity of the Sejm.

What did our largest social organization—the NFL—say? At the third congress it was emphasized that the decree of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium of 7 September 1940, on awarding USSR citizenship to all citizens of the Latvian Republic, should be deemed invalid, for it is in conflict with international norms. And that means that all those who were citizens at the moment of the occupation, and their direct descendants, are citizens of the Latvian Republic. That also means that we must restore this institution of citizenship. We must establish who are the legal citizens today, and who the others living on the territory of the republic are. We must find out which of them supports the restoration of our independent Latvia, and who wants to go along with us and be our allies and fellow citizens. At that same Third NFL Congress it was stated that permanent residents must possess all the political freedoms; social, economic and other rights; and must also carry out all their responsibilities to our state, inasmuch as they are living here. A long-term program must be worked out, in accordance with which it would be possible to regulate the legal status of all citizens who were living in Latvia on 4 May 1990. But adopting a Law on Citizenship and granting citizenship can be done only after free elections to the Sejm.

It is natural that the "Equal Rights" faction has its own draft law, and its own conception. After all, we are approaching the same question from different points of view: we, from the viewpoint of restoring the Latvian Republic, and the "Equal Rights" faction from the viewpoint of creating a new state.

[Shteyns] Latvia is nevertheless an annexed state and its legal capacity has not been restored. And until this capacity is restored, I consider all talk about introducing the institution of citizenship impossible. As a result of the annexation, citizens of a foreign country, citizens of the USSR, poured into Latvia. And in view of this I cannot agree with such a division as citizens and permanent residents. I believe that in Latvia there are citizens of the Latvian Republic and citizens of the USSR. And one may talk about returning legal capacity to the citizens of Latvia, in order that they might act like citizens on the territory of their own state. The second question concerns the citizens of the USSR. This is not

only Latvia's affair, this is an international matter. They are citizens of another state. And I think that the question of citizenship could be one of the questions for negotiation with the USSR, the Ukraine and Belorussia.

[Boyars] There are two very important questions. The first is—privatization. We can act in the manner which various political forces in the country advise: to completely open the doors to the republic. In this case they would completely buy us out. There are people who possess the capital. And most likely the majority of them would not be citizens of Latvia; they would not even be its permanent residents. And therefore we must be especially careful, in order that we do not wind up living in our motherland as if it were the house of a stranger. The second aspect is that I cannot agree with Shteyns, that the second group are citizens of the USSR. If we actually begin real privatization, then if we are lucky, many businessmen will appear, who, of course will not be citizens of Latvia. In the best case they will be permanent residents of Latvia or citizens of foreign countries who are here temporarily...

[Zaletayev] I would add a few words on the fact that the law on citizenship in the Latvian SSR did not work. In this connection there appears a contingent of people whose rights seem to have been encroached upon. And I do not understand why people who arrived here after the war and did not receive the opportunity to officially register their citizenship are considered the guilty parties rather than victims of the fact that this law did not work.

[Dozortsyev] I am in complete agreement with Mr. Zaletayev, that this is a very important feature. But it turns out that we have to dismantle that which the Soviet Union has done. Both here and on the territory of the great Soviet Union the administrative-bureaucratic system has caused so many disasters, that it would not be easy for the entire Soviet people to dismantle it. Apparently, however, we shall have to resolve these questions one way or another. And once neither you nor I receive Latvian SSR citizenship, we will have to make citizenship in the Latvian Republic our point of reference.

[Zaletayev] We must take as our point of reference the 18th of March, and the elections in which we all took part. Both you, and I, and many other citizens. And these were the elections which formed the Supreme Soviet, which today adopts and decides all questions. On the whole I cannot understand from a logical point of view, how we can deny the right to vote to those who elected us.

Answering one of the questions from the journalists: "How many people are there today who have the legal right to receive Latvian citizenship?"

[Boyars] Very roughly and in very round numbers, from 1,300,000 to 1,600,000. Of these, 1,300,000 are Latvians, but once again I say that we do not have the exact information.

I propose conducting an exact popular census during the restoration of the operation of the institution of citizenship, a scientific census in accordance with all the economic indicators—so that we can know how to build our republic further. The fact of the matter is that right now, when we must adopt economic laws as well, we are constantly asked, “And how many people does this category include?” And we do not have precise data. Therefore, I believe it would be very useful to conduct a survey of the populace and determine who is who, who wants what, and what is his economic situation. Therefore, our scholars, demographers and economists will have to work out a very clear-cut questionnaire, which can very quickly be processed on a computer—so that we can have accurate information about the true situation in the republic. Without this we will not be able to work intelligently and competently, as the parliament is supposed to do...

\* \* \*

I suppose that upon reading through this discussion, the readers of the newspaper will have a lot of questions—clarity, as we see, has not increased. No doubt conflicting views on what the Law on Citizenship should be will appear in subsequent issues of SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH as well. It is interesting, that one can find a certain logic and common sense in any of its conceptions.

I became personally interested in certain figures which Vladlen Dozortsyev offered after the meeting; such as: it turns out that during the past five years, 66,000 people have come to Latvia for permanent residence; 123,000 in all over the past ten years. Thus there is the possibility of resolving the problem by compromise. After all, even establishing a ten-year residence qualification period would involve in all 123,000 people, and not a million...

However, even a compromise version accepting a ten-year residence qualification, even antedated, offers me little encouragement. Do any of us really have the right (even all together) to turn back the wheel of history ten revolutions?

Questions, doubts, inflexibility among some people, and the search for common sense among others... All this accompanies the work on the new draft law. And for now it still hangs over us like a damoclean sword. But this time we hope that the heads win, and not the sword.

#### KGB Deputy Views Lithuania-USSR Talks

91UN0208A Vilnius EKHO LITVY in Russian  
10 Oct 90 p 5

[Reprint of interview with KGB Colonel General F.D. Bobkov, first deputy chairman of the USSR KGB, by R. Grineviciute, first published in RESPUBLIKA; place and date not given; from the “Digest: The Lithuanian Press” column by T. Zavariskis]

[Text] “On the Other Side of the Barricades”—this is the title of an interview with KGB Colonel General Filipp Denisovich Bobkov, first deputy chairman of the USSR

KGB, by Ruta Grineviciute. It was published on 5 October in the newspaper RESPUBLIKA.

[Grineviciute] You are a member of the delegation for negotiations with the Republic of Lithuania. What is your view of the course and results of the first consultations with the state delegation of the Republic of Lithuania which took place Tuesday (2 October—Editor)?

[Bobkov] We, the USSR delegation, had been awaiting this meeting for a long time. Its beginning was dragged out a bit, but we believe that it was good that we met. First of all, the basis for the consultations was revealed—this was an Ukase of the president of the USSR, a ruling of the Third Congress of People’s Deputies, and a ruling of the Supreme Council of the Lithuanian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic]. The consultations took place with sufficient goodwill—sometimes they were heated, and sometimes they were quite normal. In my opinion both sides understood that this effort is taking place against the background of discussions of a Union treaty. I do not mean to say that we worked in this direction; I only know that this was kept in mind at all times. As for results, I believe that this was a step forward. No one even thought to behave in a manner that would create the possibility of slamming the door shut. In this sense the conversation was very interesting and useful. I acquainted myself with your delegation, and I got the impression that it was possible to talk constructively with each of these people. Of course we have different positions, but understanding is possible even when there are different positions.

[Grineviciute] At the consultations you did not express a desire to discuss the problems connected with the existence of your department in the Republic of Lithuania, even though these problems are vital for you as well as for us. Were they perhaps brought up that same day at a separate meeting you had with the general director of the state security department of the Republic of Lithuania?

[Bobkov] We did not bring up this issue at the consultations, and it is not clear whether the problems of the KGB are within the purview of the groups of experts. I told M. Laurinkus that we were wrong, having begun to negotiate separately, not to have waited for the groups of experts. Vice Premiers V. Doguzhiyev and R. Ozolas will nominate them. But I understand that the problem is important and that it must be dealt with.

[Grineviciute] What is your opinion of the fact that people are leaving the KGB department in Lithuania to work at the Lithuanian department of state security?

[Bobkov] I view this as an inevitable process. But at the same time I think that those workers who are leaving today are in too much of a hurry. They could be useful to the Committee today as well.



[Grineviciute] Let us suppose that a critical situation occurred which could harm state security as you understand it. Does the KGB use the information that has been collected on the current political leaders as a weapon?

[Bobkov] First I wish to clarify that we do not have all of the leaders under surveillance; otherwise the impression might be created in your republic that we are watching everyone all the time. The truth is very much the opposite.... We never permit ourselves to act dishonorably and publish information which would make a person feel uncomfortable. We understand what kind of delicate information we have at our disposal. Once I had the opportunity to have a discussion with people who were prompting us to open our archives. I took the opportunity to say that we will of course open the archives, but many of those who are presently impatient to publish the contents of the archives may not be very pleased with the results.

[Grineviciute] A portion of the archives of the KGB department in Lithuania were taken out of Lithuania.

[Bobkov] That is not true. The archives in the country are being moved, but it is impossible to say that we have taken the archives from Lithuania in order to hide something.

[Grineviciute] As before, the KGB is taking quite an active part in political life. Many of the republics which have not yet seceded from the USSR have decided to depoliticize their KGB departments. Have their functions been reduced?

[Bobkov] I believe that there will never be an organ, and this pertains not only to state security, that will not participate in the political process. Each organization that is connected with politics will be forced to be involved. A reduction of functions may take place, but depoliticization is illogical. For example, I am a politicized man, and a religious man is also politicized. Politics is ideology. There is another phrase—eliminating party affiliations [departizatsiya]. This problem cannot be avoided. The most important thing is for people not to change their convictions and to fight for them.

[Grineviciute] The KGB also makes predictions. You are probably also trying to predict the processes taking place in the Baltic republics.

[Bobkov] I could talk about this subject, but understand my position. It would be primarily a prediction of the KGB, and it could be viewed several ways; in addition, I am a member of the delegation for negotiations. As a result, I will refrain from predictions. Despite that, I will acknowledge that it would be very painful for me to see Lithuania leave the USSR.

[Grineviciute] You have opened a portion of the archives and are helping to rehabilitate people who were persecuted and illegally convicted during the time of

Stalin. Will the KGB also take part in the revelation of one more crime—the annexation of the independent Lithuanian state?

[Bobkov] Annexation? Occupation? In my opinion, neither occupation nor annexation took place. There are disinterested sources that are proof of this. What is your opinion of the testimony of Ventslova?

[Grineviciute] As a source of information—no good.

[Bobkov] The process of Lithuania's entry to the USSR must not be viewed as annexation! Even though there were difficulties and undesirable consequences.

### USSR: Lithuania-USSR Talks Difficulties Viewed

91UN0357A Vilnius EKHO LITVY in Russian  
30 Oct 90 p 1

[ELTA special correspondent A. Mankevicius report: "Joint Working Group Session"]

[Text] ELTA special correspondent A. Mankevicius reports from Moscow:

On 29 October, at 1100 Moscow time, a joint working group session began on preparation of a protocol for the start of bilateral negotiations between the Lithuanian Republic and the USSR. The session was chaired by Lithuanian Deputy Prime Minister Romualdas Ozolas and USSR Council of Ministers Deputy Chairman Vitaliy Doguzhiyev. Also representing Lithuania at the session were Bronislovas Kuzmickas, deputy chairman of the republic Supreme Council, Egidijus Bickauskas, permanent representative in Moscow, Supreme Council Deputies Aleksandras Abisala and Aloyzas Sakalas, Justice Minister Pranas Kuris, and Minister of Foreign Affairs Algirdas Saugardas.

Our special correspondent spoke with Bronislovas Kuzmickas and Romualdas Ozolas prior to their departure for the Kremlin regarding the problems that will have to be resolved there, regarding which of them will prove most difficult for reaching agreement. R. Ozolas emphasized that this meeting is intended basically to consult on the possibilities for protocols and terms on which we might proceed to negotiations.

We cannot reach agreement on a reason for negotiations, on a preamble for negotiations, on why or about what we must come to agreement, B. Kuzmickas added.

"It is not entirely clear to me," Kuzmickas noted, "whether the lack of desire to reach agreement is just a facade, taking into account the social status of a part of the Soviet Union—if it is some kind of diplomacy, understanding that history cannot be turned back and that Lithuania and other Union republics will leave the Soviet Union. Or is it a serious desire all the same to bring us back into the Union?"

"Just like on the well-known television program—obvious, but hard to believe," Romualdas Ozolas added.

"And so they are always attempting to return and clarify "disagreements," thereby avoiding an approach to bilateral negotiations."

"But are there issues whose resolution we can approach nonetheless?"

"The general question we can approach is that of independence. If they want to do something without recognizing that we are independent, we allow ourselves not to address this and they are allowed not to acknowledge it. And then it is possible to analyze and resolve specific problems. There is agreement that our independence can be converted into a set of clearly defined, practical issues, but there is no agreement as to how to begin studying the set of practical issues, if there is no goal towards which all these studies should lead."

Kuzmickas noted the impossibility of reaching agreement as to what framework the practical decisions of negotiations can be discussed in. When it is said, for example, that the Law on Soviet Military Obligation is not in effect in Lithuania, the matter advances no further. When you begin to talk in greater detail and get into more of the specifics—perhaps it is not necessary to rush into shouting, and instead propose an alternative, etc.—the conversation goes well.

"Is the proposed date of negotiations a realistic one?"

"We are hopeful," Ozolas replied. "There is still time prior to the date which should mark the beginning of negotiations. I think work will proceed within groups of experts before that time. And an intense effort will be underway parallel to this so that over these remaining 20 days we will be able to get the protocol caught up with the groups of experts. But if we are unable to sign a protocol concerning the start of negotiations as envisaged at our delegation meeting, then negotiations will not begin on the scheduled date."

Today the joint working group session lasted until 1800. Returning from the Kremlin, Deputy Chairman of the Lithuanian Republic Romualdas Ozolas stated that the work will go on. The Lithuanian representatives flew back this evening from Moscow to Vilnius.

### **Lithuania's Polish Autonomy Issues Viewed**

91UN0200G Vilnius EKHO LITVY in Russian  
2 Oct 90 p 3

[Unattributed article: "East Lithuania"]

[Text] Recently there have been assertions in the press, and not only in the press, to the effect that those in the state commission to review the problems of East Lithuania do not have anything against the possibility of supporting the idea of an autonomous formation of Lithuanian Poles. The chairman of the state commission, Deputy Prime Minister of the Lithuanian Republic Romualdas Ozolas, stated with regard to that question:

"The commission never expressed any approval of such a recommendation. As its chairman, I do not support the idea of making parts of the territory of Lithuania autonomous, at least at the present time, or those that are being proposed. However, the commission intends to present a series of guarantees that ensure the observance of the interests of Lithuanian Poles and the representatives of other nationalities in the republic: this is the extension of the period of time for assimilating the state language; the confirmation of the rights of the Polish and other local languages in East Lithuania; the determination of the opportunities for education, including the obtaining of higher education; the use of graphic means of incentive in social and economic life, etc. Affairs and conditions in this direction are planned both for the immediate future and for the rather distant future.

"With the existence of a new approach by the official institutions of the Lithuanian Republic and to the needs of the residents of East Lithuania, a tendency that is worthy of regret is the tendency to send the resolution of the problems existing in this region down the channel of formal self-partitioning and autonomization; this is nothing else but an attempt to separate East Lithuania from expanding prospects.

"The largest amount of work that has been done on the path of resolving the problems of this region is the ascertaining of the real-life situation. At the present time there is manifesting itself the opportunity to resolve everything with a knowledge of the matter at hand, rather than by guesswork. The state commission to review the problems of East Lithuania feels that the work of studying the problems of the region and of determining measures to resolve them must be continued. The search for decisions should be expanded to the self-governments; the government should maintain with them constant timely communication that makes it possible to enact well-balanced resolutions. It is always possible to come to agreement if one seeks a path to it.

"Further attempts to carry out the autonomization of East Lithuania are being undertaken not only with an ascertainment of the content or meaning of that step, or its benefit or harm for the Poles or the local inhabitants of Lithuania of other nationalities, but also at a time when that step cannot be interpreted in any way other than the support of the USSR leadership in the forthcoming negotiations. The Lithuanian Republic will never agree to the violation of the integrity of its territory. The USSR leadership currently needs the conflict in this region as much as it needs air. We hope that the Lithuanian Poles will not allow themselves to be provoked, and will not become the stumbling block on the path of the independence of Lithuania. Any discord at the present time would be detrimental both for the Lithuanians and for the Poles. For the latter, the discord, incidentally, would also be linked with psychological prestige. We all should think especially seriously about this.



"I recommend not making any hurried decisions, but, rather, proceeding along the path of searching for general principles. At the present time there are more prerequisites for harmonious life than have ever existed. There are no insurmountable obstacles if only an attempt is made to overcome them."

### Lithuanian Government on Polish Issue

91UN0221A Vilnius EKHO LITVY in Russian  
5 Oct 90 p 1

["Statement of the Supreme Soviet Presidium and Government of the Lithuanian Republic"—EKHO LITVY headline]

[Text] Consultations are beginning between official delegations of the USSR and the Lithuanian Republic regarding the beginning of negotiations on the question of Lithuanian independence. Vitally important issues related to ensuring the existence of the Lithuanian state and problems of its historical perspective will be resolved during the course of the consultations and negotiations.

The results of the first consultative conference of state delegations of the Lithuanian Republic and the USSR held on 2 October 1990 in Moscow make it possible to draw the conclusion that relations between the sides have entered a new stage. This inspires hope that in the near future the independent Lithuanian Republic will again be politically independent and friendly to the Soviet Union. But not everyone is happy with this. People who are hostile to the Lithuanian Republic and individual groupings of them are trying to violate the unity of the people of Lithuania by saying that the rules of national minorities are being violated in the Lithuanian Republic and that for their protection it is necessary to create a Polish autonomous oblast on the territory of the Lithuanian Republic.

The question of the formation of a Polish autonomous oblast in the Lithuanian Republic is becoming more and more critical because of the undisguised policy of escalation of national-territorial conflicts that is being implemented by conservative forces in the Soviet Union. Attempts are being made to take advantage of the crimes of the Stalinist policy and the offenses and economic difficulties left over from the period of displacement of national consciousness brought about by discriminatory psychological principles; discord between Lithuanians and the national minorities of Lithuania is being fanned. The new leadership of Lithuania, although constrained by the conditions of the economic blockade and the ineffectiveness of the economy inherited from the command system, has repeatedly stated openly that it is conducting and will conduct a policy of respect for the rights of Poles and other national communities, and that it is ready to develop cultural autonomy and implement reforms which will contribute to the strengthening of guarantees of the self-expression of the national communities of Lithuania. To this end, a state commission is

working actively to study the problems of eastern Lithuania and has prepared conclusions that will be the basis for the long-term program of economic and social development of eastern Lithuania. Moreover, a draft law on cultural autonomy of nationalities is being developed and representatives of the Polish, Russian, Belorussian, and other national communities are being enlisted in this work.

Not supporting the efforts of the Supreme Soviet and government of the Lithuanian Republic directed toward a positive and immediate solution to problems of national communities, conservative groups of the Soviet Union and above all the CPSU are especially stirring up the question of the proclamation of a "Polish territorial unit." Inflammatory statements in the Polish press about some alleged persecution of Poles in the Lithuanian Republic—and this at a time when 34 new Polish classes and 66 Polish groups in kindergartens have been introduced in the last two years in Lithuania, we have begun to broadcast Warsaw television, and several new Polish periodicals are being published—is completely at odds with the facts. The Supreme Soviet Presidium and the government of the Lithuanian Republic cannot understand why the need for a "national territorial" formation, ignoring the interests of other national communities living on these territories, is declared to be the only precondition for preserving the national identity of the Poles and eliminating the threat of their assimilation. In Shalchininskiy and part of Vilnyusskiy Rayons they are calling for disobedience of the laws of Lithuania and preservation of the structures of the "Soviet system," opposition to the political independence of the Lithuanian Republic, and rescue from the chaos in the USSR.

The disinformation being spread in our country as well as in our neighboring and Western states pursues one goal—by sowing discord among the people, to lead to a breakdown of the approaching negotiations between the Lithuanian Republic and the Soviet Union, to prevent the elimination of the consequences of the aggression in 1940, and to prevent Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia from returning to the full-fledged family of European states.

The Supreme Soviet Presidium and the government of the Lithuanian Republic declare:

local implementers of the Soviet unitarian policy are using inherited difficulties, which have arisen not at all because of the policy of the Lithuanian Republic, against the independence of the modern Lithuanian Republic;

the socioeconomic difficulties of the residents of eastern Lithuania are a state problem of special importance. It is already being resolved, and the efforts of the national communities of eastern Lithuania are being applied to this work;

on 25 September 1990 the Supreme Soviet of the Lithuanian Republic applied to the UN Human Rights Commission to create a special commission and send it to the

Lithuanian Republic to help study the situation of Russian, Polish, Jewish, Belorussian, and other national minorities living here and also to give recommendations;

local self-government and the laws of Lithuania, which assure the natural and other rights of man, along with the clarifications that have been prepared for exercising these rights even in these difficult times, create reliable preconditions for resolving the problems that have accumulated without the intervention of anybody;

the Lithuanian Republic does not wish anyone ill, it protects and will protect its political territorial integrity and not stray from the path to independence;

the responsibility for the illegal and thoughtless destabilization of the political situation in the Lithuanian Republic planned for 6 October of this year in the city of Eyshishkes lies with those who represent extreme opinions, those who sow hatred, and, above all, the conservative political circles in the Soviet Union. The goal of these last—to destroy what are possibly the first positive relations in between Lithuania and Poland in history—also comes through clearly. We will not allow narrow provincialism and ill will to cause this kind of harm to our common Lithuania and to the new relations between the European states.

[Signed] V. Landsbergis, chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Lithuanian Republic

K. Prunskiene, prime minister of the Lithuanian Republic

Vilnius, 4 October 1990

### **Sajudis Deputies on Glasnost in Government**

91UN0208B Vilnius EKHO LITVY in Russian  
13 Oct 90 p 1

[“Resolution of the Congress of Deputies of Self-Government Institutions of ‘Sajudis’”]

[Text] The congress of deputies of self-government institutions of “Sajudis” which took place on 22-23 September in Vilnius adopted a resolution on the glasnost of government operations of the Republic of Lithuania. It says:

We, the delegates of a Congress of Deputies of Self-Government Institutions of “Sajudis,” taking into consideration the declaration of the Kaunas City Soviet of 13 September, demand that the Council of Ministers publish:

1. A program for the reorganization of the economy of the Republic of Lithuania as an independent state;
2. The volume of credits granted to state banks functioning in Lithuania, the recipients of the credit, the goal of the credit, and guarantees for the return of credits;
3. The texts of agreements signed with republics of the Soviet Union or with their oblasts;

4. The structures of the government (of ministries, departments, etc.) indicating expenses to maintain them (wages, maintenance, travel, and other expenses in comparison with the structures of the former government);

5. Lists of all joint-stock enterprises;

6. Current information on government decrees concerning soviets of city and rayon self-government institutions;

7. Broadcast meetings of the Council of Ministers on the radio.

### **Lithuanian Government Replies to Glasnost Demands**

91UN0208C Vilnius EKHO LITVY in Russian  
13 Oct 90 pp 1,2

[Article by the Government Information Service: “On Glasnost in the Functioning of the Government”]

[Text] 1. The demands formulated in this and other resolutions adopted by the congress of deputies of self-government institutions of “Sajudis”, and in the documents of movements or parties, are perceived by the government of the Republic of Lithuania as a desire to improve its work. The program for the reconstruction of the economy makes up one part of the government’s program—along with economic reform, the social program, and foreign policy directions—upon which work is being finished. Soon the whole program of the government will be distributed to the self-government institutions, and portions of it will be published in the press—the principles of economic reform have already been published.

2. All texts of agreements with other states, including republics of the USSR, are being sent to the Supreme Council. The most important of them, for example the treaty on a Baltic market and agreements with the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] on economic and trade ties for 1991, have been published in the press. Unfortunately, not all the state newspapers are publishing agreements signed by the government—for example, a memorandum with the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic. Agreements signed with the Azerbaijan SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic], the Kirghiz SSR, and the Tajik SSR as well as those which the government intends to sign encompass a broadening of economic, trade, cultural, scientific, and technical ties over the course of five years and are standard, thus it is not advisable to publish them in the press. Those who wish may become acquainted with them at the Ministry of Economics or in the offices of the government.

3. By comparison with 1989, annual expenses on the maintenance of the central organs of administration of the Republic of Lithuania—the staff of the government, of the ministries and departments under the government, and of the representation in Moscow—have been reduced by 1.2 million rubles [R], and the staff of the

government's management of affairs has been reduced by 31 percent. The second stage of reductions in the staffs of governmental structures is now underway.

In connection with the restoration of statehood, it has been necessary to create new institutes within the government of the Republic of Lithuania: Departments of state security, defense of the kray, and foreign economic ties—these are financed from the same funds. Their functions were previously carried out by departments of the USSR.

In all, 12 departments have been formed under the government. Two departments are under the ministries. Other institutes which are called departments are structural subunits of the ministries.

The newspaper LIETUVOS AIDAS (3 October 1990) published erroneous information concerning an increase in administrative expenses. Of R9 million—this is the amount that will be consumed for the year above and beyond that for 1989—R6 million are going to the staff of the Supreme Council because of a reorganization and changes in the status of the deputy (a wage is paid to deputies of the Republic of Lithuania of the first convocation) and also for maintenance of the institutes within its jurisdiction and accountable to it. The remaining R3 million are going to maintain the staff of local administrative institutions, for the most part of reorganized tax inspections.

4. Reports from the meetings of the government are constantly broadcast on the Lithuanian television show "Panorama," information about them is prepared by the information service of the government and ELTA, and journalists may listen to almost all the meetings in a specially equipped auditorium next door. However, issues discussed at the government's meetings—for example, concerning prices, security of the borders, trade turnover, etc.—are often subject to state secrecy or to the impossibility of publicizing specific items before the adoption of a final ruling, and therefore it is not advisable to broadcast them in full by radio. This is not done in other states either.

5. As for the proposal to publicize information about the granting of credits and the lists of those who have received them, the government is handing it over to the Bank of Lithuania which is not subordinate to the government of Lithuania but to the Supreme Council.

The list of joint-stock enterprises may also not be published for two reasons: a) According to existing laws concerning joint-stock companies and concerning the list of enterprises, joint-stock enterprises should be registered by self-government institutes; b) According to data of the Ministry of Economics, after the adoption by the Supreme Council of the Law on Joint-Stock Companies not one such enterprise was officially registered; and it was established by a decree accompanying the law that the government is charged with publishing standardized stock forms and creating the conditions so that they may be purchased by joint-stock companies by 1 November.

As a result, the activities of joint-stock that were previously registered are not sufficiently legally grounded for the time being.

6. The government of the Republic of Lithuania—attempting to take into consideration the opinion of self-government institutions, parties, other public organizations or movements, and citizens—requests that all documents or proposals on its operations and on the administration of the republic that have been adopted be sent to the Government House, Vilnius, Yu. Tumovayzhganto Street, No. 2, Government Information Service.

### **Lithuanian CP (CPSU) Scores Government's 'Anti-Democratic' Acts**

91UN0687B Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian  
12 Dec 90 p 3

[Decree of the Lithuanian CP (CPSU) Central Committee Plenum, signed by M. Burokyavichyus, first secretary, Lithuanian CP (CPSU) Central Committee: "On Anti-Democratic Acts and Human-Rights Violations in Lithuania"]

[Text] The Lithuanian CP (CPSU) Central Committee Plenum fully approves the declaration of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo "On Anti-Democratic Acts and Human-Rights Violations in the Lithuanian SSR," as published on 29 November 1990. This declaration has provided a correct evaluation of the sociopolitical situation in our republic. The Central Committee Plenum notes that the instigation of political tension in Lithuania by separatist, nationalistic forces is becoming extremely dangerous. Lithuania's Supreme Soviet and government have intensified a course aimed at separating this republic from the Soviet Union. This republic's legislative acts are anti-democratic in nature; they are stepping up the creation of a bureaucratic and repressive apparatus; and they are creating nationalistic, armed units. What is being completed in Lithuania is the creation of a juridical and administrative system for persecuting all persons who are "inconvenient" to this anti-peoples regime.

Lithuania's ruling circles are directing their attacks against those public forces which are defending democracy, humanism, and socialist ideals, those which are speaking out for a continuation of perestroika and for concluding a new Union treaty. This republic's official authorities are stimulating political blackmail as well as moral terrorism against communists, supporters of socialist elections, followers of the Soviet regime, persons having an internationalist or inter-ethnic orientation, and Soviet Army personnel. They are continuing to persecute persons who think differently from themselves, place restrictions on political liberties, and violate human right. They are also attempting to attack persons who are "inconvenient" to the authorities.

Lithuania is witnessing the rise of a genuine threat of a large-scale, sociopolitical conflict because the actions of

the communists, directed against the anti-peoples attacks by this republic's present-day leadership, are categorized by Lithuania's official, pro-Sayudis authorities as state treason, entailing incarceration for long-term sentences and even the death penalty. However, Lithuania's communists are not submitting or giving in to the provocations of the reactionary forces. And they are continuing their determined struggle for democracy, freedom of the individual, and social justice in this republic.

The Lithuanian CP Central Committee Plenum expresses protest against the anti-democratic acts and human-rights violations in this republic. It deems as inadmissible the further ignoring of the USSR Constitution and laws, the decisions of the Third Congress of USSR People's Deputies regarding the matter of the Lithuanian SSR. The vital interests of Lithuania's working people require, above all, the urgent and forthwith restoration of socialist legality and law and order in this republic, as well as ensuring the social and legal protection of persons, and the implementation of the statutes of the Charter of Europe regarding individual freedoms, as signed in Paris on 21 November 1990.

Lithuania's democratic forces support the program of President M.S. Gorbachev, as set forth by him at the 17 November 1990 session of the Supreme Soviet. These forces also approve the USSR President's Ukase of 27 November 1990 "On the Law of the Lithuanian SSR Entitled 'On Political Parties.'" In this Ukase the USSR President correctly emphasizes that the law of Lithuania's Supreme Soviet, dated 25 October 1990 and entitled "On Political Parties" contradicts the All-Union legislation; it lacks the force of law and should not be implemented by state or public organs, enterprises, institutions, organizations, or citizens.

The Central Committee Plenum appeals to communists and to all of Lithuania's working people to decisively advocate the signing of a new Union treaty, wherein we see the only possible method of preventing further escalation of tension. We are for creating the necessary conditions for making the democratic changes more profound and for ensuring the genuine sovereignty of the Lithuanian socialist state. The plenum is proceeding on the basic concept that a renovated Union, as a powerful, multinational state with strong republics, would meet the basic interests of the Lithuanian people, as well as those of all the other peoples in this country. The party organizations and the communists themselves must help all strata of this republic's population to see the ruinous nature of the collapse of economic ties, something which would lead to the disintegration of the economy, to undermining the foundations of the All-Union market, an increase in economic chaos within this republic, and a precipitous decline in the working people's standard of living. A way out of the crisis in Lithuania is possible only by the joint efforts of all the republics. Economic, political, and legal stability within this country is possible only on the basis of a firm alliance or union among sovereign, Soviet states.

The plenum calls upon this republic's Supreme Soviet to cease its provocative acts aimed at military service personnel who are stationed on the territory of the Lithuanian SSR, to prevent discrimination and violations of the honor and human dignity of Soviet officers and enlisted men, as well as their families. We call upon the communists and Lithuania's entire population to harshly condemn such actions by this republic's parliament and the local authorities. We advocate creating the most favorable conditions for Soviet military personnel to carry out their constitutional duty—to defend the Union state and to guarantee its security.

The Lithuanian CP Central Committee Plenum hereby requires that all communists work more decisively and actively to consolidate all strata of this republic's population for joint actions in defense of democracy, social justice, and socialist elections. With this goal in mind, we must further organize mass demonstrations by working people to demand the repeal of reactionary laws, the dissolving of Lithuania's Supreme Soviet, and the restoration of the legal force of the Lithuanian SSR's Constitution and the USSR's Constitution on the territory of this republic. Party committees are called upon to work out and carry out a complex of measures for implementing the program set forth by the President of the USSR on 17 November 1990; this program is aimed at ensuring economic, political, and legal stabilization, at instituting public order and discipline, and at normalizing the situation with regard to inter-ethnic relations. Initiative in solving these problems must be shown by Lithuania's communists—deputies to this republic's Supreme Soviet and local soviets, staff members of the law-enforcement organs, by all those who hold dear Lithuania's tranquility, social justice, and development along the path of economic and spiritual progress, as well as truth, honor, and human dignity.

#### **Brazauskas Views Independent Lithuanian CP Reorganization**

91UN0419A Vilnius TIESA in Lithuanian  
8 Nov 90 pp 1, 2

[Article by Algirdas Brazauskas, first secretary of the Lithuanian CP Central Committee: "Preparing for the Extraordinary Lithuanian CP Congress: Lithuania's Interests Are the Main Thing"]

[Text] Less than a month remains before the convening of the Extraordinary Congress of the Lithuanian Communist Party where it is anticipated that the radical reforms of the Party, already begun during the 20th Congress, will be concluded. What kind of Party will come out of it, whose interests will it defend, and will it manage to express its opinion decisively without beating around the bush, on all questions of concern to society?

Who are we today—so recently having withstood the pressure from the Politburo, the CPSU Central Committee Plenum and having actualized our most important and fundamental decision to break away from the CPSU?

Obviously it was the first real step taken not only by the Party, but most importantly by Lithuania on the road to liberation. No matter what our opponents would like to say, this was the beginning of beginnings which by definitive actions, rather than words, shook the foundation of the intransigent "CPSU leadership." Actually, at that time not just the Kremlin, but the whole world understood the irreversibility of the steps taken towards Lithuania's Independence.

At that time the Party experienced a peculiar emotional uplift. Without doubt the scenarios for achieving independence did not mesh with what some political leaders imagined they should be. Many wanted to have a "monopoly" over the goal being pursued by the whole country while completely uncomprehending, or deliberately disregarding, the complexity of this process and the realities of the situation. A similar attitude made clear the intentions of the conservative wing of the USSR and CPSU leadership. These intentions were obvious and easily predictable: to weaken, or at best, to neutralize the so-called "separatist" and "nationalist" hotbed tendencies in Lithuania. Actually, it was possible to describe in a few words the predominating and rather frightened reaction at that time in Moscow—Sajudis and the Lithuanian Communist Party are united!

So, in order to prevent this from taking place, forces of resistance appeared as much from the outside as at home. Constantly unfounded suspicions, undeserved accusations, and reproaches trailed the independent Lithuanian Communist Party following the party's 20th congress. That is why, even though it is a paradox, the whole burden of accusations for actual and imagined sins had to be accepted, specifically, by those people who remained, essentially, in another kind of party—one which had proclaimed its aims towards for freedom, democracy and independence. Of course, not everybody was able to endure the tremendous psychological pressure, although one will have to get used to it: we do not live in a greenhouse but in a real, polarized and rather heated present day Lithuania.

In spite of everything, about 60 thousand of us remain, making that the largest party in Lithuania today. While the constant unrelenting attacks by our opponents shows just how strong our unshakeable position in the arena of Lithuanian politics is. That is why I look to the future optimistically.

The Lithuanian CP Extraordinary Congress is approaching. Already today we hear rebukes from our opponents that we are "turning coat." They are not interested that the "old coat," while not even waiting for its part of the Party's wealth, was inherited by another party. Furthermore, we do not intend to renounce our past. It is intertwined with the whole of Lithuanian history, with the realities of the situation at the time. All of it is objective truth and cannot be destroyed or forgotten.

We are aware of our guilt in the wrong done to the Lithuanian nation in the name of the Lithuanian Communist Party. More than once we have denounced it, and a sincere repentance took place at the 20th congress. However, I will never agree that our party, more precisely, its current members, among whom a good number were the founders of Sajudis which brought the nation to rebirth, should now merely repent and beat their breasts. That would be too big of a luxury, not just for the party, but most of all for Lithuania. It is high time that the republic's political parties and movements understand that we have had enough of internecine squabbles and having to prove our faith in Independence. For the consistent and daily work that is needed, all hands and minds in Lithuania will be required. Even though it is proud, our nation is so very small!

Ideological barriers and political discrimination have excluded many representatives of the intelligentsia from active political life. But in the name of truth we must admit that in Lithuania, and in other former republics of the USSR, these losses are not easily comparable. It was possible to protect the most gifted and talented people for the benefit of the Republic's industries, its education and its culture. Could that be because they were members of the Lithuanian Communist Party? What it really was, special protection or something else, I am not able to say. One thing is clear, people were able to work as hard as they could for the good of Lithuania to the degree conditions allowed during that period. It seems that even now there will arise those who will call them collaborators—but that is a matter for the accuser and his conscience.

I am almost certain that in the rank and file of today's independent Lithuanian Communist Party there remain no more executors from Stalinist repression nor organizers of deportations to Siberia. Without any doubt there remain no more spineless careerists who quickly find refuge behind safer political labels. Gone are the flitting orthodox leninists still waiting for the bright tomorrow of communism which has never developed that way anywhere in the world.

The independent Lithuanian Communist Party is morally prepared to take the step towards further reorganization. It remains part of the political life of the Republic but not penitently. Only from the Party's hard work for the benefit of an Independent Lithuania will the nation be able to judge it.

Indeed the time has come to renounce all tactical and diplomatic curtsies and directly name the road we have taken. That is why during one of the Lithuanian CP Central Committee plenums I proposed a conditional name for our party—the Lithuanian Social Democratic Union. That way, at last, the ratified statutes of the 20th congress will be realized. That they are social democratic ones was acknowledged by everybody in Lithuania, in the Soviet Union, and by the Socintern. And that we will finally declare our true resolution also is beyond doubt. But, it seems to me, there is one hitch to calling the party



by that name. It would be incorrect from the point of view of Lithuania's Social Democratic Party. It would be a pretext for a particular kind of confrontation, for various unnecessary considerations. This the Lithuanian Communist Party does not want.

Among international socialist parties a proper place is held by workers' (otherwise known as labor) parties. In that case, it seems to me, calling it the **Lithuanian Democratic Labor Party** would be acceptable.

That way, as I mentioned earlier, the social democratic party's resolutions would be affirmed. By accentuating the **labor** party name, we would be emphasizing an orientation towards those levels of society whose livelihood comes, namely, from the work that they do. It takes place in the areas of material as well as spiritual creativity. So, the concept of work is equally intimate to the worker and to the academic, to the farmer and to the teacher, to the engineer and to the writer.

Society is usually divided into employers and hired workers. Without any doubt we will be closer to and concerned more with the interests of the workers and their social guarantees. It is already clear today that Lithuania is approaching difficult times judging by the economic problems. On whose shoulders will the greatest burden fall? Are we prepared to organize a labor exchange, unemployment funds? These, of course, are but a few of the problems which all of us together will have to solve. In this area our party must take a strong and constructive position.

Of course the congress is not being called just for the renaming of the party. We have to have as much content as organizational purpose in order to develop a parliamentary type of party. I would like to emphasize that this is less a theoretical than a practical concept of contemporary political conditions. The party will become irrelevant if it does not manage to develop definite programs formulating clear positions in the economic, social and political spheres, and if it does not develop clear methods and practical assistance to deputies at all levels. The primary party organization should not work behind closed doors but with its party members. The opinions of all voters is important—they will chose which of the party programs to support and for which candidate to vote.

Also the party should not be viewed as having become simplified, or a tool of parliamentary fractionism, that it will not be independent and so on. Relationships between party members—deputies and the party—have to be dependent on harmony from both sides. That is, such a party will determine whether our activities will be successful.

The Lithuanian Communist Party is not in opposition to the parliament nor to the government. And not because it has representatives in both places. We support the principals along with the most important resolutions for the rebirth of self-dependence. But we will always be in opposition to anti-democratic legislation. It would be

best if the creating forces were only positive rather than negative in their power to protest. Compared to the years of stagnation, our party does not have all that many members today. But they are realistic working people. In their rank and file there still are, and will remain, those whose inner values, the need for self-expression, does not let them remain on the sidelines. With these kinds of people I am prepared to work as hard as the faith in me by my friends in the party will allow.

We have the chance to become a strong constructive political party. We created this opportunity ourselves and nobody will realize that goal but us.

As we defend the most vulnerable levels of social guarantees and the interests of society, I am certain that we will attract those who for various reasons left from the party, and those who earlier were not interested in any kind of political activity. The approaching congress is not just an important end to the period of reorganization, but for our road it is a new and significant beginning.

#### **Lithuanian Intellectual Disenchanted With Sajudis, Political Processes**

91UN0284A Moscow *LITERATURNAYA GAZETA*  
in Russian No 46, 14 Nov 90 p 9

[Interview with Vytautas Petkevicius, Lithuanian prose writer and one of Sajudis' founders, by P. Keidosis, *LITERATURNAYA GAZETA* correspondent: "Confession of a 'Renegade'"]

[Excerpt] *Recently the Lithuanian press published an "Appeal to the People of Lithuania" signed by well-known Republic public and cultural figures, among them the writers J. Marcinkevicius, M. Martinaitis, V. Martinkus, A. Maldonis, R. Gudaitis, and V. Jasukaityte; academicians E. Vilkas, J. Kubilius, V. Statulevicius, A. Marcinkevicius, and A. Sileika; professors K. Antanavicius, B. Genzelis and A. Mickis; and philosophers A. Juozaitis and J. Urbsis, minister of foreign affairs in the Lithuanian Government from 1938 until 1940, who spent over 10 years in solitary confinement in the Gulag. The appeal warned that democracy cannot be achieved by undemocratic methods, and it urged people to take a more sober view of the Republic's present problems. A total of 32 people signed this appeal. True, a day later three of them repudiated their signatures. And that was three months before the Lithuanian Parliament passed its insidious formulation of amendments to the criminal code in which "enemies of the nation" are threatened with capital punishment (almost like the famous Articles 58 and 70!) and approved passports for Lithuanian citizens....*

[Keidosis] You were not among the signatories of this appeal, even though it is a well-known fact that you have repeatedly pointed out the erroneous steps taken by your former comrades. What is the reason for that? The disillusionment of a dreamer, or the weariness of a realist? Or did you perhaps foresee the public *auto-da-fe* to which signatories Juozas Urbsis and Justinas

Marcinkevicius were subjected? Are you frightened by the slander that was heaped on your colleague Juozas Baltusis and that is now being turned against Vidmante Jasukaityte, Arvidas Juozaitis, Kazimeras Antanavicius, and others?

[Petkevicius] Journalists are like the eye of God: there is nowhere nowadays where one can hide from them, especially in our little Lithuania.

Well, a confession is a confession, but I hope that it will not cause any harm either to me or to you, or to our readers.

For the moment I will give a brief reply to your question: neither one. I have had long experience with well organized acts and I realized that in this period of general euphoria I would have few allies in Lithuania, though I do believe that the time will come when those who condemn me now will themselves be condemned.... Therefore, I devoted myself fully to my creative work.

[Keidosis] In an interview with journalists from the weekly LITERATURA IR MYANAS you said, among other things: "Sajudis is guilty of a great deception; in its program it asserted that it would not strive to take power, yet now it turns out that it is precisely a power struggle that is underway, and not just any power struggle, but a personal one at that." And, later: "Lithuania has probably never before been plundered the way it is being plundered now. Both morally and physically." You also underscored that sentence in the text. How did it happen that the child nurtured by you and upon which Lithuania pinned such great hopes has turned into a "deceiver and plunderer?"

[Petkevicius] Indeed, as fate would have it I was one of the founders of Sajudis, but neither in our program nor in our subsequent actions was there even a hint that we would combat Stalinism with Stalinist methods, for violence immediately turns any goal into a lie. Sajudis was born and realized as the whole people's upsurge toward liberty and independence, not as the brainchild of certain individuals working behind closed doors. There was no intention of exalting anyone, just as we had no intention of demeaning anyone, for we were convinced that Lithuania needs all its children equally, both those who are right, and those who are mistaken, and those who were mistaken in the past. We had a tremendous desire to give each person maximum opportunities to work for the sake of social revival, regardless of nationality, beliefs or social status. However, gradually the leadership of Sajudis was taken over by demagogues; they simply laughed at the essence of the movement, at its program and aspirations, and now declare: Well, the political situation has changed, and now it is we who are going to dictate our will.

Without the slightest twinge of conscience the "new leaders" have forced out the true founders of Sajudis—the scientists and writers—and have put together the "super-elite" ruling "Independence Party" from among those who are under their thumb. A well-known paradox

has prevailed: Revolutions are prepared by intellectuals and carried out by fanatics, but the fruits of revolution are enjoyed by all sorts of rascals. That should not happen, for we have lived for too long with a triple muzzle: the party, coercion and fear; and that was why everything was decided by political illiteracy, and the ones who rose to the top were those who lied more blatantly than the rest and promised the most. Those who warned that the path to independence would be a long and difficult one were pushed aside and slandered.

Not six months have passed since Landsbergis "ascended to the throne," yet already a "collection of his speeches" is being published in a large printing and he, as Lenin, Stalin, or Brezhnev before him, is being presented with various documents bearing the number one. In order to increase his authority and "national spirit" "hunger strikes" are being employed in an attempt to eliminate a government that is "disobedient" to him, the books of writers who have objected to him are being jeered at, and demeaning pickets are being staged under the windows of those who dare to protest, at the same time as state radio and television, which have in fact been placed in the hands of Landsbergis's entourage, are lashing out at dissenters and calling them enemies of the nation.

What democracy, what law-governed state is evidenced by the changes and amendments to criminal legislation passed by the Lithuanian Supreme Council on 4 October?! Again prison and the death penalty with confiscation of property? Thank you, Iosif Vissarionovich, for your example!

You may ask: Why does the majority patiently tolerate this state of affairs? Because our ambitions hamper us, because we are afraid to admit the mistakes we have made. For the upshot of all this turmoil has been merely the replacement of one dictatorship with another, and not a better one, but one that has already created political and economic chaos in our republic.

In his latest widely-publicized article A. Solzhenitsyn warns that political affairs are by no means the most important aspect of human life, that politics are not the occupation that corresponds to the desires of the majority. The more broadly political struggle encompasses society, the more substantially spirituality declines, naturally leading to massive apathy and hence to a new period of stagnation.

Spiritual revival of the people is impossible in the midst of the turbulence that accompanies rallies. Time is needed for people to realize who is who. I believe that the time will come to us as well if we do not sit idly by, but instead patiently explain to people the true state of affairs.

[Keidosis] So what has happened to the Lithuanian intelligentsia? More precisely, to a portion of it? In turbulent 1988, or more likely right up until the first session of the newly-elected parliament, it unconditionally approved all of Sajudis's actions, participated



actively in them and painstakingly defended its comrades and idols against even the slightest attempts to reproach them. Suddenly, now that power has been won and the 11 March Declaration of Independence proclaimed, the aforementioned appeal has been issued, signed by representatives of the intelligentsia whose authority is hardly in doubt. The majority of them were there at Sajudis's cradle, and some of them have made no secret of their anticommunist views. The appeal contains these words: "Unfortunately not all of us choose democracy, law and order, truth and mutual respect. It is clear that there are already some who are striving for quick personal prosperity and premature glory and laurels." Now a campaign has been launched against those who signed this appeal, and there have been official statements at the highest level about the harmfulness and untimeliness of attempts to point out shortcomings in Lithuania's present policy. Incidentally, statements of censure and rejection now bear the signatures of quite authoritative representatives of the Lithuanian intelligentsia who were until recently your comrades and fellow thinkers. Tell me, are these growing pains, a natural polarization, or a timely return to sobriety?

[Petkevicius] Quite frankly, the majority of my colleagues are disillusioned or frightened by the processes presently occurring in Lithuania. The beautiful, peace-loving and long-suffering image of our nation, which was created in offices by skillful politicians, is increasingly being transformed into a blind mob with an extremely short memory as critical sentiments have grown. To this I should add the excellently honed tactic of intimidation, revanchistic tendencies, and anticommunist hysteria; this creates the situation in which members of the intelligentsia find themselves today.

The majority of them are party members, though they did not join the party by any means out of careerist considerations, but rather out of a deep and sincere belief that they could in some way help their people. In their opinion inaction under those conditions would have been an even greater sin. They selflessly labored in the fields of awakening national consciousness and preservation of Lithuanian spiritual culture and its heritage, in the realm of artistic and scientific creativity. On account of this they had for many years to endure reproaches and criticism and even be subjected to persecution. Only the love and recognition of their countrymen gave them strength in this struggle and deepened their faith that Stalinism would not last forever and that the hour of truth would come. When Sajudis was born and its program was published, they who were devoted to an idea were literally carried in people's arms.... Now those same people are being denigrated publicly on account of a single correct or straightforward thought. Fortunately, not everyone is doing this; that attitude is typical only of the constantly rallying and sometimes even paid and instigated handful of political "activists."

In my opinion, that is why a group of Sajudis founders and deputies attempted to make this appeal to the people

of Lithuania: Come to your senses, democracy is threatened, elect a new Founding Sejm and show your concern for the fate of Lithuania with actions, not words. Immediately these genuine patriots were ridiculed, trampled on and slandered; their many years of labor for the sake of their Motherland were termed "many years of service to the occupiers."

I personally am an old hand at this, and I am not afraid of these half-baked little fascists. That is why I can state here today openly and without the slightest fear: No one can do harm to our idea of independence except ourselves, embroiled as we are in internecine strife and humiliation of people of "nonnative" nationalities.

Another thing: Talent, individuality, and goodness, as a rule, grow in solitude, such is their nature. They cannot be held back for long by martial discipline and drill imposed from without. In any situation talent must defend itself; it cannot change its form. By the same token mediocrity, evil, and power are always organized, for only as part of the herd do that sort of people feel that they have power. And if we add to this the unbridled envy, the thirst for glory and the desire for wealth that typify mediocrity, then we can see where we get the Suslovs, the Chepaitises, the Terlyatskases, the Landsbergises, where lie the roots of their unbridled desire to rule over others.

The organization! Storm troopers! Secret police!...it does not matter what you call them...All this power is directed against individuality, which in the end cannot hold out, gives in and begins to persuade itself that in troubled times wise men keep silent.

[Keidosis] In the interview that we mentioned before you started, describing the present state of a certain segment of Lithuania's population: "Nowadays, no matter how much we may fear these words, we are gripped by mass hysteria and the herd instinct. Politics has become a kind of religion."

Does it not seem to you that this situation indicates a certain weariness on the part of our readers? Are writers themselves perhaps to blame? Is it not time for us to recall that old saying, that "words are a writer's business?"

[Petkevicius] I am just now finishing a book on the origins of Sajudis and on its premature demise. I have studied carefully the biographies of Stalin, Hitler, and Mussolini, as well as materials pertaining to the political processes that facilitated their rise to power; therefore, I am moved to remind my readers of something. "The receptivity of the masses is quite limited," wrote Hitler, "and their powers of reason are insignificant, but their forgetfulness is extremely great." Hence, he drew the following conclusion: "The masses will only bother to remember the one who repeats the same banal concepts a thousand times. If you are going to lie, then lie boldly: A big lie is believed more willingly than a small one.... People themselves sometimes lie about small things, but they are ashamed to tell big lies. As a consequence it

never occurs to them that they are being deceived so shamelessly." And this: "In the event of any failure, enemies must be sought at once. If there are none, then they must be invented."

I think there is no need to tell you what conclusions should be drawn from this monologue....

Genuine perestroika is being intolerably delayed not only because the Stalinists and the stagnationists are constantly attempting to hamper it. Perestroika is being carried out and even eagerly directed, along with honest people, by various sorts of chameleons who in the past suffocated anything that was alive and who, now that a new wind is blowing, have thrown away their party membership cards, just like the now outdated and useless bread ration cards, and have become the most enthusiastic anticommunists, all without renouncing their former ruinous craft. In this way they have once again assured themselves of new, "nonparty cards" that will guarantee them a free ride and, specifically, access to scarce goods.

It is sad to say, but today in Lithuania it is those people's time. The dilettantish nature of the course set by them has already cost the Republic economy billions. Yet we continue to live on rally-induced optimism, as if all the existing contradictions are going to resolve themselves as soon as we become independent. Many people are still obsessed with an *idée fixe*: If we can only succeed in changing state and social institutions or somehow perfecting them, then everything will change as if by magic. And no one wants to see that it is precisely these present and future institutions that have caused the decline in our spirituality. It was the powerlessness of those institutions that prompted us to embark on this endlessly long path of suffering.

Some Lithuanians want to improve on the prewar Smetona regime, others are still hoping to cobble together communism, and Russia is once again encouraging hopes for a good secretary or a good czar. Nothing will come of this, either there or here, because there has never been a single instance in the history of mankind where used ideas once again became effective or acceptable to the people who used them up. Ideas always leave the stage once and for all. New ones are needed, because the moral and cultural rebirth of peoples has nothing in common with mass movements or massive politicization. The decisive word that will be fateful for the future of our society will not be spoken by good or bad organization, not by military discipline, or rampant anarchy, **but rather by the spiritual potential of the individuals who comprise society.** Therefore, in response to the question of whether the forces that presently exist in our Republic will be able to restore Lithuania's independence, I will reply with an old witticism: Yes, they will, but I feel sorry for the Lithuanians. [Passage omitted]

## RSFSR

### Future RSFSR Foreign Relations Considered

91UN0682A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA  
in Russian 26 Dec 90 p 3

[Article by D. Matsenov, consultant at the Russian Independent Research Institute: "We Are Chosen, We Choose—Who Might Become an Ally of Russia"]

[Text] Today, in my view, collapse of the traditional "Yalta" system of international relations, a system based on confrontation between two major power centers of the world community, has become an accomplished fact, and it is entirely apparent that we are now witnessing a trend towards emergence of a whole spectrum of new power centers—and these are based not so much on military power as on economic and technological might.

Replacement of the "Yalta" reality by the reality of a new "Helsinki" world has been accompanied by the fundamental breakup of existing geopolitical structures. Taking into account the fact that the geopolitics of our newest epoch entails a dominating role being relegated to the so-called "continental colossus" (i.e., the state controlling the central portion of Europe) and the "maritime empire" (i.e., the state controlling access to the world ocean), we must note the obvious tendency towards substitution of Germany for the Soviet Union in the role of "continental colossus," and the as yet not so obvious, but entirely possible, displacement of the United States by Japan as the new "maritime empire."

Under such conditions, a most important role for Russia will be played by the question of allies. The process of redistribution of power in interstate relations will require sooner than anything else a certain reevaluation of obligations in the relations between traditional allies.

The search for allies is a matter of particular urgency for Russia, having been deprived of its important geopolitical position. In addition, the Russian state has historically always been strong through its allies. Russia, in turn, means a great deal in and of itself as an ally to any power in the world community. Concentrated in its hands today we see a colossal personnel and material potential, strategic reserves of raw materials and energy, and a critical number of weapons of mass destruction.

A struggle for control over Russia, with the aim of utilizing its status as a major European power and geostrategic bridgehead, a source of raw materials and a seller's market, will flare up chiefly between the United States and Germany (Japan may later join in). Judging from certain statements of American political experts, the United States seriously fears the emergence of an alliance between Germany and Russia in the mid-range time perspective. It is curious that some U.S. political experts warned of the danger of such an alliance as long ago as 1952, i.e., just a few years following the end of World War II!

At the same time, there also exist objective premises for an alliance between Russia and America. In the political sphere Russia would be a unique ally for the United States, since this would allow the latter to accomplish two tasks simultaneously—maintain the balance of power in Europe (using Russia as a “barrier state” against Germany’s gathering excessive strength) as well as in Asia (in the face of Japan and China). It is also difficult to overestimate Russia’s significance as a source of raw materials, under conditions when American administrations are pursuing a policy of conservation of their own resources and we see growing instability in the region that traditionally supplies the United States with oil.

Additionally, taking into account the predicted increase in emigration from Russia to America, the possibility that a strong pro-Russian lobby may emerge in the United States cannot be ruled out. As far as political and economic benefits of such an alliance to Russia are concerned—in our view, these are sufficiently evident and need not be discussed individually.

Under these conditions, a strategy of action “on two fronts” would bring the greatest benefit to Russia. Maximum advantage should be taken of American-German rivalry for “possession” of Russia, without extending a clear preference to any single country. It would be advisable to think through the question of seeking specific “zones of mutual interest” in relations with each state, taking care to see to it that these zones do not come into conflict with one another. Such a strategy is dictated by the dual nature of Russia’s position, on the one hand as a European power, and on the other—as a world power.

#### **Future of RSFSR-Japan Relationship Viewed**

91UN0682B Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA  
in Russian 26 Dec 90 p 3

[Article by A. Logachevskiy, consultant at the Russian Independent Research Institute: “How To Make Friends With the Samurai—the Future of Russian-Japanese Relations”]

[Text] The proclamation of RSFSR sovereignty and the establishment of Russia as an entity of international relations that began in connection with this are capable of significantly influencing prospects for normalizing Soviet-Japanese relations, which are today burdened by the absence of a peace treaty, in spite of the fact that a full 45 years has passed since the end of World War II.

A territorial dispute of long duration has impeded the signing of a treaty. Japan has persistently demanded that a group of islands belonging to the southern Kurile group be handed over to it, while the Soviet Union considers this a groundless claim. Moscow and Tokyo are presenting diverse legal, historical, geographic, and other arguments before one another, arguments designed to show the “primordial belonging” of these territories to each party, while the other always finds—or used to find,

to put it more accurately—weighty counterarguments. Today it seems some kind of compromise is near that should be signed during a visit of the USSR president to Japan planned for April 1991.

Now is the time to remember certain circumstances. First of all, the Kuril Islands do not constitute an abstract Soviet territory, but rather Russian territory. Second, the Russian Congress of People’s Deputies has adopted a declaration on state sovereignty, Point 8 of which states that “territory of the RSFSR cannot be altered without the will of the people expressed through referendum.” It has also adopted a resolution to the effect that Union laws and other acts that encroach upon RSFSR sovereignty are not valid on Russian territory. Third, a public opinion survey conducted in March of this year among inhabitants of the territories under dispute—the islands of Kunashir, Khabomai, and Shikotan—shows that only eight percent of those polled favor transfer of the islands to Japan. And fourth, Tokyo has unequivocally made Soviet-Japanese negotiations on the summit level conditional upon transfer to Japan of the territories under dispute. Here Japan considers the present moment exceptionally favorable for exerting massive pressure insofar as, according to the words of Hokkaido University Professor H. Kimuri, “the USSR is today prepared to make diplomatic concessions for the sake of obtaining economic assistance.”

At first glance, the circumstances enumerated indicate a diplomatic impasse. I am convinced, however, that there is an appropriate way out of it, proceeding from a logic of national pragmatism—Russian and Japanese. The clash of two pragmatic approaches should not lead to compromises, i.e., to reciprocal concessions that might turn out unrealizable for one party in the best instance, and fatal in the worst. Such a clash must lead to a mutually beneficial resolution.

What is beneficial today for Japan? I think Japan’s national interests would be met not so much by annexation of the islands as by prospects of having as an ally a peaceful, politically stable state with an open economy.

A vivid imagination is not necessary to envision the following scenario. The forced agreement of M. Gorbachev (recalling the above assessment by H. Kimuri) under certain or other conditions to transfer the islands to Japan is protested by Russia based on referendum results, and a political crisis erupts, exacerbated all the more by virtue of the confrontation in the RSFSR of Union and republic authority, which has assumed an extremely unstable diarchic nature. While the “centrists” and “leftists” settle scores with one another, favorable conditions are being created (“They are selling out Russia!!!”) for right-nationalistic forces to emerge on the political center stage, with their nonacceptance of “bourgeois values” and their xenophobia. It would be nice if these events were not accompanied by armed violence, but in truth this is hardly likely.

In other words, Russia and Japan share a common interest, which consists not in achieving advantages for the moment, but rather in imparting to Russian reforms a consistent, evolutionary, and stable character, thereby ensuring a future compatibility of the socioeconomic systems of the two countries that will facilitate transition to long-term, mutually beneficial cooperation. This is especially important to Japan in that, with the passage of time, its opportunities for selecting partners will be objectively narrowed.

This will be the consequence of an inevitable, it seems to me, transformation of the bipolar (USSR-United States) military- strategic structure of international relations into a tripolar (European Community-United States-Japan) correlation of forces primarily economic in nature. Competition among these poles will be exacerbated both as a result of the gradual equalizing of their levels of economic development, as well as by a reduced tendency to compromise, which up until recently flowed from the existence in the world arena of a common formidable enemy embodied by the USSR. In addition, there will appear the constant threat of coalition of two "poles" against the third.

Under the conditions that have come about, a subject of special concern for Japan will be the formation of its own sphere of economic cooperation—rich and reliable sources of fuels and raw materials, inexpensive manpower, and a high-capacity capital and industrial-production market. As before, the Near East will remain unstable, and Tokyo will more and more frequently come into conflict with blunt protectionism in a united Europe and United States. The Japanese preference for the Asian Pacific region will become apparent. But the United States also considers this region its natural sphere of influence, as does a China that is swiftly coming to its feet. As a result, Russia will inevitably fall into Japan's field of vision, having overcome by that time (and not without Tokyo's help, we would very much like to hope) a systemic incompatibility with Japan's market economy.

#### **Democratic Russia Popularity Viewed**

91UN0681B Moscow VECHERNYAYA MOSKVA  
in Russian 18 Dec 90 p 1

[N. Kuznetsov report: "'Democratic Russia': A New Twist"]

[Text] Muscovites first found out about the "Democratic Russia" movement during the spring election campaign. Representatives of that movement won the sympathy of the city's inhabitants: They won a majority in the Moscow Soviet. How do Muscovites regard this political movement now? Our correspondent asked this question of candidates of philosophical sciences A. Demidov and S. Kolobanov. This is what they said.

Late in November of this year, on instructions from the CPSU Moscow City Committee Moscow Political Institute, the Moscow Sociological Agency conducted a sociological poll jointly with the help of the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Sociology sector that studies public opinion among Muscovites. It turned out that today 38 percent of those polled support the "Democratic Russia" movement, while 21 percent support it in some things but find other things unacceptable. Notwithstanding, 49.27 percent of the respondents would be prepared to vote for representatives of that movement if elections took place today, while 25 percent are prepared to offer material support for "Democratic Russia."

During the course of the study, Muscovites were asked the following question: "Who are you inclined to trust more, 'Democratic Russia' or the CPSU?" Some 42 percent of those polled preferred the democrats, while 14 percent preferred the CPSU.

Some 30 percent approve of the actions of the democrats in the Moscow Soviet, while 26 percent approve of some things and disapprove of others. A total of 48 percent of those polled had heard about the new twist in the political spiral in the "Democratic Russia" movement, namely, the recent congress, while nine percent were familiar with its materials.

#### **RSFSR Finance Minister Resignation Viewed**

91UN0647C Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA  
in Russian 29 Dec 90 Second Edition p 2

[Article by A. Ryabov: "Without Any Extra Urging: Concerning the Portfolio of the RSFSR Finance Minister"]

[Text] Recently RSFSR Finance Minister B. Fedorov applied for resignation. The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet honored his request.

Considering the fact that Boris Grigoryevich had become practically the last person in the group of originators of the 500 Days Program to announce his resignation, many reviewers and commentators link his decision with the fact that not a single one of the legislative drafts that were part of that program was accepted by the RSFSR Supreme Soviet. That is, B. Fedorov's departure was dictated by major differences of opinion with the republic's government with regard to the basic trends in financial policy, and it is fitting to place on the 32-year-old doctor of economic sciences the crown of thorns of a martyr for the ideas of the "market economy."

"I would advise you not to be too hasty with unambiguous conclusions and evaluations," I was told during our discussion by Yu. Skokov, deputy chairman of the RSFSR Council of Ministers. "Although, of course, Fedorov is a very erudite, very capable economist and a specialist in his sphere. But in my opinion, the conflict that arose between him and the republic's government should be viewed not from any high positions of science, but primarily from the moral aspect."

"I would like to give the following example. On 14 November we in the Council of Ministers gathered the representatives of the republic's various territories to discuss the question of forming the next year's budget. Fedorov gave a weak, unconvincing report, to which the meeting participants responded by a complete avalanche of perplexed questions. After a heated discussion it was decided that the finance minister would take into consideration the serious critical comments that had been made, would prepare more substantial studies dealing with that question, and would coordinate in all details the recommendations with the various territories of RSFSR, the ministries, and the Council of Ministers. You can imagine the amazement of the conference participants when, on the day after that discussion, they learned that the finance minister had departed by air on an official trip, allegedly to obtain credit resources—first to Italy, and then to France. After returning from abroad three weeks later, Boris Grigoryevich threw himself feverishly into setting in type the plan for budgetary deductions. On Monday, 24 December, the Council of Ministers again gathered the representatives of the Councils of Ministers of the republics in the Russian Federation and the chairmen of the oblast and kray ispolkoms. Unfortunately, the sad picture of the finance minister's lack of preparation for the discussion was repeated.

"Therefore RSFSR Council of Ministers recommended that a statement concerning the draft of the republic's budget be given at the session of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet not by Fedorov, but by his first deputy, Igor Nikolayevich Lazarev, who, in the minister's absence, had been carrying out the practical work. That decision offended Boris Grigoryevich, and he stated that in such a case he would decline responsibility. The Council of Ministers evaluated these actions by Fedorov as being unworthy of the high rank of minister and, taking into consideration the tenseness of the moment, the chairman of the RSFSR Council of Ministers accepted his resignation."

#### **More Party Cooperation in Economy Urged**

91UN0647D Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA  
in Russian 30 Dec 90 Second Edition p 1

[Article by S. Karkhanin, under rubric "At the Politburo of the RSFSR Communist Party Central Committee": "Key Place"]

[Text] At Magnitogorsk there is a sardonic joke, "More dust falls on us than the amount of meat they give us." So, even in this workers' city, where social problems have been brought to the red-hot temperature of boiling metal, the local authorities show their contempt for the construction of projects to meet social, cultural, and everyday needs. In the 38 republics, krays, and oblasts in RSFSR, milk production has dropped. Because of a lack of raw materials, 340,000 workers in light and textile industry have found themselves on the brink of unemployment. One can already see graphically the pyramid

of authority crumbling after it was deprived of the party core that fastened it together. That is why, when a session of the Politburo of the RSFSR Communist Party Central Committee was discussing the question of the socioeconomic situation and the forecasting of the development of the republic's national economy in 1991, the discussion dealt chiefly with the responsibility borne by the Communists.

Currently they are the only force capable of stopping the sliding away of production toward paralysis, although in other soviets it is persistently recommended to economic managers that they do not maintain any contacts with party committees, and the party activists, in turn, having been subjected to psychological pressure, have recoiled from economic problems. One can already see the result. And so this is not the time to count the grievances. It is necessary to reunite, so that, by the joint efforts of the branch staffs and the party organizations, we can save the situation. Consequently, the question raised by A. M. Bryachikhin, chairman of the capital's Sevastopolskiy Raysovet, is a completely proper one: "How can I personally, as a member of the Politburo, help the economy?" Obviously, every Communist in the republic should ask himself that question.

It is difficult not to agree with Central Committee Secretary I. I. Antonovich: the party does not have the right to refuse to develop economic policy. In the soviets at all levels, the majority of deputies are Communists. They bear the responsibility for everything occurring in the region.

It is typical that the persons who spoke at the session—V. N. Shcherbak, RSFSR deputy minister of agriculture and food supplies; V. N. Zabelin, president of the Rosuralsibstroy Association; Yu. Z. Valakshin, president of the board of the Rosstrom State Concern; and other representatives of republic departments—agreed: they really do need help from party committees. Specifically what kind of help? The spectrum of desires is extensive. One of them is the desire to eliminate the boundary of distrust between the leadership and the low-level subdivisions of the new concerns. Another is the desire to work more persistently with the Communists who are the leaders of the regional agencies of authority. One concrete fact: in 26 oblasts there is a shortage of sugar, but in eight regions supplies of sugar have been laid in that will meet the needs until next autumn, but they have no intention of sharing those supplies with their neighbors... One way or another it is understood that it is necessary to implement a program for stabilizing the economy, by relying on the support given by the party members who are deputies and economic managers.

It was stated outright that it is precisely they who bear the responsibility for disrupting the shipments of food products to the major industrial centers of Russia—Sverdlovsk, Kemerovo. Having emphasized that, V. I. Chernov, chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers State Commission for Food Products and Purchases, especially commented on the need for political



work around the economic programs that have been enacted. There are many paths. The party has in its arsenal not only the traditional methods. It is possible, for example, to hold joint meetings of the party committees of concerns, ministries, and low-level production organizations.

"We must guarantee the unity of the development of the national-economic complex in the republic and in the entire country," Central Committee Secretary A. G. Melnikov said. "Sometimes economic managers with party cards in their pockets made promises, but refrain from any concrete work. We visit enterprises frequently, and the people there say outright that it is high time to hold the managers who have disrupted the shipments highly accountable to the party. We shall find out how to restore the economic ties and get them operating smoothly, and how to act with conviction."

In general, there are many possibilities. It is another matter that the party will seek its place in the economic reforms without "breaking," without ingratiating itself. The people at the party committees have realized that the time when they assigned tasks to others has gone. They realize that now they must assign those tasks to themselves, concentrating on the critical problems—food products, housing, consumer goods, social protection.

Otherwise a calamity will occur. It is already moving toward us. If the chaos in the economy cannot be stopped, we may have mass unemployment accompanied by a price explosion. This is the most dangerous social dynamite. Of course, as Central Committee Second Secretary A. N. Ilin commented, the party committees must chiefly help to orient themselves. It is not a matter, as it was in olden days, of dividing tractors among kolkhozes. But people must be reminded of their party responsibility!

Communists have a high energy potential. And they know how to respond instantaneously to changes in the situation. Proof of this is the decision made by the leadership of the RSFSR CP Central Committee to send a letter to the Uzbek CP Central Committee, requesting the rendering of immediate assistance to the RSFSR textile workers.

After the session we had a conversation with N. I. Samoylenko, Rostekstil partkom secretary. Nadezhda Ivanovna began by saying, "We hope that this help will not be delayed: the situation in the branch is simply critical. In general, I think that the republic's Communist Party should promote the economic reforms, using its right of legislative initiative and defending the interests of honest workers. That is how it will gain authority. People at the session proposed creating a council of secretaries of the party committees of the republic's ministries and departments. I do not agree with this. It seems to me that we ought not to shackle our initiative. There were many proposals that I support. On the whole, however, I was convinced that the people heading the

RSFSR Communist Party are people with firm positions, who are ready to work intensely to change for the better the present crisis situation in the economy and to find contact with the rank-and-file Communists."

At the present time this actually is necessary. It was no accident that S. A. Kalinin, who was recently elected as leader of the Yaroslavl Oblast party organization and who, at the session of the Politburo of the RSFSR Communist Party Central Committee, was confirmed in that position, says, "In the labor collectives on the eve of the new year, the healthy moods predominate. There has been a reduction in the exodus of people from the CPSU, and the fault-finding on the wave of which the Yaroslavl People's Front strove for political authority is finding fewer and fewer adherents. One of the reasons is that we ourselves are speaking openly about our mistakes. Discussing the materials of the Congress of USSR People's Deputies, the voters insist that the Communists must not refrain from deciding the socioeconomic problems. And when we again began to meet with the economic managers, we heard them say, 'Finally the obkom remembered us...'"

The Politburo of the RSFSR CP Central Committee supported the Congress's Message entitled "To the Peoples of the Country." The session also considered the work practice of the party committee at the Cherepovtsy Metallurgical Combine in reinforcing the party ranks; the status of member of the RSFSR CP Central Committee; and a number of questions pertaining to the republic's party life.

#### **Polozkov Addresses RSFSR CP Plenum 15 Nov**

*91UN0308A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA  
in Russian 16 Nov 90 Second Edition pp 1-3*

[Report by Comrade I.K. Polozkov, first secretary of the Communist Party of the RSFSR Central Committee, to joint plenum of Communist Party of the RSFSR Central Committee and Central Control Commission on 15 November in Moscow]

[Text] Dear Comrades!

The draft document that is to become the action program of the Communists of the RSFSR for the period immediately ahead was published more than a month ago. The Communist Party of the RSFSR Central Committee Secretariat and Politburo, the party Central Control Commission Presidium, and a group of invited scholars have tried to realize the recommendations of the constituent congress of our Communist Party and collate the debate that took place at it. Many ideas put forward as alternatives have been reflected. Account has been taken also of most important events in the social life of the Russian Federation and the whole country in the postcongress period, and the decisions of the CPSU Central Committee October Plenum and the congresses and conferences of public organizations and movements. We are to adopt this document with regard for the

exchange of opinions at today's enlarged meeting of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission.

### **I. Basic Features of the Crisis and Its Causes**

Today the Communists and millions of Russians are expecting of us a clear and honest answer to the questions: Why has perestroika been so long in producing the desired results? Why is progress along the path of the proclaimed humane, democratic socialism being impeded? What is happening to us and the country? Where are we headed?

In the time that has elapsed since the 28th CPSU Congress and the constituent congress of the Communist Party of the RSFSR the situation in the country and in the republic has continued to deteriorate. The course of events is confirming, unfortunately, that the present situation needs to be seen in no way other than as a slide toward catastrophe. It is thus that we define it in our document. From what do we proceed in this evaluation?

**The economy is disintegrating at a growing rate, and general chaos reigns.** This is at times portrayed as a natural process, as a necessary and natural break, virtually, with the command administrative system. However, the reality is such that, given the continued weakening of production ties and the interaction of the work force, so serious a decline in production that this will essentially mean the clinical death of the national economic complex is inevitable. The outfits of many enterprises are threatened with mass layoffs. According to expert estimates, the scale not even of market as yet but simply destabilization unemployment will constitute many millions. Or it will once again be necessary to set the printing presses running at full speed and pay out unearned money. Which, naturally, will result in a new surge of inflation and the collapse of all the good intentions in respect of a stabilization of finances.

**The natural and legitimate aspiration to have done with wage leveling is in practice being replaced by a scandalous disregard for social justice.** The material position of broad strata of the population is deteriorating rapidly. Simultaneously the living standard of our home-grown rich is rising just as rapidly. Living as parasites on the socioeconomic difficulties and disorders, millionaires are mushrooming.

**People are losing faith in the capacity of the authorities to bring even relative order to bear in the country and organize work on resolving urgent practical problems.** The republic, like the whole country, is entering the winter period with an ill-prepared economy and a serious energy shortage. And this is a serious threat to both production and municipal services, particularly of the large cities. A pretty good harvest was cultivated in the present year, except for potatoes, vegetables, and fruit. There can be no question of starvation, it would seem. But it is possible under the conditions of a disorganized economy. Inadequate food, cold homes and workplaces, a decline in the quality of medical treatment owing to a shortage of medication—all this threatens

epidemics. The commodity market could develop, is already developing, into a black market, where a working person with his income can do nothing. The general shortages are, as you know, becoming a nutrient medium of an explosive growth of crime.

**Tension in society is growing further.** It is perfectly apparent that political disagreements have begun to assume an antagonistic nature. Not simply a struggle for power but for the nature of power is under way. People with serious economic power want to occupy the pre-dominant positions in politics also. The emphasis is being put on the kindling of intolerance and hatred. A civil "cold" war has essentially been unleashed in the country, and in a number of places even it is turning into a hot war. Broad-based information aggression against the constitutional system and the state has been launched. And a number of recently elected leaders of soviets and executive committees have plunged head-first into the passions of mass meetings, hoping to earn for themselves the reputation of leaders of the "new style" from the confrontation and clash of public movements and forces.

**The process of the USSR's disintegration is approaching the point beyond which it could become irreversible.** The incessant interethnic conflicts are striking devastating blows at the foundations of statehood and placing in jeopardy the well-being, honor, and dignity and life itself of millions of people. The chain reaction of these conflicts has even reached the Russian Federation.

Many people are worried that together with the processes of recuperation of the international atmosphere, East-West **military-strategic parity is increasingly being upset.** It is this parity, achieved by the incredible exertion of the Soviet people, that served as the basis of the salutary changes. For the first time in many years essentially the country has found itself without military and political allies. The Army, the state security authorities, and the procuracy are being subjected to unbridled defamation. Unthinking, badly organized conversion is undermining the scientific and technological possibilities of the defense complex. None of these questions of exceptional significance for the country's national interests is being properly and publicly discussed among the people.

As observed at many report and election meetings in the party organizations, the decline in discipline and morals and the progressive loss of conscientiousness and civic responsibility are being reflected increasingly in the public mood and behavior. Estrangement from the past, loss of confidence in the present, and doubts as to the future are becoming sources of social apathy and nihilism.

Historical experience teaches that such a development of events naturally leads to the establishment of a totalitarian regime. Such a danger is obvious today. And it is becoming increasingly menacing with every passing day.



On the one hand the extremism of the so-called "democrats" thirsting for power in the name of the establishment of bourgeois practices, on the other, a strengthening of the conservative syndrome drawing strength from the mass disenchantment with perestroika.

I say all this not to dramatize an already grim situation. But if we wish to overcome it, we must know the whole truth about it and tell people about it.

The situation is such that it is making extremely dangerous any politicking and play of personal ambitions. It is essentially a question of the country's survival, of national salvation. And our priority task is seeking to ensure that all Communists and all honest people evaluate from precisely this viewpoint any political initiative and any political action. Here lies the criterion making it possible to distinguish between real concern for the good of society and starry-eyed Manilovism [smug day-dreaming], political rowdiness, and demagoguery.

We know that the Communists and the party organizations are agonizing over an answer to the question: What is to be done? There are numerous letters on this subject to our party's Central Committee and Central Control Commission.

You will agree, I believe, that it is first necessary to ascertain the sources of the current situation. To investigate **why in the sixth year of perestroika we are forced to speak about the threat of national catastrophe.**

I would remind you that perestroika itself began with the fact of a precrisis state of our society having been ascertained. The task of the transformations that were initiated was to lead the country onto the path of dynamic development. But instead of avoiding the impending economic crisis, we were pulled into an all-embracing crisis.

What is happening cannot be explained merely by the deformations of the stagnation period and the defects of the past. As you know, the capital's party organization has raised the question of the need for a clear and unprejudiced analysis of the mistakes and miscalculations that have been made even in the course of perestroika. I believe that it is necessary to support this position of Moscow's Communists in all party organizations. We must not be like our predecessors, who attempted to explain everything bad in life by inherited "birthmarks."

The CPSU Central Committee October Plenum and oblast and kray conferences spoke repeatedly of the weakness of authority; of a situation where the leadership is at times seeking solutions randomly and blindly; of the belated nature of theoretical and political comprehension of the practice of society's renewal; of the spontaneity of processes; of the superficiality of many political assessments, when destructive phenomena have been attributed to an invigorating flood of popular assertiveness; of the insufficient consideration and, as a

result, inconsistency of the reforms; of the condescending attitude toward the littering of the social consciousness with new myths; of the irresponsibility of the new pretenders to leadership confusing the people with the continuous organization of mass meetings and generous promises from overseas uncles. **But, most importantly, of the fact that it has not been possible—nor have certain people wished it—to involve the party masses and the whole people in political creativity and creative work.**

We evidently need to go further in our interpretation of what is happening. However galling it is to admit it, we are today confronting a manifest **process of the degeneration of socialist perestroika** into something else. Into what precisely? What goals are being pursued? What is the causation? We are, naturally, not ready today for any in any way full answer to these questions. I would like preliminarily to express just a few thoughts.

First, I believe that a major miscalculation was made from the very outset, that the danger of conservatism in the party, among its personnel, and in the machinery of state was manifestly exaggerated, and that a search for a mainstay elsewhere began. Essentially a concentrated assault on the party was launched, and an opposition to it was artificially created. "Radicals," "popular frontiers," and "national revivalists" having neither clear-cut political positions nor constructive programs were accepted as the harbingers and superintendents of perestroika, and the party was increasingly shoved aside from active participation in the affairs of society.

Life confirmed the rightness of those who warned that it was necessary to have started with the party, with its conversion into an effective instrument of socialist renewal. It is clear today that the CPSU with its discipline and international composition could have continued to have dependably bound the alliance of peoples and to have contributed to our society's progressive development.

The democratization process could and should have been stimulated by a strengthening of organization, of which the party was at that time perfectly capable. But something else happened. The CPSU proved to be largely paralyzed. Under a fire of criticism from all sides, it was unable to tackle many urgent tasks in good time. And perestroika failed to generate an equivalent force in terms of possibilities. This was the decisive circumstance that led to general collapse.

Meanwhile the opposition, which had existed originally as a support structure for the transformations that had been commenced, gradually became an organized force foisting its decisions on the country under the threat of the shedding of the political leadership and a forcible change in the social system. And according to the logic of counteraction the tendency of a part of society toward simple recoil has been making itself felt increasingly manifestly.

Second, the political mimicry of the opposition and the ambiguous position in which the CPSU found itself

created a complex situation after the elections to the soviets. The new authorities found themselves infected to this extent or the other not only with the viruses of mass meetingitis but also of opposition. Many deputies, having assumed office even, are orienting themselves not toward creation but toward struggle, not toward the expression of the vital interests of their electorate but toward personal self-assertion. The new authorities have in a number of places proven even less receptive to criticism than the old ones. But the saddest part is that they are frequently demonstrating managerial helplessness, for which they are attempting to compensate with newer and newer outbursts of denunciation. The work atmosphere of many soviets is in one way or another determined by a spirit of confrontation and an endeavor at all costs to find culprits wherever possible, only not in the style of activity of one's own soviet.

Third, even now there are sufficient grounds for saying that external and internal forces deliberately steering in the direction of the disintegration of our society, the burial of socialism, and an end of us as a great power have become deeply embedded in our political process and are exerting a growing influence on it. Both conservatives and liberals, both genuine and imaginary democracy, and both the old authorities and the new ones are a matter of profound indifference to them. Both are for them just pawns in a big geopolitical game, which they are playing, it has to be acknowledged, decisively and adroitly.

I repeat: I am voicing thoughts of a preliminary nature, not claiming an exhaustive and absolutely precise analysis. I would like them to be the start of a broader and, I hope, more detailed, thorough discussion on the topic broached. The present situation, in our opinion, should be seen not as a failure of perestroika but as a crisis of its methods and the deformation of its original model. And we will within the framework of the CPSU Rules insist on a close examination of our position, not shunning an analysis of our own mistakes and omissions. We are confronted squarely with questions determining the fate of the fatherland, our system, and our movement, and the very survival of socialist civilization.

## II. Main Strategic Goals and Current Political Tasks of Russia's Communists

Proceeding from an understanding of the situation in society and the causes of the crisis development, I would like to further set forth what the RSFSR Communist Party Central Committee Politburo and Secretariat see as the main directions of our activity.

I would remind you that the most diverse interests were manifested at the time of discussion of the idea of the formation of the Communist Party of the RSFSR. The vast majority of Russia's Communists aspires to mold the republic Communist Party as a real force capable of finding ways toward the solution of urgent problems. Many Russians link their hopes with the Communist Party of the RSFSR. And we do not have a right to

deceive their expectations. The document we are discussing today determines clearly: The republic party organization is fully resolved to become in practice a political force expressing and upholding the fundamental interests of the working people. It is open to all citizens of the republic interested in a renewal of the CPSU and wishing to contribute actively to realization of the socialist choice and the economic and spiritual revival of the Russian Federation.

However, there are other approaches to the activity of the Communist Party of the RSFSR also. Some people, taking cover behind pseudo-democratic phrases and pursuing splittist ends, would like to use the organization of Russia's Communists as an implement of struggle against the CPSU Central Committee. Others hoped with the aid of the creation of a republic party center to "mothball" and preserve pre-perestroika practices in the party. We declare with all due certainty that neither splittists nor those pining for the comforts of stagnation will succeed in foisting their positions and modus operandi on the Communist Party of the RSFSR and its Central Committee.

Russia's Communists are a part of the CPSU. This also we deemed it necessary to emphasize once again in the draft document, rejecting all the inventions, which are still making the rounds. We will live by the rules common to the CPSU and in accordance with the decisions of the 28th CPSU Congress.

But this by no means signifies that we renounce the right to our own understanding of actual processes, intellectual initiative, and independence in the determination of our position on this specific issue or the other. I would put it like this: We consider the republic party organization a factor of renewal based on the creative development of the theoretical store of knowledge and style and methods of work.

Our position is that the basic values of perestroika are not in doubt. It means constructive initiative, democratization, information freedom, openness to the world, renewal of the USSR on the basis of the real sovereignty of the republics which are a part of it, fundamental modernization of the economic basis, the creation of a socialist state based on the rule of law, and spiritual and cultural revival. All these were and remain for us most important goals.

At the same time, however, we say frankly and openly that the adopted methods of the accomplishment of these goals are not to a large extent withstanding the test of reality. As a result, the goals themselves are either hanging in air or becoming a cover for activity in a different direction. And are ultimately being discredited in the eyes of the population.

Members of the Politburo and secretaries of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the RSFSR recently attended party conferences, met with the activists, and conversed with many Communists and non-party persons. There is every reason to maintain that the

overall mood in the party is one of growing unease and concern and, at times, even confusion, depression, and hopelessness. And above all this—the justified anger on account of the fact that the hopes of perestroika are proving to have been deceived.

The situation compels reflection on the logic of the revolutionary process. Strategic goals are incompatible with bustle and with attempts to accomplish them at a stroke. Movement toward these goals does not always follow a straight path, and halts, breathing spaces, and retreats even are possible and advisable. Revolutionary strategy is not an opportunist surge of enthusiasm but long-term, day-to-day work. We are somehow starting to become disaccustomed to the latter.

It would seem to us that a situation has now taken shape where it is necessary first and foremost to restore the manageability of society and normalize life sustenance, see how the land lies, regroup, and carefully analyze the program of further progress. Our document says with the utmost clarity: "The main thing is to halt the slide toward catastrophe and stabilize the social and political situation. And we need to do this not in order subsequently to go back. There is no returning to the past. We need to direct revolutionary perestroika into the channel of creation and unite for this all truly democratic forces."

How are the set goals to be achieved?

The idea of the creation of volunteer committees for the salvation and defense of socialism is maturing in places. They could unite all people who are of a genuinely patriotic mind and who think in state terms and reflect the interests of the people.

It would be a good thing if the party committees together with the Communist deputies were to be the sponsors of this undertaking. It is not important what these committees are called. It is important that the labor collectives, as legally recognized subjects of local self-management, hook up with the legal systems of the civil society. It is necessary to learn self-management both at the place of residence and the place of work.

I wish to emphasize once again that radical transformations cannot be implemented without firm political authority. And we appeal today to M.S. Gorbachev, president of the country and general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, to adopt the most decisive measures to bring order to bear in the country. If the dystrophy of power continues, this will force us to revise our attitude toward the actions of the center.

One has the impression that some people are either deliberately isolating Comrade Gorbachev from the information available to the work force concerning the true state of affairs in the country or are attempting to divert him from the decisive actions which the people today demand. It has to be said also that the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and Comrade V.A. Ivashko are not insistently putting before the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee the questions

which today demand a solution in accordance with the rights accorded the president and with the rights available to the Communists in the soviets of people's deputies. The government and its chairman, N.I. Ryzhkov, which should at this critical time be working in accordance with the conditions of a special, emergency situation and should be endowed with sufficient authority to rectify the state of affairs, are being defamed before our very eyes. People are attempting every day, essentially, to force the government to abandon adopted decisions and to question all its actions. We appeal to the Communist deputies, members of the USSR Supreme Soviet and, particularly, to district deputies of the USSR from the CPSU and the leaders of all Union republics to give the government an opportunity to work normally. Otherwise we will not emerge from the current situation.

We understand, of course, that firm power in the country and the republic is possible only on the basis of public consent. Let everyone to whom not personal ambitions and not false pride but the interests of the people are dear unite. We propose for this period **the establishment of a kind of moratorium in the political struggle and that intelligent compromise be found.** We propose that all political parties, movements, and organizations examine together questions of a stabilization of the state of affairs in the republic and the country, **form an Alliance of Democratic Forces in Support of Perestroika**, and contribute by common efforts to Russia's revival and renewal.

**Securing civil peace and harmony in society is an inalienable prerequisite to a solution of key political and socio-economic problems.** And the task of the **preservation and consolidation of the USSR** takes the primary place here.

We believe that the elaboration and conclusion of a new Union treaty brooks no delay. We are convinced that this should have been done considerably earlier, 18 months to two years ago at least. Unfortunately, time has passed by. The connivance at nationalism and separatism is too far gone. We are to blame for the fact that we were for a long time unable to discern behind the masks of the national revivalists nationalist thugs who had made for themselves idols of the fascist stooges and who operate by their methods. The centrifugal trends which are gaining momentum and the "wave of sovereignties" which has rolled by have created a real threat to our country's integrity.

We cannot be naive and fail to understand that there are today also powerful forces in whom the mere existence of the Soviet Union evokes rejection and hatred. Sovietologists hostile toward us are currently commanding a high price. The long-familiar ideas of "contributing to the disintegration of the Soviet Empire," "ouster of the Bolshevik regime," "support for the opposition," and so on and so forth may be heard in their latest memorandums, reports, and recommendations. This is not surprising. What is odd is something else: Why are these tunes being picked up so readily in our country? A majestic historical tragedy, before which the Time of

Troubles known from textbooks pales, is unfolding right before our eyes. The new false prophets have a mandate of inviolability, immense resources acquired from it is not known where, duplicating equipment, and mass media, and nor does the law mean anything to them.

Nonetheless, a cross should not be placed on the USSR. The Soviet state has sufficient resources and moral authority to rein in the handful of figures who have overstepped the bounds and who are picking apart a great power bit by bit to the detriment of the fundamental interests of their peoples. Soviet people of various nationalities will have the wisdom to figure out what's what. Let the people independently choose the form of their statehood on the basis of a new Union treaty. We are profoundly convinced that only in a united and renewed Union will we be strong, free, and sovereign.

The Communist Party Central Committee intends to sponsor an initiative concerning the organization of an all-Union congress of democratic and patriotic forces interested in the preservation and renewal of the USSR.

International in essence, the Communist Party of the RSFSR will strengthen ties to the Communists of the other Union republics. We are meeting with both understanding and reciprocal steps on the part of our party comrades in all the Union republics. At the same time we will support and develop in every possible way processes of the democratization of relations between the peoples of our country and seek optimum new forms of them.

We view the sovereignty of the Russian Federation in this context also. While championing the idea of Russia's sovereignty, we recognize, however, that it may be genuinely sovereign only as an inalienable part of the Soviet Union. And only with the assurance of the necessary sovereignty for the autonomous formations which are a part of it. Communists, all citizens, and people's deputies of soviets of all levels should know the position of the Communist Party of the RSFSR Central Committee on this issue. We, comrades, must do everything to convey it to people.

A most fundamental aspect of the democratic process of the present stage is undoubtedly connected with the formulation of a new basic law of the republic. Yes, it is urgent. But would it be opportune prior to the conclusion of an all-Union treaty which would determine the constitutional and legal character of the country as a whole? An efficiently working basic law is hardly possible in the atmosphere of instability in economic and social relations and their as yet maturing forms. It would be more correct to devise and adopt a number of amendments to the current Constitution of the republic. This is one point.

Another: It is known that a working group of the RSFSR Constitutional Commission has prepared a draft basic law of the Russian Federation. It is coming to be propagandized already. Yet the draft is in need of serious critical analysis. It is a question not of democratic

transformations but of the abolition of the soviets and replacement of the form of state government. Renunciation of the historic choice made by the people in 1917 and confirmed by the 28th CPSU Congress is proposed, essentially.

In this connection we say with all certainty, expressing the wishes of the Communists of the Russian Federation, that the main thing in our strategy is the renewal of society. But not for the sake of renewal in general. We are for the socialist suffusion of social life and against its "cleansing" of socialism. We proceed here from fundamental values, the essence of which is well-known. We are for a society in which a person feels confident and safe and in which he is assured on the basis of the development of production of decent material living conditions and the free development and application of his capabilities. The mass of Soviet people is devoted to socialism, which they demonstrated convincingly on 7 November. And the supporters of abrupt reversals, to the start of the century, will have to reckon with this.

And one further point. The authors of the draft constitution are, in our opinion, displaying manifest haste and endeavoring to keep up an accelerating pace of the law-making marathon and not afford not only the electorate but the deputies themselves even an opportunity to comprehend the content of the bills.

The people should have the conditions for familiarization with all drafts of the basic law—a reasonable amount of time and a normal atmosphere for its discussion. It is essential to take account of the opinion of the electorate, the work force, and public organizations, and for citizens of the RSFSR to consciously approach a choice of paths of development of the republic. Our people are intelligent, magnanimous, and wise. They have experience and the heroism of accomplishments. And they can make their choice correctly and fittingly.

The decree on power will be presented for final approval at the coming Congress of People's Deputies. The draft contains a manifestly discriminatory, Arakcheyev-like clause restricting our party's activity in the work force. Communist deputies will oppose this clause and encroachments on human rights. And we appeal to the good sense not only of the Communist deputies but to all honest deputies: Look at this from an objective, correct angle.

On the threshold of the congress we invite Communist deputies to a special seminar. Its program is oriented toward preparations for practical participation in the consideration of basic issues at the Congress of People's Deputies.

It would be useful, I believe, if the party organizations locally were to sponsor deputies' meetings with the work force on the eve of the congress. It would be possible at such meetings to hear their reports and to require them to express their view of the problem of stabilization of the socioeconomic and political situation. It is important

that the deputies go to the congress with a sound knowledge of the opinion of the working people and their electorate.

A most important direction of the party's activity in strengthening the power of the people is constructive cooperation with the soviets. Through the Communist people's deputies the party organizations may present legislative initiatives, elaborate concepts and drafts of solutions of questions of principle, organize mass discussion of them, and contribute to their realization.

Let us draw conclusions from these actual facts: Where the party committees and soviets of people's deputies have established businesslike ties and cooperation, vital questions of the life of the people are resolved more successfully and a healthy moral-psychological atmosphere is maintained, on the whole. The experience of joint work with the soviets of the Amur, Belgorod, Kaliningrad, Lipetsk, Penza, and Orenburg Obkoms [Oblast Party Committees], Pskov Oblast's Pechorskiy Raykom [Rayon Party Committee], and a whole number of others testifies to this.

Tula Oblast's Novomoskovskiy Gorkom [City Party Committee], for example, sponsored the elaboration of programs of preparation of the city and rayon for work under the new conditions. The gorkom commissions comprehensively work up questions which the electorate is putting to the Communist people's deputies, after which they are submitted for consideration in the soviet. The main thing is that party initiative has not been lost here.

And, on the contrary, where instead of specific business there are merely mutual complaints and personal ambitions and where the party committees have affected a pose of persons with a sense of grievance and are adopting a wait-and-see attitude: you have been given power, you carry on, we will watch—both friction and confrontation are arising there, as a rule, and problems of human existence are receding into the background. There are more than enough of such examples also, unfortunately. We realize that establishing contacts is difficult today, nonetheless it is essential that this be done, we have no other way.

The Guidelines of the Activity of the Communist Party of the RSFSR speak of the importance of the continued democratization of the electoral system. Public opinion is disturbed by the fact that the workers and collective farm members were able at the elections of people's deputies of the USSR, the RSFSR, and the local soviets to gain merely a negligible number of seats. They were simply pushed aside from the elections. The party organizations are duty bound to assist the work force to convey in energetic form its opinion in this connection.

I believe that the idea of the creation of soviet authorities directly at the enterprises for the solution of all questions connected with social protection merits attention. Perhaps self-defense squads, which are already being discussed locally, will be necessary also. In the event, for

example, of a repudiation of the predatory "privatization" at issue in the notorious Program-90. It says plainly there, after all, that several dozen fine fellows could, for example, show up at kolkhoz [collective farm] and declare the land their property.

### III. Ways of Improving and Renewing the Economy and Protecting the Social Interests of the Working People

Comrades! A key problem of social life is provision for the transition of the economy to market relations.

Some critics of the constituent congress of the Communist Party of the RSFSR reproached us for having renounced the market and the orientation toward the market economy. This is wrong. We have studied historical processes well enough to understand that the market is a universal value and has been in existence in all times. For us the market is not identical to capitalism. Market relations existed before capitalism and they may today be developed perfectly well outside of capitalism.

What, in our view, are basic parameters of a controlled market economy of the socialist type?

First, the market should be oriented toward the social requirements of the population, actively contribute to the reorganization of the seriously deformed structure of the economy, and stimulate an expansion of the volume of production and the scale of scientific research.

Second, the main figure should be the producer of material and spiritual assets, and the highest authority, the authority of honest, creative, and conscientious labor. No Soviet individual capable and desirous of working conscientiously, as also veterans who have invested their labor in the creation of social wealth, may be hurt or deprived of his share.

Third, the market should be under the control of a democratic Soviet state with a real opportunity to regulate socioeconomic processes and a comprehensive system of social safeguards.

Fourth, this must be a single, all-Union market, as the economic basis for the pursuit of an international policy bringing the peoples closer together, uniting their economic interests, and making it possible to most fully develop and realize their production and spiritual potential.

In developing various models of the market economy, Russia's Communists will struggle to ensure that the interests of the working people not be hurt here, that the manpower and whole professions that are released undergo adequate retraining at society's expense and be used rationally in other sectors of the economy, and that the working man not fear for his own future and the future of his children and always be sure of just compensation for his labor.

Avoiding the negative consequences of the capitalist market, which has throughout its history ruthlessly destroyed whole social groups and classes—this is the



mission of a controlled socialist-type market economy, transition to which we have already begun. Russia's Communists will fight to ensure that the program of economic recovery recently adopted by the USSR Supreme Soviet be embodied everywhere sufficiently comprehensively, profoundly, and fully.

We will render Soviet power our support where necessary, but will simultaneously make a close study of actual processes, working out the optimum models of the introduction of market-type relations, and counteracting haste and an endeavor to impose on people this approach or the other by force.

We realize what a fierce assault will be launched against us for this position by the supporters of a transition to capitalism. But we must not turn aside from this path.

I would like in this connection to say a few words regarding so-called "privatization." We do not share the illusion that it is possible in privatization to find a method of bringing the owner closer to the means of production, allegedly ridding the public property, which we have accumulated at large-scale industrial enterprises and agricultural associations, of "neutrality," ownerlessness, and so forth.

Privatization understood as the transfer of the entire public economy from collective to private hands is a small-shopkeeper philosophy. Nor should it, in addition, be forgotten that such privatization represents an alienation of the workman from the means of production and makes production far more "neutral."

Our society has come by its social experience hard, by decades of trial and error. As a result, granted all the inefficiency of our production, strong ties of social mutual assistance and the concentration of resources in periods of national and social difficulties have been developed with us. Would it really be sensible today to destroy these ties?

We have already paid dearly for the fact that a whole number of centralized mechanisms has been destroyed before new systems of production relations and interdependencies have been created. It is all the more criminal to try to persuade our people that it is possible to live comfortably on unemployment benefit merely because millions live this way in the United States. This is a deception and an insult to the working man.

However, even PRAVDA would today have us believe that unemployment is inevitable, as is the stratification of society into "poor, rich, and very rich." As far as many other publications are concerned, this stratification is being presented as the sole path to future prosperity. They are summoning people to a new social paradise, where the basis of universal prosperity will be the "very rich." From them, allegedly, some things will filter down to the poor also, and as a result there will be a rise in the overall living standard. Science and art will flourish thanks to the munificence of the rich.

I oversimplify and exaggerate nothing. The extreme desirability of patronage of the arts for a cultural upsurge was mentioned in no place other than at a meeting of authoritative figures of culture with the president of the USSR.

To slogans of the destruction of stereotypes, de-ideologization, de-partyization, and such like, the ideology of the bourgeoisie in its most primitive, most reactionary version is being introduced to the people's consciousness. Plans for the salvation of the fatherland and the introduction of the country to modern civilization are in one way or another based on this ideology.

But let us suppose that we really do need the "very rich," meaning entrepreneurs. Only where are they to be found? Are we to import them? The enterprise about which our alleged "free" and "independent" commentators are dreaming took shape in the West not over decades even but centuries. Having a large amount of money does not mean that one is a businessman. Our domestic moneybags on the waiting list for Mercedes at 800,000 rubles apiece are by no means organizers of production.

Expecting them to be capable of some kind of creation and of the rational organization of our economy is the profoundest delusion. Their social experience amounts to dragging off everything that lies in temptation's way. But that at which they will be really brilliantly adept is organizing the division of the social pie not according to labor but according to whoever knows more dexterously how to lay his hands on it. Incidentally, this is being done even now. Their resourcefulness and activity are growing, and their income is fabulous, but the overall property of the country is dwindling here.

We need to take a sober look at things. If attempts are made to introduce capitalism here, it will by no means be its Swedish, Japanese, or German but its home-grown model in its worst, that is, criminal-profitteering, version. There should be no illusions on this score.

We are assured that the people are fed up with talk about all kinds of "isms." What, it is said, is the difference—capitalism, socialism—as long as there are the basic necessities. But they are being crafty and would like legally to hang on the people's necks thieves, embezzlers, and all kinds of con men, who are even now being portrayed as the heroes of our times.

Comrades!

The situation demands of Russia's Communists **specific political initiatives to stabilize the economy** in order to halt the economy's slide into the abyss.

It is not a question of once again substituting for someone or other. But we believe that, owing to the extraordinary situation, **it is essential to mobilize the party's entire potential for the solution of urgent questions of economic policy**, which should be at the center of the government's attention.

**It is the task of the party organizations of the production outfits.** Communist managers and specialists working at production enterprises and in organs of economic administration, and people's deputies to do everything to **rescue the contract campaign for next year** and strive for strict compliance with supply discipline and restoration of a steady production rhythm. The narrowly pragmatic approach, economic anarchy, and group egotism are dependable traveling companions only on the road to deadlock. The genuine democratization and updating of production, on the other hand, means mutual exactingness and responsibility, and for us Communists, stringency also.

A key role in the shaping of the sociopolitical character of society and the nature of its further development is being performed by the transformation of property relations. **Communists of the Russian Federation see the urgent need for denationalization and the development of diverse forms of ownership and advocate a multistructure economy.** And let us not be accused otherwise.

Ownership of the land is a special question. It is understandable that mistakes in its solution are fraught with the danger of irreparable consequences, from famine through internecine strife, for which the people would have to pay. Of course, it is for the people themselves and the working people to adopt the decisions on ownership of the land. And we Communists will insist on the holding of a referendum on this question. Our position is defined in the document we are discussing today and has been comprehensively reflected in the draft guidelines: We are opposed to the selling off and transfer of land to private ownership. This is needed not by those who are about to tackle the Food Program and not by those who wish to feed the people. It is needed by those who wish to own estates and farm laborers.

**Rethinking social policy, it is the party's task to make it conform in full to the new economic challenge.**

This policy is multifaceted and cannot be reduced merely to social protection, which, nonetheless, remains a most important component of it.

It is known that one-fourth of the population of the country and the republic lives below the poverty line. And for this reason our thoughts and actions will be addressed through legislative initiative and public actions to veterans, trainee and student youth, invalids, and the needy strata.

Understandably, nor will we forget the workers, employees, and specialists of large-scale enterprises, who constitute essentially three-fourths of the national economic complex, and the workers of the countryside, who are so in need of social renewal and support. Tens of thousands of servicemen, particularly those who have recently been returning to the motherland, mainly to Russia, from overseas garrisons, are in need of social protection and the solution of numerous economic and everyday problems. The Communist Party of the RSFSR

is true to its idea of defense of the interests of the people and will not shirk its responsibility to them.

In this connection we would consider it expedient that a special RSFSR Congress of People's Deputies session examine draft laws on the protection of human rights in the period when market relations are coming into being and on mechanisms for the social protection of the population. This could be done in a package of documents pertaining to stabilization of the economy and the transition to market relations, the revival of the Russian countryside, and the development of the agro-industrial complex. These items are on the agenda of the coming congress.

**We need to ensure that the work force and all working strata not only see their position in the new system of socioeconomic relations but also participate actively in their formation.** This is essentially the central issue of the party's social policy.

Today the authority of the primary party organizations at work depends directly on how actively they defend the work force and help it exercise its right to the free and conscious choice of forms of ownership and the organization of economic and social activity.

And one further glaring problem directly connected with the stabilization of the social atmosphere in society and people's everyday disposition. I refer to crime and its unchecked growth. In less than two years almost 42,000 persons have died at the hands of murderers and on account of all kinds of slackness and the nonadoption of measures on the part of the central authorities in the country and the republic. Just think about this figure!

We believe that the time has come to arouse the party organizations, the work force, and the population of the streets and neighborhoods to the struggle against the violence and brazen venal crime engulfing our society. We Communists have been and wish to be the force profoundly linked with the working people's cherished aspirations and hopes. We believe that people will not only understand but also support us.

Comrades! Political speculation concerning our history and a commercial, more precisely, mercenary-minded, opportunist approach to the spiritual sphere are becoming a source of social tension and conflict. This is a nutrient medium for vandalism, the desecration of monuments, brutality, and arbitrary action. People are justifiably angry and are demanding that the authority and force of the law be used, finally, in respect of those who are attempting to trample the historical memory of the people.

The idea of the mistaken nature of October, which allegedly interrupted the natural course of the historical process and should be viewed virtually as a crime, has purposefully and persistently been introduced in recent years and continues to be introduced to the public consciousness. Assertions that the October revolution was merely a coup in the name of the seizure of power by

a handful of fanatics are being heard in the press, at mass meetings, and in works laying claim to a scholarly approach.

The civil war, terror, the death of millions of people, even the fascists' attack on the Soviet Union—all this is being imputed to October, Lenin, and the Communists. Attempts are being made to expunge from the consciousness of people, particularly of the youth, the grateful remembrance of those who at the cost of their lives saved our country and the world from fascism. Instead of pride in our heroic but also tragic history, some people would like to instill in us blame for it and are demanding repentance. This, it might have seemed, is impossible in any civilized society.

But people blinded and deafened by anticommunist hysteria are bitterly destroying monuments to Lenin and the participants in the revolution and the Great Patriotic War. It is astounding that this barbarity is in a whole number of places being encouraged and supported by the decisions of the soviets and their executive authorities.

Just as earlier the ashes of Aleksandr Nevskiy were jesuitically mocked and the images of outstanding fellow citizens—Suvorov, Kutuzov, Dostoyevskiy, and Yezenin—were consistently expunged from the popular memory, so today also attempts are being made, under a cover of perestroika verbiage, to blacken names dear to us.

On the pretext of historical justice decisions are being signed in haste in the Moscow City Soviet on name changes which are essentially an insult to our national dignity. The names of Lermontov, Chaykovskiy, Khmel'nitskiy, Razin, Chkalov, and Gagarin, who constitute the pride and glory of our people, have become unsuitable. This is being done not in some unimportant town but in the capital of the Union, the capital of the republic, in circumvention of the public opinion of the capital itself. Why does the president of the USSR remain silent? Why is the Constitutional Council silent about this? Why are Russia's party organizations and people's deputies not speaking out? Why are Muscovites silent?

I would like to remind you in this connection that even in Paris there is a Rue Stalingrad, thus named following our people's victory at the battle of Stalingrad. It has never even occurred to anyone in Paris to rename it. So will we in deference to the ambitions of each new Moscow City Soviet chairman organize in the streets and squares of a great capital a dance of names and signboards? Our organs of democracy are silent on this subject. They are remaining silent even when unbridled anticommunists, specifically, the NTS [National Labor Union] center, form their branches in Moscow and other cities. They have always seen the Union as the enemy.

An office of the Posev Publishers has been set up in Moscow's Oktyabrskiy Rayon, and it is intended to finance the activity of such branches or it is already being financed in other parts of the country. Why is the capital's Oktyabrskiy Soviet silent? Why are the people's

deputies tolerating this? They know full well the reputation of the NTS. We appeal today to the deputies, primarily the Communists, first and foremost the deputies from the Central Committee: Do not pretend that you see nothing and do not turn your back on what is happening in the country. You should understand that this is the start of collapse, and you will be answerable to the people for all this.

Comrades, we cannot allow the unbridled chaos of self-emphasis and personal ambitions to leave behind it a wilderness in the sphere of the human spirit. Without respect for the historical memory and cultural traditions there are no, nor can there be, normal human relations, no continuity of the generations, no future for society, no future for any state.

The capital of our state, Moscow, and Leningrad, the cradle of the revolution, are a special question. I am convinced that their political and legal status should be regulated by a law of the USSR Supreme Soviet and should not be subject to the inordinate zeal of the apologies for renamers.

In the stormy debates on the ways out of the crisis and the concerns for our daily bread we should not lose sight of what determines the moral health of society and its intellectual potential—the spiritual sphere. Narrow pragmatism based on opportunist advantage is unacceptable here. Despite all the economic woes and difficulties, **we believe that the organs of state power and administration and society as a whole are duty bound to give pride of place to the development of education, science, and culture, which are today in a miserable state. As the guidelines say, the Communist Party of the RSFSR will energetically support all practical steps here.**

Perestroika has brought about a powerful upsurge of the national self-awareness of the peoples inhabiting our country and the republic. But there has simultaneously been a stimulation of forces which are, not unsuccessfully, deforming the sacred national feeling and bringing it to the point of nationalist blindness.

The Communists of the RSFSR cannot be reconciled with the fact that in certain regions of the Russian Federation and other republics the Russian-speaking population is identified with the exponents of the administrative command system and that blame for the economic and social disorders and the increasing political tension in society are being shifted onto it.

**Our task is to direct the growing national self-awareness into a noble patriotic channel.** To do everything within our power to ensure that the wounded dignity of the Russian people and all Russians not assume perverted forms. And not descend to the level of answering challenge with challenge, however much we are pushed to do so. We have been and will remain decided opponents of great- and lesser-power chauvinism, racism, anti-Semitism, and all forms of religious and national intolerance.

The Communist Party of the RSFSR states clearly and definitely in the guidelines: We will not leave in the lurch those for whom Russia is the historical motherland. We will **emphatically insist** on the adoption by the president of the USSR and the Supreme Soviets of the country and the republic of **urgent and all-embracing measures to protect the life, civil rights, and property of representatives of the peoples of the RSFSR residing in zones of interethnic conflict.**

We believe it necessary to form a commission from the ranks of people's deputies of the USSR and the RSFSR to study the state of affairs in Lithuania connected with the violation of civil rights. We believe that the losses of people who have found themselves in the position of refugees must be fully compensated by the governments of the Union and autonomous republics on whose territory they resided and where their constitutional rights have been flouted.

Under the auspices of the Communist Party Central Committee we intend to form a voluntary council which will study on a permanent basis the whole set of problems of the life of Russians outside of the RSFSR and prepare the corresponding proposals for the Central Committee and the groups of deputies.

A voluntary committee for relations with Russian emigres is also needed.

#### **V. Stimulating the Activity of All Components of the Party**

Comrades!

We understand clearly that the Communist Party of the RSFSR will increase the people's trust in it if it acquires a spiritual and moral character in keeping with the times and ensures the **power of the party masses, openness, and democratism.** Without repeating what has been said in our document in this connection, I would like to emphasize the following.

The tasks of the party's democratic renewal are being tackled today primarily in primary party organizations. Without slackening party influence in the production sphere, **it is essential to look anew at the work of the Communists according to the place of residence.** Questions troubling the population, including social, environmental, and others, are being raised increasingly often here also. It is to here that the center of political struggle, particularly in the period of election campaigns, is shifting. We need to move more boldly toward the creation of territorial party organizations of a new type, having reinforced them with skillful organizers and propagandists, and to assemble little by little experience of political work according to the place of residence.

You know that the report and election campaign in the republic party organizations is drawing to a close. To speak of its most notable features, the main thing, perhaps, is the fact that the Communists are gradually shaking off the torpor and confusion in the face of the

novelty and complexity of the situation, and the aspiration to constructive work is strengthening. And there is currently no more important task for the party than the restoration of the trust in it of the worker and peasant movements, the intelligentsia, and the youth. We need to go into the work force, confer with people on how to overcome the pre-catastrophic situation, and direct the working people's initiative into the common channel of constructive, creative work.

The republic, kray, and oblast committees' tasks are information and methods support for the party activists, personnel training, and the elaboration of the key issues of political activity and its tactics under current conditions. I would like to request of the secretaries of these party committees here present in the hall: Take an inventory of the whole arsenal of party influence—how it is helping the raykoms and gorkoms to enhance the effectiveness of the primary organizations, and the Communists to get their bearings in a rapidly changing situation.

Yes, the party is going through what are for it extremely difficult times. The seepage from its ranks is increasing. Many explanations are being advanced for this, from disagreement with the policy being pursued by the party through personal circumstances. There is an aspiration here to "lie low," wait it out, and keep one's distance from the party currently, at this difficult time, under conditions where a squall of unbridled criticism has come crashing down on it on a wide front: from hard-hitting current affairs writing through a vaudeville which has sensed on this topic a "new Klondyke."

We need to support the honest people who have not come to grips with the situation and who have left the party, and help them restore their faith both in our cause and in themselves, but no one will detain anyone by force. We would merely caution that the laurels of turncoats at difficult moments have yet to adorn anyone anywhere, and a person who has betrayed one party could with the same airiness betray another also. For it should be remembered that betrayal of one's comrades has in Russia since time immemorial been considered a grievous sin.

We appeal to all Communists and all political currents in the CPSU. Dear comrades! Now is not the time for pedantic arguments about who is left, who is even more left, who is Marxist, and who is even more Marxist. Let us think together about a strengthening of the Communist Party, the cohesion of its ranks, the consolidation on this basis of all progressive forces and unity of action. Let us take a somewhat tighter hold and together confront the avalanche of anticommunists that has descended on us.

This is all the more important in that a number of political organizations which are springing up under the influence of the "infantile disorder" are filled with intolerance and are increasingly expending their forces on the defamation and persecution of the Communists.

They are demanding that the CPSU be put on public trial and attempting to heap onto us all the sins not only of the past but of the present also, including their own political helplessness and political incompetence.

This was shown as graphically as could be by the recent congress of the movement that has called itself "Democratic Russia." One notices the rigid tone, far from democratism, of the documents adopted at it. Plans for a further loosening of the sociopolitical foundations of the republic, the removal of the Communists from the political arena, and the weakening of the constitutional bases—the USSR Supreme Soviet, the Union government, and the president—show through clearly in them.

Although the participants in the constituent congress of "Democratic Russia" called themselves a movement in opposition to the CPSU, they are not in fact an opposition. After all, an opposition acts constructively: within the framework of the constitution and respect for the law and democratic traditions. But here the intentions are destructive: dissolution of the organs of power, revocation of the constitution, and appointment, not elections, to the structures of power of their representatives. No democratic state would recognize such a demand by members of the opposition. Their nature and intention are different: the accomplishment of a coup d'état and the usurpation of power by forcible methods. And this needs to be distinctly and clearly recognized.

What is the meaning of the campaign unleashed against the CPSU? Why is an enemy image in the shape of our party being introduced to the consciousness of the people? Why such hysteria surrounding CPSU property? For what purpose do people want to distance it from the news media and expel the party organizations from the work force, the Army, and the law enforcement authorities? Communists and nonparty people have not yet obtained a clear answer to these questions from the leading mass information organs, including from our newspaper PRAVDA.

We are appealing to the rules of democracy and law and citing the Constitution. But this is not enough, even less under the conditions of right-wing nihilism. We are obliged to explain to the people that anticommunist forces are waging war against our party by no means in the name of democracy and justice. Yes, there are in the CPSU many careerists and people who have insinuated themselves in their positions, toward whom the Central Control Commission will undoubtedly turn its stern gaze. But it is not these persons who determine the character of the party. The flower of our people, almost all the well-known writers and poets, prominent scientists and military leaders, and the majority of skilled economic managers, higher educational institution professors, rank-and-file intellectuals, workers, and peasants are today assembled in it.

The attempts to ascribe all of them at a stroke to the "new enemies of the people" are links of one and the

same chain: to completely undermine Russia's intellectual potential, conclusively bleed its peoples, primarily the Russian people, white, demolish administration, and bring to power corrupt demagogues and shadow economy operators—the bourgeois—who are not concealing their rapacious appetites and pretensions to power.

The CPSU is the main obstacle in the way of the domination of these new masters, who are in no way different from those whom the people ousted in 1917. And if their plans are successful, there is every reason to believe that in the wake of moral terror against the Communists and members of their families physical terror will be unleashed—and is already being unleashed. They would have to destroy several tens of millions of people. They could not otherwise take possession of the country, they would have to intimidate it. And as historical experience shows, things do not end with the extermination of one party. All Soviet people should recognize this.

**Current political practice insistently demands that the Central Committee and the party committees of all levels rely increasingly firmly on the findings and achievements of science.** It is necessary for the local party committees to stimulate a creative quest for forms and methods of political and ideological work under the new conditions, organize debate with the invitation of forces of the broadest creative and political range, and step up the practice of the organization of scientific-practical conferences, the results of whose work could be put forward for serious conceptual collation. I would like in this connection to call your attention to the material of a conference recently conducted by the Leningrad Obkom.

Comrades!

The essence of our political activity is not the speculative designing of a "shining" future and not the unblinking borrowing of overseas practices but the assurance of the balanced, well-considered, socialist focus of development based on forms of popular existence verified by history.

Taking advantage of the historical experience of the democratic organization of society, our strategic line is for this reason oriented toward the Communist ideal, which is geared to the creation of all the necessary conditions for man's all-around and harmonious development. This goal has united the ranks of Communists in all times and in all peoples. We remain true to it today also.

The highest responsibility for the fate of the party, the republic, and the country, for the cohesion of our forces, and for unity of action is required of each us at this difficult, pivotal time.



### Lysenko on Democratic Platform, CPSU

91UN0331A Moscow SOBESEDNIK in Russian No 45, Nov 90 p 10

[Interview with RSFSR People's Deputy Vladimir Lysenko by SOBESEDNIK special correspondent Mikhail Sokolov under the rubric "Bull's Eye"; place and date not given: "Democratic Platform Outside the CPSU"]

[Text] *This young philosophy instructor in the Moscow Aviation Institute and one of the first organizers of the party clubs "informal" movement, the goal of which was to transform the CPSU into a parliamentary party, has gained nationwide recognition after his courageous speech at the all-Russia party conference. My interlocutor, RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] People's Deputy Vladimir Lysenko, has dismissed as useless the idea of reforming the CPSU from within. Now, together with other supporters of reform and renewal, he is organizing a new, Democratic Platform-based party that takes out of the CPSU "ranks" those who have not yet lost their honor and integrity.*

[Sokolov] Do you believe it is possible to change our totalitarian narrow-minded world?

[Lysenko] I would like to think so. Our party will be different from the one created under the aegis of I.K. Polozkov. Let me make it clear that the Democratic Platform was against the formation of a separate RSFSR Communist Party; the Democratic Platform had advocated moving over to social-democratic, humanistic positions. We had brought this rather firm position to the congress in order to oppose the conservative majority. We had tried to show that the emerging new party was about to adopt a dead-end stance that would oppose even Gorbachev's inconsistent position. That is exactly what it turned out to be. It was an extremely anti-Gorbachev congress.

[Sokolov] But it stopped short of a real split. Why?

[Lysenko] Such politicians as P. Bunich and O. Latsis, who think of themselves as liberal forces inside the CPSU, have demonstrated that they are not capable of any decisive action as long as they remain part of the party. Although they have collected 183 delegate signatures in support of position that offered an alternative to the one put forward by Polozkov, they have not been able to create an alternative structure. Those who are at the top of the apparat pyramid order the music.

[Sokolov] And how do you view the actions of the "Kommunisty- Reformatory" group, which declared itself to be part of the Democratic Platform but remained within the CPSU?

[Lysenko] This is a purely apparat faction. Its leaders Gusev and Lipitsky have been collaborating with the Moscow gorkom [city party committee] for quite a while, and lately also with I.K. Polozkov. They are trying to talk people out of leaving the CPSU, to "fight to the end" for

its democratization. They have already been appropriately rewarded for their efforts: Lipitsky has been elected into Polozkov's RSFSR Communist Party Central Committee, and Gusev—into its Central Control Commission.

Now the remaining left and centrist forces will be gradually separating themselves from the RSFSR Communist Party, and it will eventually turn into an orthodox ultraconservative organization.

[Sokolov] Who may be considered centrists in today's CPSU?

[Lysenko] It is noticeable now that such people as Moscow gorkom First Secretary Yu. Prokofyev maintain dual positions. They constantly maneuver at the right edge of the left flank so they appear to be well-intentioned democrats against a backdrop of the fanatical brotherhood of "true Communists." But when it comes to action, they immediately capitulate to the right. I think that politically pragmatic figures such as A. Bryachikhin or Yu. Prokofyev are doomed as party activists. The CPSU apparatus today is dominated by those who try to jump off the sinking ship, having first ensured a soft landing, and those for whom the sacred Marxist dogmas are more important than the fate of the country.

However, as long as there are all-Union power structures that are not controlled by the democratic opposition, the so-called centrists are safe: The process of separating the state from the CPSU has started. Former CPSU leaders A. Yakovlev, E. Shevardnadze, V. Medvedev, V. Kryuchkov, and N. Ryzhkov, having kept, or acquired, state positions, are no longer members of any elective party organs. Local nomenklatura follow their example. It just sort of happened by itself that the Politburo no longer appoints either ministers or diplomats. The main prerogative of power has drifted from this party organ into the hands of Gorbachev himself and his circle. It is obvious that Gorbachev's decree on transformation of political organs is of a highly declarative nature, but its aim is clear: to ensure that the Army will be loyal not so much toward the CPSU or Marxist ideology, but towards the President himself and his proxies in the Union leadership. All of this shows that the ruling group, in its bid to keep power in its hands, no longer counts on the CPSU alone, but will be relying more on support on the part of the state apparatus, which has not yet discredited itself in the eyes of the public, and the touched-up soviets.

The CPSU is suffering from the dissolution of vertical links. In the past, as soon as the Politburo passed a resolution, the whole anthill came to life, down to the last party cell: Everybody was rushing headlong to fight against unearned income, or for sobriety, to accelerate...

[Sokolov] I think the latest example of this was last spring, when a CPSU Central Committee letter directed party organizations to expel your colleagues from the party.

[Lysenko] Those were just mere convulsions: Many party organizations have simply sabotaged Central Committee directives. And will continue to sabotage them. Whom should they listen to? The apparatchiks see discord below and fluctuations at the top. Some follow the more "liberal" CPSU Central Committee; others—the more conservative Polozkov's RSFSR Communist Party Central Committee; and the majority, under the cover of confusion, simply crawl under, or try to solve their own problems, or start joint ventures, or take back-to-back defensive positions against the onslaught of the new soviets, sensing that soon enough they will encounter face to face true popular hatred towards totalitarianism.

[Sokolov] It seems to me that by now the process of leaving the CPSU has acquired avalanche dimensions.

[Lysenko] In some oblasts up to one-third of the primary party cells do not pay their party dues. It is a unique situation: The party apparatus, until recently financially prosperous, has found itself short on money. The CPSU Central Committee still eats up its lion's share, and soon there will not be enough money to pay local party officials. And on top of that subscriptions to PRAVDA and SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA sank....

[Sokolov] Isn't this the main driving force behind the party apparatus now jumping into the murky waters of private business, which they had always treated with such contempt?

[Lysenko] Yes, the CPSU is trying to launder its property now, and to invest it in commercial ventures with Western capital participation. The farsighted nomenklatura is using the CPSU as a means of exchanging political power in society for an economic one. Here is one snapshot: In one of Moscow's districts both the first and the second party secretary "parachute" into joint ventures that they have been previously actively promoting by giving them office space and securing preferential treatment. Now it's payoff time. But they are replaced at the district party committee by hard-core disciples of antimarket United Workers Front theoretician Sergeyev....

What is outrageous is the fact that the CPSU does not invest the funds it has misappropriated from the people into expanded production of consumer goods or into agriculture. The apparatchiks are attracted, like flies to honey, to such spheres of activities where they can—without too much risk or effort—safely launder the capital and earn assured, if not too high, profits. For instance, we have received documentation on the recently created International Bank for Public Financing and Credit of National Programs. Among the participants in this project are the Administration of Affairs of the CPSU Central Committee, the Moscow gorkom, the USSR Bank for Housing and Municipal Services and Social Development, and the Soviet Culture Fund. There is even a mysterious Military Unit No. 032152 on that list. Western participants include Le Credit Lionnaise, Morgan Guarantee Trust, Barclay's, Banque

Privet Edmond de Rothchild, Marine Midland, Comsat, and a number of joint ventures of doubtful origins backed by Arab capital. Judging by the documentation, the organizers are attempting to secure considerable privileges.

[Sokolov] You have traveled quite a lot around Russia recently, asking former Communists and noncommunists to join a party based on the Democratic Platform. What kind of reception did you get?

[Lysenko] The moods varied greatly. I have found some understanding in Vladivostok. But you feel the breath of change in a much lesser degree as you go away from major centers. In Blagoveshchensk, for instance, those who call themselves "The Democratic Platform," want to stay within the CPSU and to compete for the position of the obkom [oblast party committee] first secretary. They still have the illusions we have already overcome.... Or in Kuzbass—people there have cooled off to politics; they are more interested in organizing independent trade unions. The people are not looking for democrats or conservatives now, they are not counting on this or that party, they want **action** and **people of action**.

[Sokolov] Do you think that at this stage of the "economic revolution" independent trade unions have more of a future?

[Lysenko] There is no need to promote Soviet "Solidarity" among our workers. There is a real-life need for it. The task of all existing parties is to help the workers to organize themselves into an independent political and economic force. We have good contacts with the Donbass strike committee precisely because they are already a step beyond purely economic demands and are looking for contacts with the intelligentsia in their search for alternatives to the existing order.

[Sokolov] How do you explain the fact that many Democratic Platform founders leave the CPSU but do not want to join your party?

[Lysenko] There are examples of that. But people are coming to us. We have over 30,000 registered members, and this number is growing. There are primary party cells that leave the CPSU practically in full complement. On the Ulyanovsk "Kontaktor" factory, for instance, after the factory director resigned from the CPSU, out of the 700-member party organization only a little over 50 remained. We maintain contacts with those CPSU organizations that decided to shift to noncommunist positions.

The reason why many people do not pay their party dues but at the same time do not leave the party is that they are waiting for the emergence of a strong party that will be able to provide social protection, to stop their bosses from persecuting them for their political beliefs. Because such things do happen. We will publicize such cases. There is now a group, headed by Russia's People's Deputy Victor Belov, whose task is to protect the right of those who have left the CPSU.

[Sokolov] What is the process of organizing your party?

[Lysenko] We have chosen a way that is different from the one used by the Democratic Party of Russia and the Social Democratic Party of Russia. We have decided to put our new party together gradually, starting at the grass-roots level. First, local organizations need to create their regional structures. Since the beginning of September, we had two or three oblast or kray conferences going on every week. These conferences establish our party branches. Nothing is predetermined: not the program, not the charter, not the name. Right now we are collecting suggestions from the local branches. On 17-18 November we will have a founding congress of a new parliamentary party of the Russian Federation. Simultaneously, a similar forum of the independent Ukrainian Democratic Platform will take place in Kiev.

[Sokolov] Now that all three major parties—the Democratic Party of Russia, the Social Democratic Party of Russia, and the Democratic Platform—support implementation of Shatalin's plan, after it is revised to take into account the current situation, and B. Yeltsin's actions to protect Russia's sovereignty are in opposition to the CPSU line, one gets an impression that there are no major distinctions between these parties....

[Lysenko] Gradually these distinctions will become more pronounced. Ideologically we are fairly close to Social Democrats, partly because we draw on many principles enunciated in the Socialist International program. Although the Social Democratic Party of Russia no longer speaks openly of the ideals of "democratic socialism," preferring to use the term "social state," they subscribe to the same "Swedish model" values. We distance ourselves from "democratic socialism" more resolutely. However, we cannot support the tendency for an all-out anticommunism, which is prevalent among some Social Democrats, and even more so within the Democratic Party of Russia. We do not want to turn away those who leave the CPSU for ideological reasons. Our position is that communism should be condemned as a Utopian theory that has brought our country to the brink of an abyss, and that the CPSU should be held responsible for its crimes, but we do not want to confer our moral condemnation of the party as an institution of power and violence, onto its rank-and-file members; this would be a dangerous political mistake that could lead to civil war.

A considerable number of Democratic Party of Russia leaders are those who organized the Democratic Platform in the first place, and who left it after the publication of the Central Committee open letter, without waiting for the CPSU congress to take place. People's deputies N. Travkin, A. Borodin, G. Burbulis, and even more so G. Kasparov, support positions that are more radical than ours. They advocate full privatization; they want to create a society where everybody has to earn his own living, and they do not want to admit that some part

of our population is not ready for the market economy. I think that in the future lineup the Democratic Party of Russia will be considered—using West European terminology—a right-of-center, if not right-wing, party, while the Democratic Platform will be a left-of-center one. It will be a party of not only social-economic progress, but of social protection as well. In our program documents these issues receive as much attention as those of transition to the market economy.

And, finally, the Democratic Party of Russia is a rigidly structured, centralist party, whose task is, according to N.I. Travkin, to defeat the CPSU. I think that it is unnecessary and dangerous to create another Bolshevik-type party in our country. Our idea is to create a party-movement that would have not only the core membership with its ensuing obligations, but also a wide range of supporters, not related to the party organizationally, who would vote for it, attend its meetings, make contributions, buy our publications....

However, currently the Social Democratic Party of Russia, the Social Democratic Party and the Democratic Platform have one common goal—to dismantle the totalitarian system. We maintain good contacts with the leadership of all three parties; this made it possible to sign a coalition agreement last September. This coalition will become an important factor in contributing to success of "Democratic Russia", a broad popular movement created on 20-21 October, which will unite various parties, their parliamentary factions, independent trade unions, democratic public organization, and regular citizens in support of change, and by doing so will fulfill the same task in our republic as Solidarity has in Poland.

[Sokolov] Will this coalition provide real opposition to the CPSU?

[Lysenko] Some people say that a de facto two-party system usually emerges in normally developing societies, and that in our situation the CPSU and a united democratic party could play such role of mutually balancing and opposing social forces. I think that, similar to what has happened in Poland, after a sufficiently long period of time two major democratic parties will have emerged—one right-of-center and one left-of-center. The competition between them, their effort to win the voters to support either a gradual move towards more social protection or, on the contrary, towards more free-market economic competition, will ensure a stable and effective development of the society.

For the good of Russia the orthodox and dogmatic communism-religion, which does not want to adapt itself to the changed environment of the late 20th century, should be pushed to the periphery of life, as has happened in Poland and Hungary. This task may be accomplished by a powerful civil movement that congregates around an organizational core; the Democratic Platform is one of the participants in this work.

### Emergence of Republican Party Assessed

91UN0338A Moscow TRUD in Russian 20 Nov 90 p 3

[N. Dorofeyev report: "Republicans in Russia"]

[Text] Moscow—Among the multitude of parties born in the country of late, yet another has emerged—the Republican Party of the Russian Federation (RPR). This was the name given to their offspring by the 235 delegates to the constituent congress, who came from 50 republics, krais, and oblasts. The organizers of the congress and nucleus of the new party were participants in the "Democratic Platform Outside of the CPSU" movement. A large group of people's deputies of the USSR, the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic], and local soviets took part in the congress.

It is difficult to astonish anybody with anything these days. But the Republican Party managed this. The point is that the Republican Party of Russia is one of the few, if not the sole, parties which in no program document declare their anticommunist thrust. As one of its founders, V. Lysenko, people's deputy of the RSFSR, said, the new party should oppose the organization of a "Nuremberg" trial of the CPSU, the persecution of the communist rank and file, and the rapidly growing anticommunist campaign.

The fact that the Republican Party of Russia has resolved to forgo such a "sure" trump card, seemingly, testifies primarily to the relatively high intellectual level of the group of fellow thinkers who formed the party and who understand that no big political capital can be made merely out of bare rejection of past and present alone. And the Republican Party, as the spiritual successor of the Democratic Platform, already has such. In terms of authority and influence (as certain sociological studies show) the Republican Party of Russia ranks in the first three opposition parties together with the Democratic Party of Russia and the Social Democrats. And in terms of the number of supporters, second behind the Democratic Party of Russia. There are now Republican Party of Russia structures in all krais, oblasts, and republics of the RSFSR, except for Kirov Oblast. The corps of deputies in its ranks is very strong.

How do its creators conceive of the Republican Party of the Russian Federation? It follows from the main program documents adopted at the congress and from the delegates' speeches that it is primarily a parliamentary party setting as its main task the restoration of the genuine sovereignty of Russia and the achievement of civil and interethnic accord in the republic with the aid of political dialogue, intelligent compromise, and the peaceful substitution of market democratic relations for the old command-administrative structures. Proceeding from this, the Republicans see as the main aim today support for the activity of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet headed by B.N. Yeltsin and the economic program of the Russian Government.

In the course of the congress proposals were heard in a number of speeches concerning the fact that the Republican Party of Russia should begin to unite with other

parties close to it in terms of ideological principles. Specifically, with the Social Democratic Party of Russia. The delegates were quite roundly supportive of the idea of such an alliance in itself. The disagreements emerged later, when the question of form arose: a merger of the two parties or a political bloc? The idea of unification on a platform of democratic constitutional reform gained a minimal preponderance.

But far more arguments were evoked by a question illustrating our current understanding of democracy and pluralism. Who would lead the party? And did it altogether need a leadership in the shape of individual leaders—cochairmen—or could it manage with the election of a coordinating council that would be the party's highest representative body between congresses?

This topic proved quite painful for the delegates, and the atmosphere at the congress, which had prior to this been a model of discipline and professionalism, changed abruptly. A heated debate flared up, and the hall was split into two groups, each offering its own, not unfounded, arguments. A new parliamentary-type party was being formed, the supporters of a coordinating council claimed, and its main essence was the decentralization of power. But given the creation of the institution of cochairmen, totalitarianism, and an authoritarian approach, to which the Republican Party of Russia is opposed, would be revived, and there would be the danger of "chiefism."

But other congress delegates disagreed with such a viewpoint. Whether people followed it or not would depend on how well known and popular the leader who headed a party was. In addition, the Republican Party of Russia and other opposition parties were confronted with the very strict and well-oiled structures of the CPSU and the Russian Communist Party, and, consequently, what was needed was not an amorphous and faceless movement but a precisely organized structure also....

I shall not venture to judge who is right and who is wrong here. Fear of "chiefism" will, most likely, leave us when the last drop of the slave is squeezed out of ourselves. But if we do not trust one another to such an extent and are afraid of our very selves, what is the point of uniting in a party?

### Tatarstan Disregards 7 January Holiday

91UN0676B Moscow TRUD in Russian 8 Jan 91 p 1

[Article by Ye. Ukhov: "A Decree Is Not Binding?"]

[Text] Kazan—Some of the able-bodied inhabitants of Kazan still managed to add one more day off the work week of the new year, which is the shortest to begin with: Christmas is Christmas!

However, at the last moment the Presidium of the Tatar SSR Supreme Soviet adopted a decree that stated that "7 January will be considered a work day until the Tatar SSR law on holidays is adopted, in keeping with the declaration on the state sovereignty of the Tatar SSR, and with a view to upholding the equality of rights and

freedoms of all citizens of the republic regardless of their ethnic background and religion."

However, some enterprises, organizations, and establishments preferred to comply with a resolution of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet and proclaimed Christmas day a holiday in keeping with the decisions of the labor collectives.

### Urals Republic Proposal Criticized

91UN0365A Moscow *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA*  
in Russian 24 Nov 90 p 1

[Article by V. Pankratov, *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA* staff correspondent: "The One and Indivisible? Followers of the Movement 'For the Urals Republic' Propose To Divide Russia Into Parts"]

[Text] Sverdlovsk—This movement emerged late last year. It must be assumed that it was given an impetus by a speech by B.N. Yeltsin at a preelection rally when he ran for people's deputy of the Supreme Soviet of Russia in the Sverdlovsk National-Territorial District. To be sure, Boris Nikolayevich stated this proposal as one of the alternatives for overcoming an economic crisis in the Russian Federation. It did not gain support, and drew deserved and well-founded criticism from his opponents in the election campaign.

Nonetheless, the proponents of various reforms that are not well-reasoned, who are without number at present, jumped at this idea, despite Boris Nikolayevich himself, already chairman of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet, acknowledging his proposal to be not quite constructive and giving it up. After all, if Russia were to be divided into economic zones there would be no need for a Supreme Soviet.

However, today I once again read a statement of this—pardon me for being blunt—delirious concept of the leaders of "For the Urals Republic" in the newspaper *ZA VLAST SOVETOV* on the specialty page "The Free Thinker." What are the goals and tasks of this movement, which has been numerically small so far? The main concept is to mobilize all constructive forces and to create a sovereign Urals Union Republic within the RSFSR with Sverdlovsk as its capital.

A. Bakov, an activist of this movement, believes: "Sverdlovsk, Tyumen, Kurgan, Chelyabinsk, Orenburg, and Perm Oblasts, as well as the Komi, Udmurt, and Bashkir ASSR's [Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics] could join the Urals republic." He also adds:

"All of these territories are united not only by geographical and cultural-historical commonality, but also by the existing specialization of a pillar of the great power and an appendage of the military-industrial complex. The goods that the Urals area produces, i.e., products of the defense industry and heavy and special machine building, do not circulate in the domestic market of our country."

We cannot but agree with the author that the Urals region has shouldered and continues to shoulder a burden that is much greater than it is capable of at present. Both its ecology and economics are on the brink of a disaster, especially in terms of consumer goods and foodstuffs production. In the opinion of the republicans, stresses A. Bakov, an independent Urals could sell its raw materials and the fruits of its labor itself and purchase inexpensive and high-quality consumer goods in the world market.

Holy simplicity... What if East and West Siberia, and subsequently the Far East, Voronezh, and Belgorod, form their own "sovereign union republics" tomorrow, and subsequently all other areas and regions? In this case, Supreme Soviets and Councils of Ministers will have to be created in all of them, government buildings will have to be erected, new structures will have to be piled up, hundreds of millions of rubles, if not billions, will have to be spent in order to satisfy the ambitions of local "patriot-activists" of their regions, instead of spending this money and assets for moving the people out of the slums.

Pardon me, dear sirs, but it is not the benefit of the people that various groups and associations are after when they preach separatism and slip the ideas and petty ideas of sovereignty to those who are not at all simpletons. While making yet another mess they are playing with fire. A genuine way out needs to be sought. As the newspaper *ZA VLAST SOVETOV* reports, a leaflet put out by the proponents of the movement "For the Urals Republic" says instead: Our movement has gained favor with economists, soviet functionaries, and prominent economic leaders at a meeting of the representatives of executive committees from the Urals oblasts in Chelyabinsk. Allegedly, this is what the economic situation is prompting—the separation of the Urals from the RSFSR and the creation of a unified regional market that will make it possible to soften a transition to market relations that is painful to the people. The underpinnings are fine, but the means for achieving common prosperity are dubious.

### Moscow 'Tent City' Liquidated

91UN0647A Moscow *SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA*  
in Russian 3 Jan 91 First Edition p 1

[Article by A. Ryabov: "The Lawn Is Clear: The Tent City Near the Rossiya Has Ceased Its Existence"]

[Text] The year that has ended gave Moscow yet another tourist attraction—the tent city that was pitched on the lawn in front of the west vestibule of the Rossiya Hotel by marchers from all parts of the country. The tents that were covered with boards, streamers, and posters were not only a picturesque and exotic spectacle, but also, as people wrote at that time, "a sign of the capital's democratic rebirth." And for that reason they quickly became a place of pilgrimage for Soviet and foreign guests with a definite orientation.



Late in September, by a decree issued by the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, a special commission was created for the purpose of considering the appeals made by the persons living in the tents.

After considering the complaints, the commission members concluded that, for the most part, they were unfounded. With regard to 26 appeals, the commission instructed the appropriate agencies to carry out an additional inspection; and for three complaints decisions were made that protect the persons who suffered. The commission sent more than 70 letters to soviet and economic agencies, requesting them to help the applicants.

But even this did not stop the life of the tent city, because the claims made by many of the residents who remained there were obviously outside the commission's bailiwick. For example, a marcher from Ryazan asked to have issued to him a statement that "throughout his life there had not been anything reprehensible in either his thoughts or his actions." Nevertheless there was a result from the commission's work. At least the attitude to its residents began to change. Both the Muscovites themselves and the capital's guests began to realize that certainly there does not exist any link between democracy and the tent city. But this entire farce of plywood and cardboard is needed by someone for completely obvious political purposes—for purposes of inflaming passions and for vilifying yet again the "enemies of the people": the country's leaders, the Communists, and the militia. The only surprising thing is that for a long time the capital's leaders could not understand that. Because the Mossovet subcommittee for the protection of the citizens' civil rights announced that the tent residents were under its protectionship. Therefore the commission of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet recommended to Mossovet that it resolve by itself the final fate of the tent city and its residents.

On the evening of 29 December, in execution of an order issued by the capital's procurator and on the basis of the decision made by the Mossovet ispolkom, an announcement was made to the residents of the tent city that it would be liquidated.

As was reported by Rossiya Hotel workers who had witnessed that event, at 0300 hours on 30 December the tent city was surrounded by trucks and buses. Troops from a detachment of special-purpose militia jumped out of them. Some of the residents who needed medical care were sent to Moscow hospitals. The others were sent to receiving and assignment stations. Within a few seconds the tents were dismantled and a bulldozer had begun moving across the emptied lawn. By 0600 hours there was not a trace of the tents that had been there.

### Kaliningrad Political Situation Viewed

91UN0647B Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 31 Dec 90  
Second Edition p 2

[Interview with A. Savkin, by I. Podsvirov, under rubric "Following After the Year, Meeting the Year Halfway": "The Reason I Am Alarmed Is That Party Work Is Not a Privilege, but a Responsibility to People"]

[Text] For Aleksandr Semenovitch Savkin, who until recently worked as an assistant professor in the Philosophy Department at Kaliningrad Technical Institute, 1990 was a time of high political and civic participation. Judge for yourself. At the 28th Congress he was elected member of the CPSU TsKK [Central Control Commission], and then, at the oblast party conference, he was elected second secretary of the party's Kaliningrad Obkom. Many people also remembered his statement at the December Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, in which, with the maximum frankness and acuity, he posed questions dealing with the status of his oblast after the signing of the Union Treaty. We telephoned Aleksandr Semenovitch in order to find out how the other people in his oblast had perceived his reflections at the Plenum, but he said, "It would be better for us to talk in Moscow. I will be conducting a reception there for Communists in the reception room of the CPSU TsKK."

So we met after the day of receiving visitors.

[I. Podsvirov] How was your day, Aleksandr Semenovitch?

[A. Savkin] Would you believe that I did not even have time to get any lunch. People kept coming to see us from morning to night. And we had to listen to what all of them had to say. We had to analyze every situation thoroughly, and, to the best of our ability, render assistance or try to make our conversational partner change his opinion to some extent. It is hard work. If, of course, one does not take a red-tape approach to it, but handles it conscientiously, with complete responsibility... Many Communists come to us with their appeals and complaints, as their last level of appeal, and seek our protection or support. So we must not make any mistakes or seem to be too rigid.

However, there is also a gratifying sign of the times. A rather large number of Communists, and even of non-party members, come to the TsKK reception room with their recommendations for getting out of the economic and political crisis as quickly as possible, and for renewing the party's activities. Moreover, these are people who sometimes have opposing views, with different platforms and currents in the CPSU. Once again I am convinced that, within the near future, we shall have to resolve a very important task—the achievement of the party's inner consolidation. And a second thing is that the party must master new functions and work forms under present-day conditions.

But what is happening? The primary organizations frequently do not know what they are supposed to do now, how they are supposed to act. Although, in my opinion, their main duty is to rise boldly to protect the interests of the working man, especially during the changeover to market relations. But how should we protect them? Obviously, not by pressure, not by fiat. Those methods have become a thing of the past, never to return. The CPSU can and must defend the workers' interests through the Communist deputies in the parliaments and the soviets, through the Communist leaders.

[I. Podsvirov] Aleksandr Semenovich, in your statement at the CPSU Central Committee Plenum you mentioned the complexity of the social and political situation in Kaliningrad Oblast, and separatist, nationalistic, and other negative tendencies. What is especially alarming to you?

[A. Savkin] Like all the other inhabitants, I am alarmed by the oblast's future. It must be kept in mind that the people of Kaliningrad Oblast began to be concerned about their own fate as early as that period when the headlong reunification of Germany began to occur and the signing of the Soviet-German agreements was begun. Although those documents did state firmly the stability of the existing borders and the rejection of any territorial claims, people nevertheless began to worry about whether the oblast would become pocket money that the country would use to pay for the improvement of Soviet-German relations. It would seem that the thing that became the reason for such fears was the press report concerning the proposal by the Soviet side concerning the holding of an all-European referendum dealing with the question of the reunification of Germany. Its purpose, evidently, consisted not only in analyzing public opinion, but also in the attempt to assuage it. So people began wondering why our leaders were more concerned about how the Europeans feel than they were about the residents of the amber land themselves.

In my opinion, as far back as that time steps should have been taken to discharge the atmosphere by sending a special message to the population that would have stated the guarantees assuring the unchangeability of the status of Kaliningrad Oblast. Unfortunately, the highest leaders of the country and the republic, having traveled around practically the entire Union, for some reason have not yet visited the most western oblast in Russia, which is rightfully called "the European crossroads." So people have begun to have unfounded fears and suspicions relative to the oblast's future.

[I. Podsvirov] But do you not explain to people the true state of affairs when you visit the labor collectives?

[A. Savkin] I consider the meetings with workers to be my very first party duty. Frequently I speak at enterprises and at seminars of secretaries of primary party organizations, or make statements in the local press or over the oblast television. Incidentally, a mistake crept into the report on my speech at the Central Committee

Plenum. It seemed that I am in favor of direct union administration of our oblast. Actually, this is not so, because everyone knows that many Kaliningraders have a negative attitude toward this idea. They consider the oblast to be an inseparable part of the RSFSR within the framework of the renewed Union. The question of a change of its status cannot be the subject of idle talk or all kinds of "guesses." By virtue of the conditions of the formation of the oblast, that question must be considered only by the RSFSR and USSR governments.

In the discussion of such problems it is necessary to employ the maximum amount of caution and, I might say, diplomatic tactfulness. Unfortunately, these are qualities that are sometimes lacking both in journalists and in home-grown politicians. For example, the entire oblast was stirred up by the dissemination at the congress of RSFSR people's deputies of a questionnaire that contained, among other questions, the following one: "What do you think about the transferring of Kaliningrad Oblast to Germany?" As you know, a sharp protest with regard to this thoughtlessness, or one might even say provocation, was made by RSFSR people's deputy Yu. Semenov, first secretary of the party's Kaliningrad Obkom. The protest was also supported by V. Yeltsin. But you can imagine how "actions" such as this, and various kinds of gossip, aggravate the already complicated situation in the outlying areas.

It might not be a bad idea to ask the political gossips and interpreters first of all what the Kaliningraders want themselves. I shall answer that question succinctly: the people in my oblast want to see the end of any attempts, wherever they originate, to place in doubt the actually existing status of the oblast. They want, during the conclusion of the RSFSR treaties with Lithuania and in course of negotiations between the delegation of the Lithuanian government with the USSR leadership, for consideration to be taken of the interests of Kaliningrad Oblast and for a guarantee to be provided that those interests will not be infringed upon.

[I. Podsvirov] I would like to know how the Kaliningraders themselves visualize the prospects for the oblast's development within the framework of the renewed Union.

[A. Savkin] Despite the fact that the oblast has an exit to the sea and is the "European crossroads," it is nevertheless separated from mainland Russia. Considerable difficulties arise when carrying out transportation, energy, cultural, and many other ties. It is definitely necessary to take all this into consideration. Otherwise there will be inevitable miscalculations. For example, during the application of the economic sanctions with respect to Lithuania, the oblast's vital interests also suffered. Inasmuch as we receive petroleum products, gas, and building materials, including cement and slate, through or from Lithuania. Because of the republic's blockade we experienced a cement shortage. And the switching over of our enterprises to other suppliers did not normalize the situation.

The recent lessons must teach us something. We are interconnected with our neighbors and we want to build our relations on reasonable, mutually advantageous principles. Kaliningraders are given hope by the prospects of creating free-enterprise zones on the territory of the oblast. This is already a close reality: the appropriate materials prepared by specialists and plans developed by the presidium of the oblast soviet of people's deputies already exist.

True, there are also opponents to the free-enterprise zone. They are worried about the "economic occupation of the oblast by western capital, primarily German." As for the Communists in the oblast's party organization, they are in favor of regulated market relations. In this process we shall strive for legal and political guarantees that protect the inhabitants during the changeover to the market.

It was not by chance that, in my speech at the Plenum, I mentioned three alternatives for a change in the status of Kaliningrad Oblast that I personally consider to be unfounded and erroneous. Take, for example, the idea of creating on its territory the Baltic Independent Autonomous Republic. By virtue of its geopolitical situation, our oblast is separated from Russia. Consequently, we should be more concerned not with the intensification of autonomous status, but, on the contrary, with our closer ties with Russia and with the USSR. That is why we need genuine economic independence.

I consider to be unserious the territorial claims of annexing to the oblast the Klaypeda area and part of Kurshskaya Kosa in the event that Lithuania leaves the Union, which claims are made by certain circles of the public in Kaliningrad Oblast. What is important is that the oblast has a self-interest in normal relations with Lithuania irrespective of its status in the present and in the future.

[I. Podsvirov] It appears from our conversation that, with your election, Aleksandr Semenovich, as the obkom second secretary, you have acquired more things to worry about and to experience. But there is a widespread opinion that party workers don't have to pay for their keep. Is that really the way it is?

[A. Savkin] Are you joking? In this day and age?... At the institute I basically answered for the quality of my personal work, for my ability to find a common language with the students, and to convey to them in an assimilable way the "philosophical material." And what is the situation now? The reason why I am alarmed, and why I do not sleep at night, is that party work is not a privilege, but, rather, a philosophy of current life, and responsibility to all the people. Practically speaking, I answer for everything. So let us talk squarely: are there a lot of people today who are ready without any second thought to assume such a heavy burden? I ask this question not to brag about myself. It is simply that sometimes you want people to understand you.

### Leningrad Soviet to Audit Party Property

91UN0341A Leningrad LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA  
in Russian 13 Nov 90 p 1

[Article by V. Koshvanets under the rubric "Leningrad Soviet: Third Session": "Is Life Really Full of Surprises?"]

[Text] As each of us has found himself in an unexpected and not very pleasant situation, which probably happened more than once, one had to find consolation in the trite saying, almost proverbial by now: "Life is full of surprises." Well, this is not the worst of consolations, as one really cannot foresee everything in one's life. But it might be a different story that many of the surprises befalling us are far from being all that unexpected. Rather they stem from our own faults or from our inability to look the truth in the eye. Then the question arises: Do we have any right even to that kind of a consolation? This problem becomes doubly poignant if we are talking not about just one individual but about groups of people or about authoritative organs that are supposed to prevent all kind of surprises or at least smooth out their negative consequences.

These were the thoughts that occurred to me, in spite of myself, at the third session of the Leningrad Soviet, which opened yesterday in Mariinskiy Palace. Here are some reasons for these thoughts. In the morning before the start of the sessions, like other journalists accredited here, I was given an impressive package of draft session decisions and of documents offered for consideration at the session. These drafts and documents are a serious proof that the Leningrad Soviet commissions meeting in the Mariinskiy Palace have not wasted the taxpayers' money; they have prepared for the third session issues much more thoroughly than for any before.

The things I found in the document package! There was a draft of the regulations on the Leningrad free enterprise zone and the description of the Leningrad emblem (two silver anchors crossed against a red field, behind a gold scepter), draft decisions on the Leningrad Soviet Presidium and on addressing the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet and the RSFSR Procuracy concerning the establishment of an interagency commission to audit and assess the work of the Leningrad Procuracy.

Here are also two draft decisions on the issues that are widely discussed at rallies now. The first one deals with the inventory of all property owned by political parties and sociopolitical and public organizations.

"...To pay special attention to the legality of their (parties' and organizations'—V.K.) leases for government property, land leases, their use of historical and cultural monuments protected by the government." "To consider, by 15 November, 1990, the legality of 26 May 1990 USSR Council of Ministers decision No. 807-r 'On handing over the Smolny and the Marble Palace buildings to the CPSU operations administration' and to take

measures necessary to protect the ownership rights of Leningrad." These are the items of this document.

This is the title of the second draft: "Regulations for the Activity of Parties, Sociopolitical and Public Organizations Within the Departments of the Leningrad Soviet, the Leningrad Soviet Ispolkom [executive committee], as Well as Within the Institutions, Organizations, and Enterprises Subordinate to the Leningrad Soviet and the Leningrad Soviet Ispolkom." In essence it means that no political activity is allowed in the abovementioned places during work hours. Neither will it allow party committees or any other structures of political parties, of sociopolitical, or public organizations to function there.

It seems that only one draft paper was missing from this heap of diverse documents—the one describing the urgent measures that are supposed to be taken by the Leningrad Soviet to resolve the food problem in the city and to stop the undisguised panicking caused by food shortages in the recent few days. However, this issue was already being debated yesterday.

But there is nothing surprising in this. The fact is that the food issue has not been proposed for discussion and its appearance in the session agenda has been caused by life itself, as they say; it is the result of long lines, reminiscent of the blockade of Leningrad, that formed on the morning of 7 November by Leningrad bread stores, by the food store shelves that were swept clean of any food during the holiday. But was it one of those surprises that could not be foreseen or prevented? It was clear what was happening to the food supplies long before 7 November.

I want to hope that today, after we hear the report by A.A. Shchelkanov, the Leningrad Soviet ispolkom chairman, and the second report on the subject by M.E. Salye, chairman of the food supplies commission, Leningraders will learn who or what has caused the existing food situation and how it is going to be corrected.

As for other items on the approved agenda, most of them, similar to the food issue, were included in the agenda as late as yesterday. The Leningrad Soviet Presidium proposed not to discuss at the session the draft regulations on the Leningrad free enterprise zone or the draft USSR law on expanding the jurisdiction of the Leningrad Soviet in the government, industrial, and sociocultural construction as it was proposed before. It was decided to discuss these two issues at the joint session of the Leningrad Soviet and the Leningrad Oblast Soviet in December.

The current session will deal with the following problems: preparing the residential areas of the city for winter, the work of public transportation, the transfer to the market economy, and the city budget for 1991; it will also look into the 7 November violent actions of the militia officers directed at Leningrad Soviet deputies.

It is hard to say now how long the session will take. In any case, when A.A. Sobchak suggested that the session agenda be limited to two issues only—those of food

supplies and personnel and the discussion be over in two days, the deputies declined the idea.

Yesterday, after the agenda was approved, they started discussing what the Leningrad Soviet Presidium should be like. One wishes heartily that in the long run the presidium would become more active as it helps the Leningrad Soviet to prevent and repel the surprises that life puts and definitely will continue to put before the presidium and, therefore, before all Leningraders in future.

### **Leningrad Aktiv Resolution on Current Situation**

91UN0648A *Leningrad LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA*  
in Russian 30 Nov 90 p 2

[Resolution: "Resolution of a Meeting of the Leningrad Party Organization's Aktiv, Entitled 'The Current Moment, the Proposals of the USSR President, and the Actions of the Party Organizations to Stabilize the Sociopolitical Situation in Leningrad and in the Oblast'"]

[Text] The meeting of the Leningrad Party Organization's aktiv shares the alarm of the workers of Leningrad and the oblast with regard to the sharp worsening of the economic and sociopolitical situation in the region, the republic, and the country as a whole. Under conditions of the economic crisis the system of administration is not functioning, there has been a decrease in labor discipline, an increase in crime, and a lowering of the standard of life for the workers and the employees of state enterprises and sovkhozes, the intellectuals, and especially young students and pensioners.

In this situation the Union and Russian parliaments and the local soviets at all levels, while declaring their striving for civil consent and economic stabilization, could not guarantee the necessary living conditions for the population.

USSR laws are not being executed; legislative acts of the RSFSR and decisions by the local soviets are entering into contradiction with them; and the actions of the executive authority are being blocked. Dissatisfaction is being evoked by the actions of the USSR President, who is not using to the proper degree his powers to protect the citizens' economic, political, and social rights.

The build-up of nonpredictability in the development of the social processes, a build-up that creates a threat to state integrity and to the very life of Soviet citizens, has also been caused to no small degree by the inaction of the CPSU organizations and their managerial agencies and by the striving of the antisocialistic forces to eliminate them completely from participation in the making of decisions that affect the workers' fundamental interests.

The aktiv participants support the USSR President's proposals that are aimed at carrying out urgent emergency measures to reinforce the executive authority, to preserve the single union state system, and to guarantee

civic peace and economic and sociopolitical stability, which measures provide hope that a way out of the crisis will be found.

The aktiv meeting calls upon the Communists of Leningrad and the oblast to demonstrate their initiative and civic maturity and to promote the renewal of socialism and the movement ahead to genuine sovereignty of the people and self-government.

Taking into consideration the critical situation in Leningrad and the oblast, we issue to all the Communist deputies the proposal that they create, within Lensovet, Lenoblsobvet, and the city and rayon soviets, their own deputy factions.

We deem it necessary to conduct in December 1990 a plenum of the CPSU obkom with the participation of the Leningrad Communist deputies of all levels, managers of enterprises and organizations, and secretaries of party committees and buros in order to develop joint actions to overcome the crisis in the region.

We deem it necessary to demand that the CPSU Central Committee listen to reports concerning the parliamentary activities of the deputies to USSR Supreme Soviet who were elected from the Communist Party, and, depending upon the results, to give each such deputy a well-principled political evaluation.

The aktiv meeting of the CPSU Leningrad organization decisively protests the failure of the mass media to report on the materials of the joint Plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission of the Russian Communist Party. In the opinion of the aktiv participants, the Plenum materials should be made available to every party organization in Leningrad and the oblast, and should become the basis of their activities.

We declare a categorical "no!" to the idea of dragging through an anti-Soviet, antisocialist Constitution that sanctions the replacement of the social and state structure of Russia. The Communists of Leningrad and the oblast insist on the cessation of the impure political game and require, as constituents, from their deputies, and primarily the CPSU members, that they strive at the Congress to resolve the questions of the RSFSR Constitution only after the conclusion of a new Union treaty and the conducting of a nationwide referendum.

We demand of USSR President M. S. Gorbachev the undertaking of the necessary measures to assure the energetic defense of the socialist constitutional system. We are decisively against the capitalization of the Soviet economy.

The meeting of the party aktiv deems it desirable to support the initiative of a number of labor collectives in expanding the Social Salvation Movement which, under conditions of the build-up of the crisis, is capable, irrespective of its dependence upon the ideological positions of its participants, of becoming the guarantor of the consolidation of the workers for the sake of a noble

goal—the overcoming of the crisis, the preservation of the life and human dignity of Soviet citizens, and the integrity and independence of their Homeland.

### **Leningrad Soviet Registers Monarchist Political Organization**

91UN0648B Leningrad LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA  
in Russian 8 Dec 90 p 1

[Article by Lyudmila Shchukina, Lensovet press-center worker: "The Monarchists Feel, 'It's Time To Name a Tsar...'" ]

[Text] Yesterday the Lensovet presidium registered the charter of the sociopolitical organization named the Sankt-Peterburg [St. Petersburg] Monarchical Center.

According to society council member Aleksandr Shtamm, the center's chief goal is the restoration of the monarchy in Russia as the legal basis of state and public life.

The monarchists plan to achieve their goal by nonviolent methods within the framework of respect for the law. The plans of the monarchist center, which currently consists of 85 persons, include the convoking of a Land Assembly, or Constituent Meeting, which are supposed to appeal to the sovereign.

In response to the question of whom the monarchists see as the contender to the Russian throne, A. Shtamm confidently named Grand Prince Vladimir Kirillovich, who lives in Paris.

The Sankt Peterburg Monarchical Center has been registered. However, in the opinion of several jurists, the basic paragraph in its charter concerning the restoration of the monarchy can subsequently give rise to attempts to protest this decision by the Lensovet presidium as failing to conform to the legislation that is in effect.

### **Chukotka To Hold Sovereignty Referendum**

91UN0296B Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA  
in Russian 11 Nov 90 p 1

[“Annadyr: Is Chukotka To Be a Republic?”—RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA headline]

[Text] A session of the soviet of people's deputies of the Chukotka Autonomous Okrug has confirmed the verdict on the creation of a Chukotka Autonomous Soviet Republic.

A referendum of the inhabitants of the autonomous okrug will be conducted on 25 November for the final decision. The formation of a republic, specialists believe, will facilitate the region's transition to market relations.



## Caucasus

### November Armenian Pannational Movement Congress Reviewed

91US0199A Yerevan GOLOS ARMENII in Russian  
28 Nov 90 p 1

[Report by A. Gazazyan: "The Congress Has Concluded; The Work Continues"]

[Text] Approximately 900 delegates gathered at the 2nd Congress of the Armenian Pannational Movement [AOD], opened in Yerevan on 23 November.

Yes, relatively little time has passed, and the people who began this movement have come into power in the republic, have taken up key positions both in the government and in the Supreme Soviet.

Of course, the current representatives of real power cannot solve all the most grievous problems in a short time.

Our people have many complications on the path to stabilization of the economy, to market saturation with necessary goods and products, and finally, to sovereignty. You can almost hear the reproaches against those who "brought the republic to the brink." Reproach is all well and good, but without everyone's complete recognition of his place in the complicated, complex situation, without striving to solve problems jointly, neither the "people from AOD," nor anyone else will be able to do anything...

"We will support the government, the Supreme Soviet of the republic, if it does not stray from our programs..." said Vano Siradegyan, chairman of the board of the Armenian Pannational Movement and Armenian republic Supreme Soviet deputy. "But the programs of the AOD and the government are national programs. Our program will not tolerate changes, since the program adopted by the Supreme Soviet is in effect created on the basis of the AOD program."

What are the imminent tasks of the Armenian Pannational Movement? On the eve of the congress, one came to hear opinions on how the AOD will turn into a party in the near future.

"The AOD will not become a party," says Vano Siradegyan. "Such discussions were held before the congress; incidentally, just as they were before the 1st AOD Congress. But each time we come to the conclusion: A movement such as ours cannot be squeezed into the framework of any party whatsoever. The AOD will remain a movement."

The main issue at the congress will concern determining the place of the AOD after its coming into power in the sociopolitical life of Armenia. If it succeeds at this, then the congress can consider its task accomplished...

**The first day of the congress.** Debate speeches after the report presentation, given by the AOD chairman of the board. A multitude of opinions, judgments. There were also those that were clearly keeping track: the government is deviating from the national program in this way; some of its decisions are not finding support either among the congress delegates or among the population. Yet the majority feels that under current conditions, it is the unity of forces that is capable of defusing the situation, allowing space for the development of the full functioning of all structures in all levels of the republic's life activity.

"While the previous congress had more defined goals since the AOD was in opposition, now they must change—after all, the AOD has become a political organization. Both its form and activity must change," says G. Minasyan, member of the Spandaryanskiy Rayon AOD Council. "The basic goals remain the same, since this is the tasks of our people as well, and for the time being they have not been realized. There is a need for certain tactical changes. We do not have the right to make mistakes now..."

"This congress will yield answers to many questions, and, I hope, it will also raise a new powerful wave of the pannational movement, for which there is undoubtedly a need—we face problems of national unity, true unity, not unity in words. Today it is necessary that we unite around the parliament, for after all, our basic goal is the creation of an integrated national ideology. Of course, while doing this, various parties must and will be created, and naturally, they will further one another on the principles of tolerance."

It should be noted as information for reflection: At the 1st AOD Congress, over one-third of those gathered were representatives of the Communist Party, CPSU members. At the congress, the situation has changed radically: Three months ago, the AOD adopted a resolution on the incompatibility of simultaneous AOD and CPSU membership.

What, incidentally, is the AOD people's opinion of communists? It is widely distributed—there is no need to be excessively severe and intolerant toward rank-and-file communists, for of course there are among them people who represent great value for all the people, a useful healthy force. They must be involved in the resolution of all national issues.

**The second day of the congress.** The debates continue. First Deputy Chairman of the Armenian Supreme Soviet Babken Ararktsyan spoke to the delegates. He said that the main goal is the restoration of statehood. More than a little has been done on the path to this goal, but a great deal remains to be done. That is the main point of putting in effort, for the Armenian Pannational Movement as well. The AOD has not exhausted itself, but must remain a movement, for unity is necessary.

In his speeches, Armenian Republic Supreme Soviet Chairman L. Ter-Petrosyan repeatedly emphasized that

it is not confrontation that we now need, but consolidation in order for the republic to find a way out of the crisis. We know that the documents of the 29th Armenian CP Congress also appeal for this. It seems incautious to bring dissonance to this conformity of opinions. So the part of B. Ararktsyan's speech in which he began to accuse the communists of all sins, and predict the chance of them restoring Stalinist procedures sounded all the more incomprehensible...

In effect, the arguments as to whether the AOD should remain a movement or become a party continued the entire day.

"In my view, the congress expressed its opinion on this matter simply, to be a movement," says Yuriy Grigoryan from Artik, a guest of the congress. "And I share this opinion. But I think that the delegates have not delved into the issue. If those working toward an AOD party had won, by the way, wouldn't a step toward a multi-party system have been taken? But if you want to hear out my opinion, people are just tired of the party struggle..."

During the second half of the day, the congress delegates worked in sections: "On the Artsakh [Armenian Artsakh Union] Problem," "Armenia-Diaspora Relations," "Foreign Policy," and "Ecological Issues."

**The Third Day of the Congress.** It seems that the conclusion has been made definitively: The Armenian Pannational Movement will not achieve all the goals set for itself, and thus cannot be a party. It can become a party when we reach statehood. And the experience of other parties has shown that there is no getting along without a bureaucratic apparatus. A nationwide movement encompassing the broadest strata of the population cannot be bureaucratic.

It seems to me that the AOD board, which had elections on the final day of the congress, can become the moving force. A somewhat nervous discussion unfolded over the inclusion on the board of Ashot Manucharyan, who, as the attendees were informed, had left politics and is exclusively involved in pedagogical work. All the same, by a majority of votes, Manucharyan was included in the AOD board.

The charter and program of the AOD were adopted at the evening session...

The elections to the AOD board lasted until after midnight. Forty people were elected members of the AOD board. Among them are V. Siradegyan, P. Ayrikyan, A. Manucharyan, B. Ararktsyan, Yu. Movsesyan, G. Paskevichyan, and others. Elections for the chairman will be held on Thursday.

The AOD review commission was elected by open ballot.

Participating in the work of the 2nd AOD Congress were Armenian Republic Supreme Soviet Chairman L. Ter-Petrosyan, Supreme Soviet First Deputy Chairman B.

Ararktsyan, Supreme Soviet Deputy Chairman G. Arutyunyan, and chairmen of the Armenian Republic Supreme Soviet standing commissions.

### **Ter-Petrosyan Addresses Armenian Pannational Movement Congress**

*91US0199B Yerevan GOLOS ARMENII in Russian  
29 Nov 90 pp 1, 3*

["Address of Levon Ter-Petrosyan at the 2nd Congress of the Armenian Pannational Movement, 25 November 1990"]

[Text] I followed the work on the congress very attentively on television and I can share some of my impressions with you.

First of all, I want to note the positive movement observed by comparison to the previous congress: A more businesslike, more constructive setting reigns. I can also add, having the experience of parliament work, that there is gathered in this hall no less intellectual potential than there is in parliament. And I can even note one advantage over parliament—the fact that the talk, the arguments here are conducted more spontaneously, more honestly. There are two explanations for this: The first is that parliament, by nature more concerned with current, and legislative problems relating to the state structure, does not have the time to seriously take up ideological issues, despite the fact that these issues are touched upon from time to time. That is the gap which is being filled here. And the second is that in any case, there are opposition forces in parliament which frequently argue not constructively, but based upon mere political speculation.

Since this is a meeting of like-minded people, here there are no such shortcomings. There were heated arguments; issues were pointedly raised, yet this was not done for the purpose of political speculation, but from the desire to seek the truth, to get at the truth.

I would like to bring some clarity to the issues that were under consideration here.

The first of these are the issue of the structure of the further activity of our movement, when the issue of transforming the movement into a party or preserving it as a movement has been acutely presented itself. This is a natural question. It emerges before all such movements and people's fronts of the world that come into power, for this question has its own objective cause. Mankind has not yet invented any form of political struggle, political activity other than the struggle of parties. Such for the time being is the natural course of events, but for stable, already formed societies. This natural law is always violated in a transitional, revolutionary period, and frequently the revolution is headed not by any sort of party, but by a common public front, a pannational movement, such as the Armenian Pannational Movement has been.

However, it is all the same if that issue comes before us not today, but tomorrow, the day after tomorrow, or in a few years. It will come up because parties must form along with the movement; they will carry out the purely party activity, and in order to withstand this political competition, the movement will be forced to create a solid structure, that is, gradually turn into a party.

This is the concern that first and foremost is the reason for the issue that has been touched upon at our congress. I think that the congress has drawn the right conclusion: Until the movement has fully justified itself, there is absolutely no need to place on the agenda the issue of its transformation into a party.

One more explanation. Considered here was the issue of an opposition of national to democratic tasks, democratic and social tasks.

I think that this opposition has been created artificially. It is never permitted to oppose the national to the democratic, and to mean by the latter cosmopolitanism. In no way. They supplement each other and cannot exist without each other. Even in the most developed, civilized countries in the world, democracy and a person's freedom are created, formed first and foremost, if not solely for the sake of the prosperity of his own people. It seems difficult for me to imagine a better national goal.

Another issue concerns the accusations against the Armenian Pannational Movement. As the predominating political movement, naturally, it had to have opponents, sympathetic opponents, serious critics, and bearers of healthy criticism. Yet it is also natural that it should have slanderers. And thank God, there is all of this.

We simply must be able to distinguish the healthy criticism of a friend from the accusations of an ill-wisher, which should just be ignored. No time should be wasted on that; the accusations should be disregarded. What are these accusations?

First of all, it is what many have been repeating for three years now, and it has been addressed at our congress, that supposedly our movement suffers from spontaneity, our successes are all accidental, there is neither activity nor any long-range national program. This is the biggest lie there ever was, and it shattered on the rock of the Armenian Pannational Movement and dissolved into dust.

However, despite this, there are still people who insist on it. I am simply surprised that those making these accusations have not over three years themselves managed to created this national program, to persuade the people and lead them.

And if we get to the essence of it, I think that the Armenian Pannational Movement itself is a profoundly national program, the real program that can be implemented today. And the Declaration adopted in our parliament, if we compare it with the program of the

Armenian Pannational Movement adopted in November of last year, we will not find any principle differences, which is not to say that we see these two documents as being completely identical.

This is the national program whose goal is the restoration of Armenian independent statehood and the necessary measures aimed at its implementation. If there are people who doubt the rightness of this national program, then please, we are prepared to discuss the programs presented by these people, but I repeat, for three years now these accusations have been made even though, unfortunately, no one has proposed such a program. The Armenian Pannational Movement has always set for itself not abstract goals, but only achievable tasks, even if they did not seem so great at first glance. By means of these small but realizable tasks, the AOD was able to convince the people of its viability, and only thus managed to win its trust, implementing its program step by step. Today, our program from last year has to a certain extent become outdated, because the majority of the upcoming tasks included in this program have for the most part already been realized.

I am convinced that from now on the movement will not lose its consistency, and I repeat, disregarding the malignant people (I want to be correctly understood, this does not apply to friends, to whom great attention must be paid), their slander and accusations, we must firmly implement our own policy.

One more accusation. I am glad that issues have been raised pointedly here; we do not shy away from an acute presentation of an issue, and today I too must raise an issue with all acuteness: We are talking about the case that supposedly the Armenian Pannational Movement, the leaders of the "Karabakh" committee used the Karabakh issue as a springboard in order to settle into a post, and then afterward forgot about Artsakh [Karabakh], losing sight of its interests. This is the usual accusation; you come across it both in the Armenian press, at various meetings, and among the foreign diaspora. And there are organizations within our diaspora abroad that are consistently following specifically this line.

But those who are close to the movement, who have practically and genuinely participated in this movement know of the efforts of the Armenian people in solving the Artsakh problem; they can testify that frequently those who make such an accusation have had nothing to do with the Artsakh problem. It has become today just a subject for political speculation, the aim of which is simply the defamation of the Armenian Pannational Movement and the current national power generated by it.

The Armenian Pannational Movement and the current authorities of Armenia have a precise political program with regard to Artsakh and are implementing this policy consistently. I had the opportunity to discuss this

in detail yesterday at the session of the Artsakh section of the congress, and thus do not wish to misuse your time.

Another accusation that also has its own history is that supposedly the Armenian Pannational Movement neglects the Armenian issue, rejects the historical right of the Armenian people. We have offered explanations on this matter, but they have absolutely no effect on our opponents. The feature of the argument, unfortunately, is that it can in no way have an effect on an opponent. Discussion exists in order to persuade people, a third side. No matter what, if any sort of position is advantageous to our opponents, however well grounded our conclusions, our explanations, they will constantly repeat the same accusations, since they hold no other political card.

What can be said about this? Our attitude toward the Armenian issue is simple. First of all, there exists a mistaken point of view that the Armenian issue is a matter only for the diaspora, a problem of the Armenians of Western Armenia. Hardly. We must proceed from the fact that at least half the Armenian population is descended from the people of Western Armenia. And the feelings of the diaspora Armenians are as dear to the people of the fatherland as they are to the diaspora Armenians. So, it seems to me, to turn insistence upon the Armenian issue into the privilege of just the diaspora is basically false. This is the first thing. Secondly, we have often repeated that the Armenian Pannational Movement hardly rejects the historical rights of the Armenian people, the demand for the international recognition of the genocide, but it feels that these ideas, while necessary, located in the arsenal of the ideology of our political and social organizations and while remaining the basic tasks of their activity, cannot become agenda issues of a state policy. That is our approach. Approximately 1,500 national political figures are in attendance in this hall. You are bound to know that these accusations will continue to be repeated, but we do not have the right to waste our efforts, our energy responding to such ill talk. We simply have to get past it, and only in this case will the accusers quiet down. I am glad that our congress is being broadcast on television, that I have the opportunity to express our view on this contentious issue. The Armenian issue, the right of the descendants of the people of Western Armenia to their historic homeland will get onto the agenda of state policy only when the Armenian state is in a condition to resolve these problems through its own efforts.

There is one other issue linked with this that has also become the subject of political speculation. Against our will this issue has been show more attention than it deserves. We speak of the question of our mutual relations with Turkey.

We do not at all separate these relations from the sphere of relations formed with all our neighbors. Yet is is not known why our people, simply forgetting other neighbors, constantly force us to speak only of relations with Turkey. This is understandable, too, having its own

objective and subjective reasons. The objective reason is that it is difficult for our people, reared on a certain psychology over the course of 70 years, to make a complete reversal and admit the possibility of our dialogue with Turkey. The subjective one is that even those people who are convinced that today relations with neighbors hold vitally important significance for us disclaim them. These relations are not a goal in themselves, but are dictated by the demands of the thinking that our people have finally found. I think that the greatest achievement, the greatest revolution in our political thinking that we have achieved over recent years is the rejection of the vain thought of relying on another, on the protection of a third state. For over 300 years, the political thought of the Armenian people was poisoned by the erroneous idea that a major power, sometimes of Western Europe, but as a rule, Russia, must implement our national tasks. That is the idea by paying homage to which we also paid in great losses. It is today that our people are rejecting this naive faith and seeing that even the Soviet Union, which, it would seem, provided over the course of 70 years certain guarantees for our nation's existence (and this is a reality, since over that time there have been no shots over the border of Armenia. The Armenian people, despite great losses as the result of the destruction of villages and during the era of the Stalinist repressions all the same had the opportunity to concern itself with peaceful, creative labor), from now on cannot be such a guarantor, perched on the edge of collapse. We ourselves must seek, create new, more reliable guarantees for our nation. Normalization of relations between Armenia and Turkey are only one link in a row of such guarantees. As I have already said, owing to a feature of our social psychology, these relations have attracted more attention than relations with our other neighbors.

And so that there are no misunderstandings here, I would like to emphasize that the regulation of relations with Turkey, which offer first and foremost the opportunity for trade and economic relations, hardly signifies a rejection of our historical rights, of the demand for the condemnation of the genocide. We are, however, guided by the principle that both sides—and it should not be forgotten that these issues are as painful and acute for the Turks—must manifest some political sobriety, and not attempt to stipulate political conditions for each other for establishing such relations.

Only such an approach will permit the implementation of the regulation of such mutual relations with neighbors, including Turkey, that are so necessary for Armenia.

Social justice was also discussed here. This is indeed one of the pointed issued facing us, for we must admit that having come to power we have not been able in a short period to improve the living conditions of our people. Our people recognize that quite well. A country destroyed over the course of 70 years cannot be restored in a few months. Yet our people are right to demand from us today that we provide at least social justice.

Because, despite the numerous important transformations, all the same, officials of the past, those who exploited the people, are continuing to take bribes, to rob the property both of the state and of our nation, oppressing our people. And it is the duty of each one of us to eradicate this phenomenon as quickly as possible. But it is impossible and undesirable to realize this solely by repressive measures. And it seems to me that the simple appeals being addressed to our authorities are harmful.

This reality must be changed, but changed through serious, radical transformation in our economic and social life.

Of course, this does not exclude that repressive measures may also be applied within the framework of the law.

I think that the foundation of our social solidarity, social justice is the creation of a such a democratic structure in which every person has his own worthy position in society. Of course, this is the ideal which in all probability is difficult to achieve, but that is what our path must be. The newly-elected power of Armenia is attempting to do this (to what extent we will succeed is another matter). Both in the parliament and in the formation of the government it is necessary to find the best cadres, regardless of their party affiliation, independent of their past, cadres who today are in a condition to best correspond to the positions they hold. It seems to me that only this way can we ensure for the individual the principle of evaluation according to his qualities, an evaluation that, I repeat, must become the foundation for social justice and national solidarity. And if for now we do not succeed, then I think we should be forgiven; for the time being we are searching, and I presume we have the right to make a mistake.

I think that both the Armenian Pannational Movement and the national power created by it have the right to expect from our people a vote of confidence; this means first and foremost granting the one they trust the right to make a mistake.

Unfortunately, we are somehow a little impatient; we do not tolerate even small errors. This relates not only to the other strata of our society, but even to the figures of the Armenian Pannational Movement. Not infrequently, a small blunder, a somewhat poor expression become the cause of censure, arousing passions, creating excess nervousness.

I hope, however, that we will have a sufficiently broad political view to reserve for our power the right to make mistakes. Of course, there is a limit to even the mistakes, and in no way should these reach a proportion that they threaten the fundamental statutes of our program, lead to serious deviations from this path.

I am certain that with a display of mutual tolerance, unity and productive cooperation between both the Armenian Pannational Movement as a social organization and the Armenian Supreme Soviet as the highest

state legislative organ and the government of Armenia as the highest state executive organ will be completely ensured, which is the guarantee of our success.

If today we wallow in all sorts of minor tasks today, then we will only be giving our opponents grist for their mill. I ask to be correctly understood; I hardly have in mind that we should hide, conceal our shortcomings, not criticize one another, by no means. Yet I repeat, tolerance must be shown for the search, a process in which mistakes are inevitable.

And a final comment regarding not only our audience, the Armenian Pannational Movement, but the entire people. This is haste, intolerance, nervousness. Unfortunately, nervousness has now become the basic feature not only of Armenian society, but of all the Soviet Union. The authorities have also been infected with this nervousness. I was recently in Moscow, and I was particularly concerned with the atmosphere of nervousness in the USSR Supreme Soviet: I did not see there a single balanced, cool person; everyone came in a nervous, excited state, which is very dangerous. It is quite clear that they are infected with society's nervousness; passions are again being aroused in parliament; the degree of these passions is increasing, which is transmitted to society in turn, and then back to the authorities. This can create an extremely dangerous atmosphere. We must avoid this. We must be cooler, more tolerant. Haste and impatience only increase and deepen our mistakes, and can threaten our entire cause.

The people's impatience can also be explained. We were expected to fly, but miracles, flight do not happen in this world; they take time.

But it should not be forgotten that people have already completed the highest flight. I want to emphasize the historic (I am not afraid of this definition) mission of the Armenian Pannational Movement and the powers created by them in the last 4 months. Just owing to the fact that the Armenian Pannational Movement managed to come to power, civil war in Armenia was averted. You recall full well the situation in Armenia four months ago. If the power of the communists had lasted another month or two, we could not have avoided a civil war. And for any people, a civil war is the greatest tragedy, greater on the scale of tragedy than aggression from outside. And this tragedy was at our threshold. We managed to take control of the situation not because of our qualities, but only because of the people's trust.

Secondly. A civil war would not have ended as just a civil war. Our movement, our authorities have managed to avoid the occupation of Armenia by alien troops. Thus the occupation of Armenia by Soviet troops would inevitably follow a civil war, as it happened in Azerbaijan.

Such is the historical mission realized by the Armenian Pannational Movement. And even if it were to leave the historical arena today, it would all the same have already fulfilled its enormous historical mission for the people.



These are great, important achievements, but not the flight that the Armenian Pannational Movement, our entire people realized. The flight was the fact that the Armenian people cast off the 70-year-old colonial yoke, took the path of creating independent statehood, and created its own national power.

Armenia today has power ruled not by Moscow's instructions or any one else's, but only by the interests of its own people, its own state. I see in this the substance of sovereignty, the essence of national power.

And I assure you that the leadership of Armenia will never stray from this political principle.

Thank you for your attention.

### Armenian CP Congress Adopts Charter

#### Congress Information Report

91US0200A Yerevan GOLOS ARMENII in Russian  
30 Nov 90 p 1

[Report: "Information Report on the 29th Armenian CP Congress"]

[Text] On 29 November 1990, the Armenian CP Central Committee continued its work of the second stages of the 29th Congress of the Armenian CP in Yerevan in the sessions hall.

V.M. Movsisyan, CPSU Central Committee Poliburo member and first secretary of the Armenian CP Central Committee chaired the morning session. The correction and changes introduced by the delegates on the previous evening were presented to the congress by V.G. Petrosyan, chairman of the Editorial Commission and first secretary of the Armenian CP Spandaryanskiy raykom. After their discussion, the communists' proposals were introduced into the draft Charter of the Armenian CP.

The congress unanimously adopted the first Charter of the Armenian CP in the history of the Armenian Communist Party.

Then the delegates began a discussion of the second agenda item. V.M. Movsisyan, CPSU Central Committee Politburo member and first secretary of the Armenian CP Central Committee, reported on the received corrections and changes to the draft of the Fundamental Statutes of the Program of the Armenian CP. The delegates participating the debates introduced proposals and supplements to the draft.

The congress confirmed the Fundamental Statutes of the Program of the Armenian CP. The congress delegates elected a commission for the preparation of the Program of the Armenian CP.

Delegate G.A. Oganyan spoke on the third agenda item: "On the Draft of the Statute of the Armenian CP Control

Commission." The congress adopted the statute on the Armenian CP Control Commission.

At the recommendation of the delegates, M.L. Mkrtchyan, chairman of the Mandate Commission of the congress, presented the commission's resolution on halting the powers of the group of delegates representing the Coordinating Council who have left the congress. This resolution was adopted by the overwhelming majority of those present.

The congress elected the leading organs of the Armenian CP.

The congress delegates discussed and adopted resolutions on youth policy, the Armenian CP policy toward conducting economic reforms and making the transition to market relations, a declaration on genocide against Armenians, and other resolutions and declarations.

The congress continues its work.

#### First Secretary Movsisyan Address

91US0200B Yerevan GOLOS ARMENII in Russian  
30 Nov 90 p 1

[Speech by V.M. Movsisyan, CPSU Central Committee Politburo member, first secretary of the Armenian CP Central Committee: "Report on the Activity of the Presidium of the 29th Armenian CP Congress During the Period Between the Two Stages of Its Work"]

[Text] Comrades!

Today we begin the work of the second stage of the 29th Armenian CP Congress, where the Fundamental Statutes of the Program will be discussed, as well as the statute on the Review Commission, and the leading party organs—the Armenian CP Central Committee and the Review Commission—will be elected. Also ahead is the discussion of the the issue of holding a referendum, adopting a number of resolutions, declarations, and decisions.

Since, in accordance with the decision of the congress, the direction of the political and organizational issues of the activity of the Armenian CP were entrusted to the congress presidium during the interim between the two stages, allow me first of all to present briefly the fundamental trends of its activity.

The activity of the presidium of the 29th Armenian CP Congress has been directed toward the organization of the broad discussion of the decisions adopted by the congress on the preparation for and conduct of a referendum concerning issues such as the drafts of the Fundamental Statutes of the Program and the Charter of the Armenian CP, its status and appellation.

The Drafts of the Fundamental Statutes of the Program and the Charter of the Armenian CP have been discussed in over 4,200 primary party organizations. They have also been discussed and for the most part approved at 48 plenums and meetings of the aktivs of city and rayon

committees, in the work of which participated members of the presidium of the 29th Congress, delegates and senior officials of the Armenian CP Central Committee apparatus. In as much as the discussion of these documents coincided with the organization and conduct of elections to local soviets, it was concluded on 15 November. During the discussion process, communists also made numerous suggestions and critical comments, on the basis of which the gorkoms and raykoms sent 450 suggestions and comments to the presidium of the 29th Congress. All these materials have been worked over and summarized by the commission and will be presented for your consideration.

The Armenian republic draft law: "On Public Associations" and proposals for the formation of party groups (factions) in the Armenian republic Supreme Soviet were developed and directed to the republic parliament as a legislative initiative.

The presidium has done specific work to prepare for and hold elections to local soviets. The presidium's appeal to the voters and to all the citizens of the republic was published in light of the elections of 28 October and 18 November. Conferences took place for the purpose of organizing practical assistance; members of the congress presidium, delegates, and senior officials of the Central Committee apparatus were sent to the provinces. According to preliminary data, approximately 60 percent of the deputies elected to local soviets are communists.

Specific work has been completed to prepare for press the resolutions, declarations and decisions adopted during the first stage of the 29th Armenian CP Congress. They have already been published. Other documents subject to discussion during the second stage have been prepared: resolutions on youth policy, economic policy, and market relations; the genocide against Armenians of 1915, the mass information media, the Armenian language, culture; science and education.

The leadership of the Armenian CP Central Committee has repeatedly raised with the country's highest organs the issue of a gas pipeline. As you already know, this issue has finally been resolved. Negotiations have been conducted with the USSR Council of Ministers, the CPSU Central Committee and the RSFSR Central Committee on activating work in the disaster area, thanks to which the republic has been granted additional capital investment. Expressing the united will of the congress delegates, the presidium addressed a demand to the CPSU Central Committee Politburo for the immediate restoration of party and soviet organs in NKAO [Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast]. I can report as information that negotiations for a constitutional resolution of this problem have begun and are continuing with the participation of delegations of both republics.

A number of topical sociopolitical issues concerning the situation in the republic were discussed at the conferences of the communist deputies, party raykom and gorkom first secretaries, party newspaper and magazine editors, enterprise and association party bureau leaders and secretaries to the republic Supreme Soviet.

The presidium of the congress adopted a decree on the 73rd anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution. An evening gala took place on 6 November; a meeting with party, war, and labor veterans, and representatives of the intelligentsia was held.

The presidium adopted a resolution that discusses cases of political vandalism and illegal activities against monuments of V.I. Lenin and other public figures and outstanding people.

During and immediately after the congress, the course of the work of the congress and the post-congress discussion of the documents adopted was systematic covered in the party newspapers AYASTAN and GOLOS ARMENII.

A number of decisions associated with party publications, newspaper and magazine subscriptions, expansion of editorial boards' right to economic independence, and regulation of associates' salaries were adopted.

Comrades!

The situation both within the Armenian CP and surrounding it has sharply intensified in the brief period between the two sessions of the congress.

According to current data, by today over 5,000 communists have left the party; 37,116 people are abstaining from payment of party dues. The most dangerous thing is that this process is continuing. The basic cause is the complex situation in the republic, the indefinite state of the party itself, and frequently, the indecision of its leading organs.

The indicated processes within party ranks became particularly intensified after the decision of the republic Supreme Soviet.

As you know, on 5 November, the republic Supreme Soviet adopted the resolution: "On the Depoliticization of State Organs and State Enterprises, Institutions, Organizations, Educational Institutions, and Military Subunits of the Armenian Republic," according to which the activity of party and sociopolitical organizations has ceased in the indicated locations. This occurred under conditions of the extreme passivity of a number of communist delegates, which was manifested both in the process of discussing the document and in voting on it.

It should be noted that even before this decision there was already a depoliticization of the republic Procuracy, Supreme Court, KGB, Ministry of Justice, the Academy of Sciences Presidium, Council of Trade Unions, Armenian Youth League, and Yerevan State University. The tension in party organizations reached an extreme degree after the adoption of the decision.

The decision adopted by the republic Supreme Soviet contradicts the effective Constitution and international laws concerning human rights. On 6 November the Presidium of the 29th Party Congress introduced a declaration in view of the decision of the Supreme Soviet, noting that it contradicts the effective Armenian Constitution, which guarantees the opportunity for the successful implementation of the chartered tasks of social organizations. The declaration stated that this hastily adopted decision, which contradicts effective laws, can be assessed as an attempt to sow the seed of distrust of the Communist Party and other sociopolitical organizations, and hamper democratic processes.

It was proposed to parliament that it halt the action of the decision until the discussion of the draft law: "On Social Organizations," directed by the Armenian CP Central Committee to the parliament on 12 October.

On 13 November, the Supreme Soviet discussed our declaration, in light of which I expounded in detail the position of the congress presidium, indicated the illegal nature of the adopted decision, and made the appropriate suggestions. However, the decision remained in force. The presidium does not agree with it, and feels that the congress must propose the appropriate declaration, and once again demand parliament's review of the decision.

Despite the fact that a mechanism for its activation was not worked out simultaneously with the adoption of the decision, all the same, grounds have been created for pressuring communists and primary party organizations. In a number of enterprises in the service sector and in schools there have begun to resound unlawful demands to halt the activity of the party organizations; moreover, communists have been called upon to turn in their party cards on a mass scale.

Attempts to discredit the Communist Party and its members have continued. Such attempts were undertaken even at the last AOD [Armenian Pannational Movement] Congress by a number of its delegates. We decisively condemn such ill-intentioned, groundless, feeble impulses, and demand that an end be put to such a form of action, capable of only damaging the nation's unity.

We have repeatedly, loudly, and openly announced our own shortcomings. To be more precise, they are, in effect, mistakes and shortcomings of the party upper echelons, with which the rank-and-file communists, the broad party masses have nothing in common.

We have today an entire army of honest, brave communists; people who registered for the party with faith and conviction, with a readiness to serve their native people, the working person. We must put all our effort into defending them from unjust and base attacks; we must stand up to defend the rights, honor, and dignity of citizen communists.

The republic's communists, all our citizens must not doubt that the pressure on the party is being used to mask concrete political aims that have little to do with the ideas of democracy, public consensus, and social harmony, bringing order and calm to the Armenian home. It is not hard to imagine where such a process may lead. Political history knows such situations, and their consequences—schism and resistance in society, which will unavoidably lead to a political and social crisis. We feel it necessary to remind the public of the republic, our voters of this one more time.

We must also raise the issue in parliament, so that during the discussion by the Supreme Soviet Preparatory Commission of the draft law: "On Parties and Sociopolitical Organizations" anti-democratic formulations of the draft be excluded, that the corresponding draft law presented by the Armenian CP Congress Presidium be studied appropriately and discussed seriously. We discussed this draft law carefully at the conferences of communist delegates and raykom first secretaries.

Comrades!

It must be noted too that there have also been omissions in the activity of the Congress Presidium. The presidium has not always gotten effectively involved in the various areas of the party's activity, guided, or coordinated the work of lower levels. On the other hand, it must be openly admitted that despite its desire to do so, the presidium has not always fully implemented the functions of the party leading organs. Thus the elections of leading party organs today are extremely urgent.

Comrades!

The party members expect from the congress concrete actions, clear explanations as to where the renewed, transformed Armenian CP is heading.

We must adopt the Fundamental Statutes of the Program and Charter, and make clear the status of our party, our future mutual relations with the CPSU and other Communist Parties, and make concrete the political aims of the Armenian CP, the trends of its activity. In our opinion, the Armenian CP must become an independent political organization with its own Program and Charter, guided by its own decisions, and be in federal mutual relations with all Communist Parties. We hope that the congress delegates will yield the answers to these questions with their businesslike comments and proposals during the discussion of the Fundamental Statutes of the Program and Charter.

Today, the Armenian CP stands at the crossroads of complex and fateful paths. There is one way out. It must become an independent national strength whose aim will be the preservation of the unity of all the forces of the Armenian people, the active defense of their interests, confirmation, and people power. It must become a political force that will fight for national consent and civil peace.

In liberating themselves from the load of errors and shortcomings of the past, communists are obligated to fight actively in the name of common human values, in the name of the prosperity of our new republic.

### Central Asia

#### Kirghiz President Sees Stabilization, Progress in Three Years

91US0169A Frunze SOVETSKAYA KIRGIZIYA  
in Russian 23 Nov 90 pp 1, 2

[Article by V. Niksdorf, SOVETSKAYA KIRGIZIYA correspondent: "A. Akayev: 'I Need Three Years....'"]

[Text] Two meetings with Kirghiz SSR President A. Akayev took place last Wednesday—first, after a 10-minute address in the Supreme Soviet Presidium, he answered the questions of republic and central newspaper, radio, and television correspondents; later, in a meeting hall at the branch of the Central V.I. Lenin Museum, he outlined his views on the situation in the country and the republic to representatives of the city's aktiv.

The questions that the journalists and the city of Frunze's enterprise and organization executives asked the president turned out to be similar for the most part, and this is understandable: The main things worrying all of us just now are what is being done in Kirghizia for the transition to market relations, what is the head of the republic's attitude toward the price-formation reform that has begun, and how can the transition period's difficulties be overcome more quickly. We shall try to convey to readers the president's viewpoint and some of his thoughts on the pressing problems of the day.

**What are the main problems of the day?** First of all, it is essential to establish civil order and civil concord in the country. Many people almost go into a state of panic when they get news of conflict situations in one or another region. But conflict, however paradoxical this may sound, is a normal phenomenon in social development. It is a struggle of the old and obsolete with the new and progressive. It is just necessary that the political conflicts do not turn into armed clashes and lead to people's deaths. Our convictions should be propagated in the society by democratic means. Now, when the processes have intensified, it is necessary to find the points of concurrence of views and begin to reach agreement—after all, we all want the good of our country and our people. Therefore, the main thing is to concentrate all resources, not on destruction, but on creation.

Hence arises the second problem—to bring about the transition to market relations faster on the basis of civil concord. In order for the transition to be successful, the Union Treaty should be concluded more quickly. Economic relations are being disrupted largely because there is no such treaty and the future of the Union of SSR's is unclear. Therefore, some republics and enterprises located in various regions are either biding their time or

beginning to carry out "the new economic policy" primarily by raising the prices of their products to levels two to four times as high as before.

An All-Union market is essential in order for the economy to function normally. That is why political solutions that will promote the dying down of centrifugal inclinations are so necessary.

**Changes are required.** In the very near future, the president noted, a reorganization of administrative organs will be forthcoming. In this, we will not copy what has already been done in other republics, but will follow our own path, taking Kirghizia's specific characteristics into account.

Apparently, the Council of Ministers will be changed into a cabinet headed by a prime minister who, in turn, will begin to serve the president. New people—young, energetic, and businesslike—undoubtedly will enter into this cabinet.

The President's Council, in which various political forces and social strata are represented, will continue its activity. This collegial organ under the president was created for the development of measures to implement the basic directions of Kirghiz SSR domestic and foreign policy.

**I need three years**—That is how the president answered the question about when he hopes to get visible results from his work. Now, when leaders are not particularly trusted, society openly asks: for how long do you need a vote of confidence. We remember that Boris Yeltsin asked for one and one-half to two years, and at the present session of the Union Parliament several speakers gave Mikhail Gorbachev 30 days. Askar Akayev thinks that the period for the situation to stabilize in our republic will last two to two and one-half years, and only in the third year perhaps we will begin to advance.

I have already stated my impression of the President's position. It is noted for a sincerity in estimates typical of a genuine scholar of statements of truth, no matter how wretched it is. At these meetings the president did not try to quiet the audience, but, on the contrary, he spoke about the reality which awaits us all.

Three years—this period is sufficient if the situation becomes stable, and everyone also must thoroughly understand this. Indeed, a person can do highly productive and high-quality work only under conditions of calmness and good order.

**Priorities.** Speaking of these, A. Akayev stressed the importance of cultural development in addition to the problems in normalizing internationality relations and shifting to the market. In this regard, he understands cultural development in a broad sense: not simply an increase in education and science, but also the culture of interpersonal relations, the culture of commercial operations and knowing how to conduct a dialogue with foreign partners, etc.

Primary attention in the economy should be devoted to developing the agro-industrial complex because this sector yields the fruits of labor faster than all the rest. It is necessary to create small processing enterprises—not in the cities, but in the villages and right where the agricultural produce is raised.

We have great potentials in agriculture, and just need to make better use of them. And we need to process the raw materials on the spot to a greater extent in order to market a finished product. This approach will give the republic 2 to 3 billion [milliard] additional rubles annually. In view of our current deficit of r2 billion, it is essential to seek reserves everywhere.

**Train cadres.** The market will require knowledgeable people, familiar with management [menedzhment], the new technologies, and world practice in market relations. Who will teach our native manager [menedzher]? In A. Akayev's opinion, Gorbachev's big mistake lies in his not worrying about training cadres when initiating perestroika. And yet, Peter I sent boyars' sons to Holland, England, and France for training, even by force.

I am convinced, the president stressed, that we have great intellectual potential in the country. However, it has not been called upon, and it must be put to use for the good of the country. We should send young Kirghiz men and women abroad for one or two years so that they may, not only study there, but also undergo on-the-job training and develop a feel for the market with both mind and hand [razum i kozha] as the saying goes. For the time being, however, the republic till is empty, and there is no currency for prolonged foreign assignments—It is also necessary to seek reserves in this case.

**Who will help us?** A. Akayev again repeated a thought already expressed by him at a USSR Supreme Soviet session—It is vitally important to organize international economic ties, but to orient ourselves, not on the West, but on the East.

Kirghizia, of course, also needs to avail itself of assistance from abroad—and will be unable to manage without this! However, a question arises: No one in the business world does something for nothing, and we must pay. But with what? Our republic has no currency. Therefore, the president proposes his own alternative—use our natural resources. We must boldly mortgage even, perhaps, entire regions.

All of this, of course, must be done under the aegis of the Union of SSR's, but ensuring that the foreign investments are fairly distributed. By the way, the separatist inclinations are largely to be explained by certain republics' not believing in such fairness. We have rich subsurfaces and raw-material resources—It might be possible to develop tourism and to create joint enterprises. Why should we not lease some region to a foreign company or concern? Later, when we have enough of our own currency, we shall buy it back—but it is necessary to resort

to such bold relations if we want to develop the republic, not by slogans, but by attracting all possible resources for completing the task.

In this regard, the president emphasized, it is necessary to abandon ideology in economic relations. We have fallen behind the other world precisely because we have fitted almost our every step to what the classics of Marxism-Leninism said in this respect many decades ago.

I wish to note that the president's position meets with many opponents. These will probably begin to scream about a sellout of the native land to capitalists and the marketing of national resources. Similar judgments can be heard in the Russian Republic [Rossiya], and even read in the two ROSSIYA's—SOVETSKAYA and LITERATURNAYA. However, those super patriots look generally absurd in an epoch of universal integration. And, in view of the shortage of most goods in our home—they look like hostages of precisely that ideology which has led to the universal, leveling poverty. But hunger is a hard taskmaster [golod—ne tetka], and teaches a great deal—rather quickly. Just last year, the Novgorod public, for example, took a firm stand against the attraction of foreign firms to organize joint enterprises. Now it is all "for," even including the patriots.

**Prices will have to be raised.** The president has his own principled view: Their raising is an unpopular but necessary measure. We must not, of course, raise the prices of bread, milk, and sugar. After all, and there is nothing to hide—bread is the basic food in our villages. However, the remaining prices must be made free of control. By the way, this has been called for in all the programs proposed to the country's parliament, including the Yeltsin-Yavlinskiy Program. Only the ways that different economists have been proposing are alternative: Raise the prices either gradually (Shatalin) or all at once (Abalkin).

Increase in retail prices is inevitable, and the people must be told the whole truth about this, A. Akayev stressed. In his opinion, however, the country direly needs monetary reform. Right now approximately 200 to 400 billion [rubles] are circulating in the "shady" economy sphere. This money cannot be taken away from the Mafia, but it can be "tied up." If even r150 billion were taken out of circulation, this would already improve our finances. However, the reform must absolutely not be carried out the way Stalin did it. He simply took away everybody's money. It is essential to protect labor's savings and create a system of social security measures. It should be understood that we cannot change over to a normal market economy without having a strong ruble.

A. Akayev also answered other questions. These concerned problems of land privatization, the organizational structures of the republic press, and the president's attitudes toward new public formations.



Dzh. Saadanbekov, A.M. Muraliyev, and F.Sh. Kulov, members of the President's Council, took part in the meetings.

### **Kirghiz President Sees Need To Strengthen State Power in Republic**

*91US0201A Frunze SOVETSKAYA KIRGIZIYA  
in Russian 2 Dec 90 pp 1, 2*

[Message from A. Akayev, KiSSR President to the KiSSR Supreme Soviet: "On the Situation in the Republic"]

[Text] I, the President of the KiSSR, am exercising a right granted to me under the Constitution, sending the KiSSR Supreme Soviet my first message and proclaiming it to the people of our republic. In this message I would like to give my assessment of the situation in the republic and propose urgent measures to reorganize the system of state power and carry out economic reform.

As I appeal to the Supreme Soviet I express the hope that our republic's supreme legislative organ will support the solutions to highly important matters of state and public affairs which I propose.

As I make public this message I count on the people's understanding of the necessity of these measures and their enthusiastic participation in efforts to carry them out.

\* \* \*

The need for decisive measures objectively stems from the present state of the republic. Almost one-and-a-half million people have a total monthly income of less than R75 (rubles). A total of 140,000 of our working population are unemployed, and of those three-quarters are young people under the age of 30. The housing problem, food shortages and a serious shortage of manufactured goods have become chronic social ills. No effective system of health care has been created. Investment in public education, culture and the intellectual realm is extremely inadequate. Working and living conditions for the greater portion of the population, especially the rural population, are such that there is actually talk of a boundary beyond which lies the inevitable destruction of our people's genetic stock and their physical, intellectual and moral degeneration.

The situation is further exacerbated by the rising cost of living. Currency circulation is disrupted in the extreme, there has been a sharp worsening of the situation on the consumer market and prices are rising.

According to expert assessments the expected results of the current economic year will be disheartening. Volumes of state procurement as compared to last year will fall to four percent for meat and milk, 37 percent for grain, and 21 percent for vegetables. There is projected to be a decrease in production of sausage, butter, cheeses, whole milk products and sugar.

There will be a decline in planned growth of consumer goods production by a factor of almost seven. By year's end the shortfall (as compared to standard levels) in stocks of goods available will reach R210 million.

The plan for construction of housing, schools and pre-school facilities, clinics, houses of culture and clubs will not be fulfilled. Strictly centralized planning, a lack of priorities and lack of interagency coordination have caused a sharp increase in the volume of incomplete construction projects, which by year's end will have a total value of R1.5 billion, a sum which is greater by a factor of 1.7 than in 1985.

A decline in overall economic activity has resulted in decreasing profits in our republic economy.

The general decline in the standard of living and the emerging crisis of power have resulted in worsening of the mood in society, dissatisfaction and even animosity between people; this has been particularly evident in regard to the state of interethnic relations.

Over the past 10 years the crime rate has virtually doubled. The black market has practically been legalized and is operating on an ever greater scale and with increasing intensity. Organized crime is becoming more prevalent.

The KiSSR, like other union republics, has acquired purely declarative sovereignty not backed up by legal or political opportunities for achieving independent solutions to any of the serious problems in our life.

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I would like to state with all seriousness that all our ideas about ways of emerging from this crisis and our efforts to move forward as quickly as possible could prove to be nothing but wishful thinking if our republic does not have strong state power. Evidence of this is our entire experience with perestroika, and especially recent events. Pluralism of opinion and political schools of thought is one undisputed achievement of the perestroika years. However, in a situation of economic chaos and paralysis of power these democratic features are often transformed into their exact opposites and weaken social discipline in an intolerable manner.

Efforts by local soviets to preserve party control have resulted in unjustified separation of executive and legislative functions, which in turn gives rise to powerlessness and slackening of responsibility on the part of local administrative organs. All this is occurring in parallel with the weakening of federative ties within the USSR, ties between the center and the republics. The cumbersome and costly system of ministries and agencies is not working. The objective need for improvement in the entire system of state power and administration in our republic is obvious.

What direction should these efforts take?

Above all we need fundamental changes in local government.

In view of this I feel that it is essential at the level of the republic Constitution and through a special law:

- to clearly delineate the functions and powers of state (republic) and local governments;
- to combine legislative and executive power on all basic levels of local government (oblast, city and rayon);
- to define forms of soviet activities such as sessions, permanent commissions, presidiums and chairmen; the latter should primarily exercise executive authority. A soviet's chairman should simultaneously serve as chairman of its presidium. In order to ensure the necessary continuity and increase efficiency of administration it would clearly be desirable to include not only the chairman of the current ispolkom on the presidium, but also his deputy;
- to establish that a soviet chairman from the rayon level upward is to be confirmed by the republic president following his election. This should provide the necessary point of contact between presidential authority and local government and create a unified mechanism for the functioning of all levels of state power;
- create a working apparatus attached to soviets in place of ispolkoms at all levels of local government.

Parallel with this we also need to strengthen other aspects of state power in our republic, especially in the context of improvement in the actual and legal status of the president as head of state. This will require major changes in the legal and organizational forms of the government's activities. This will mean new approaches to definition of the republic government's structure and its functions and powers.

Around the world there are predominantly two types of organization of executive power in a presidential system of government: without a prime minister, and with a prime minister as head of the cabinet of ministers. Obviously we should continue to employ the second option.

The basic functions of a prime minister are to coordinate the activities of ministries and state committees, carry out day-to-day supervision of their work and make decisions regarding state administration.

Realization of these proposals will make it possible:

- to eliminate the present inconsistency in definition of the republic president's status;
- ensure greater stability in the republic's state institutions, something which is of vital importance in a period of political and economic stabilization.

The most important instrument of a rule-of-law state is the institution of constitutional control. Union-wide experience has demonstrated that the constitutional oversight committees established at the Union level and

in individual republics have not proved to be the best means of ensuring compliance with constitutional law. Therefore I wish to lend my support to the idea of establishing a KiSSR Constitutional Court which would perform the following tasks by means of democratic procedures: monitor compliance with basic standardizing acts issued by the republic and with its Constitution; resolve disputes in the areas of state power and administration; and serve through its decisions as an effective guarantor of our citizens' rights and interests.

The problem of direct people's power is of exceptionally great significance in terms of further democratization of public life in our republic. I am referring to the need for development of a procedure for people's voting (referendums) and people's initiatives at various levels, from the republic as a whole down to the rayon level.

Effective procedures for people's voting and people's initiatives would definitely help not only to reveal public opinion but would also help mold it and serve to increase political culture among the citizens of our republic.

Realization of the measures outlined will require ambitious legislative activity and amendments to a number of laws which have already been passed, in particular the Law on Land, the Law on Property and the Law on Leasing.

Summing up my proposal in regard to ways of improving our republic's system of state power and administration, I intend to exercise the right of legislative initiative and submit a draft law on this matter and proposals for changes and amendments in the KiSSR Constitution to the republic Supreme Soviet.

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It would be illusory to expect a quick solution to our complex social and economic problems. Most likely we are in for a long and incredibly difficult road to economic recovery. And the start of that road should be development of a new economic course.

At its previous session the republic Supreme Soviet approved: "Basic Statutes for Stabilization of the Economy and Transition to Market Relationships."

With regard to further development of these statutes I deem it essential that we define a number of essential components in this new economic course. These are, above all, a planned and gradual approach to market transformations and state regulation of the economy through tax, price and credit policies and various forms of licensing. We are quite simply compelled to preserve the system of distributive relationships in order to avoid total imbalance in the economy.

The basis of our new economic course, which will give maximum consideration to our unique economic conditions, should be a mixed, multitiered economy, the emergence and development of which will be made possible by:

- attraction of outside investment (technology, credit and loans);
- objective market processes within the economy itself.

The first steps toward formation of a mixed, multitiered economy should be:

1. Land reform and strengthening of the agrarian sector, above all through expansion of private farm plots and creation of peasant farms.

2. Creation and adoption of programs for the development of rural entrepreneurial activity, which would include:

a. establishment of a large number of small enterprises and encouragement of small-scale entrepreneurial activity in rural areas;

b. establishment of special services which will provide economic support for rural entrepreneurial activity (advantageous loans, technical assistance, organization of supply and help with the sale of products);

c. establishment of "industrial development zones" in rural areas; these zones will be the focus of top-priority state industrial construction, and local entrepreneurs will be given especially advantageous conditions in regard to taxation, credit, supply, allocation of land, etc.;

d. formation of a new generation of enterprises which have a good feel for the unique characteristics of the national psychology, understand ethnic and cultural traditions and are to a certain extent capable of preventing ethnic conflicts during the formation of market structures.

3. Development and adoption of a program for development of medium-sized and small cities as magnets for surplus rural population and as structural counterweights to large cities. This will create the preconditions for equal development of the social and economic infrastructure and will make it possible to ensure free movement of investment and labor resources, something which is especially important in terms of the emergence of market-based economy.

4. Definition of priority sectors which would be given the most favorable economic conditions so that they can serve as a base for development and the basis of future structural transformations. Among these could be agriculture, light industrial, traditional crafts, electronics and nontraditional forms of tourism.

5. Creation of the economic, legal and organizational conditions needed to attract foreign investment.

6. Development of a republic policy on development of small business, privatization in trade, food services, the service sector, industry, construction, the building materials industry and motor vehicle transport.

7. All-round development of the market infrastructure, i.e. a network of commercial banks, sales organizations, brokerage firms and a securities market.

8. Organization of training and retraining in our country and abroad to produce cadres who are capable of working in a new system of economic relationships.

The above gives me the right to propose appropriate changes and amendments in the program for economic stabilization and transition to a market economy.

As I appeal to the Supreme Soviet and the people of our republic I want to stress that adoption of these urgent measures will form a basis upon which to overcome the crisis and improve our lives.

*Signed: A. Akayev, KiSSR President*

### **Kirghiz Visa Official Projects Tenfold Growth in Republic Emigration**

91US0201B Frunze SOVETSKAYA KIRGIZIYA  
in Russian 1 Dec 90 p 1

[Response from B. D. Derbishev, head of the KiSSR MVD Department of Visas and Registration: "A Reader Asks": "Farewell, Native Shore"]

[Text] "They say that every day a great many people leave our country to take up permanent residence abroad. I am curious: how many people have left Kirghizia this year?"—A. Sulluyev, Tash-Kumyr

We addressed this question to B. D. Derbishev, head of the KiSSR MVD's Department of Visas and Registration [OVIR]. Here is his reply:

"As of the first of November 1990, according to our figures, a total of 10,075 people had left our republic to take up permanent residence in other countries. Another 15,099 KiSSR citizens have applied to emigrate."

"Most of these people are going to capitalist countries. Thus, 9,224 former citizens of Kirghizia went to live in unified Germany this year, and another 13,343 want to move there. Israel is second in popularity, 647 people having already emigrated there and another 1,425 awaiting permission to leave. Next is Greece (176 and 294 people, respectively) and the United States (19 and 20, respectively)."

"Emigrants are also going to other countries, but not in significant numbers. Incidentally, individuals of Kirghiz nationality are also taking up permanent residence outside of our country. True, their numbers are relatively small."

"In comparison with last year the emigration process has accelerated by twofold. According to our projections, as soon as the USSR Law on Immigration and Emigration is passed the number of persons wishing to leave the republic will increase tenfold."

"Quite frankly, we on the OVIR [Office of Visas and Registrations] staff are horrified at what could happen when this law passes. Even now our personnel are barely keeping up with the growing flood of work. Yet our staff is not being enlarged, and we are running out of space: seven people use each of our offices. We do all our work the old way, with pens and accounting ledgers, but what we need are computers and copying equipment."

### Amendments to Tajik Constitution Published

91US0205A Dushanbe KOMMUNIST  
TADZHIKISTANA in Russian 8 Dec 90 pp 1, 3

[Law of the Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic on Improving the Structure of Executive and Administrative Power in the Tajik SSR, and on Amending and Supplementing the Constitution (Basic Law) of the Tajik SSR]

[Text] In order to create a harmonious system of state control, to strictly divide legislative, executive and judicial power, and to eliminate parallelism and redundancy in the activities of state bodies, and considering the importance of all-out reinforcement of executive power during the transition to market relations and in connection with adoption of the Tajik SSR law: "On Approval of the Post of President of the Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic," the Supreme Soviet of the Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic **resolves**:

1.1. To combine the presidential, executive and administrative power of the Tajik SSR Council of Ministers.

To reorganize the Tajik SSR Council of Ministers as the Cabinet of Ministers under the President of the Tajik SSR. The President of the Tajik SSR is concurrently the Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers.

2. To institute the position of Vice President of the Tajik SSR. The Vice President is appointed by the President of the Tajik SSR with the subsequent approval of the Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet. On the instructions of the President of the Tajik SSR, the Vice President of the Tajik SSR manages the Cabinet of Ministers and organizes its work, and he carries out some other of its functions and acts in behalf of the President of the Tajik SSR in his absence.

3. To instruct the President of the Tajik SSR to form the Cabinet of Ministers of the Tajik SSR, to be subsequently submitted for approval to a regular session of the Supreme Soviet of the Tajik SSR.

To establish that prior to formation of the Tajik SSR Cabinet of Ministers, the Tajik SSR Soviet of Ministers is to exercise its powers established by the Tajik SSR Constitution and laws of the Tajik SSR.

4. The republic's Cabinet of Ministers consists of the Vice President of the Tajik SSR, deputies of the Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers, ministers, and

chairmen of state committees. Members of the Cabinet of Ministers are appointed and dismissed in accordance with procedures determined by the Constitution of the Tajik SSR.

II. To introduce the following amendments and supplements to the Constitution (Basic Law) of the Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic:

1. To substitute the words "Council of Ministers of the Tajik SSR" in the third part of Article 87 by the words "Cabinet of Ministers of the Tajik SSR";

2. To adopt the following wording for paragraphs 7, 8, 9, 14 and 32 of Article 99:

"7) election of the Deputy Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Tajik SSR;

"8) approval of the nomination of the President of the Tajik SSR for Vice President of the Tajik SSR, the composition of the Cabinet of Ministers of the Tajik SSR, and changes made within it; approval of decisions of the President of the Tajik SSR concerning formation and abolition of ministries and state committees of the Tajik SSR;

"9) appointment of the Procurator of the Tajik SSR and his deputies, as nominated by the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Tajik SSR and coordinated with the President of the Tajik SSR; approval of members of the board of the Tajik SSR Procuracy";

"14) repeal of acts adopted by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Tajik SSR, acts of the President of the Tajik SSR and orders of the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Tajik SSR";

"32) approval of decisions of the President of the Tajik SSR concerning announcement of a state of emergency on all territory or in certain locales of the Tajik SSR";

3. To supplement the fifth part of Article 101, following the words "Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Tajik SSR", with the words "President of the Tajik SSR";

4. To adopt the following wording for the first part of Article 104:

"The right of legislative initiative in the Supreme Soviet of the Tajik SSR belongs to USSR people's deputies from the Tajik SSR, to the people's deputies of the Tajik SSR, to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Tajik SSR, to the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Tajik SSR, to the President of the Tajik SSR, to committees and permanent commissions of the Supreme Soviet of the Tajik SSR, to the Committee for Constitutional Oversight of the Tajik SSR, to the Soviet of People's Deputies of the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast, to oblast and the Dushanbe city soviets of people's deputies, to the Tajik SSR Committee for People's Control, to the Tajik SSR Supreme Court, to the Procurator of the Tajik SSR, and to the Main State Arbiter of the Tajik SSR";

5. To adopt the following wording for Article 106:

"Article 106. The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Tajik SSR, headed by the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Tajik SSR, is created in order to organize the work of the Supreme Soviet of the Tajik SSR.

"The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Tajik SSR is composed of: the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Tajik SSR, the Deputy Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Tajik SSR, the Deputy Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Tajik SSR acting as Chairman of the Soviet of People's Deputies of the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast, chairmen of the committees and permanent commissions of the Supreme Soviet of the Tajik SSR, and the Chairman of the Tajik SSR Committee for People's Control.

"The Supreme Soviet of the Tajik SSR may also elect other people's deputies of the Tajik SSR to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Tajik SSR";

6. In Article 108:

to delete paragraphs 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12;

to renumber paragraphs 13, 14 as paragraphs 6 and 7;

to renumber Paragraph 15 as Paragraph 8, and to adopt the following wording for it:

"8) awards qualification classes to judges of the Tajik SSR Supreme Court, to oblast and Dushanbe city judges, and to rayon (city) people's courts of rayons and republic-subordinated cities, and the first qualification class to judges of the court of the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast";

to renumber Paragraph 16 as Paragraph 9;

7. To adopt the following wording for Article 109:

"Article 109. The Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Tajik SSR is elected by the Supreme Soviet of the Tajik SSR from among people's deputies of the Tajik SSR by secret ballot for a term of five years and for not more than two consecutive terms. He may be recalled at any time by the Supreme Soviet of the Tajik SSR by secret ballot.

"The Chairman of the Supreme Soviet is accountable to the Supreme Soviet of the Tajik SSR.

"The Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Tajik SSR provides overall leadership to the preparation of issues to be examined by the Supreme Soviet of the Tajik SSR, and signs decrees adopted by the Supreme Soviet of the Tajik SSR and acts of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Tajik SSR; submits the names of candidates to the Supreme Soviet of the Tajik SSR for election or appointment to the positions of Deputy Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Tajik SSR, the Chairman of the Committee for Constitutional Oversight of the Tajik SSR, the Chairman of the Supreme Court of Tajik SSR and the Main State Arbiter of the Tajik SSR, and upon

coordination with the President of the Tajik SSR the Procurator of the Tajik SSR and his deputies, and submits proposals concerning appointments to the Committee for Constitutional Oversight of the Tajik SSR. Other candidates may be nominated in this case as well; makes representations to the Supreme Soviet of the Tajik SSR concerning dismissal of the indicated officials.

"The Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Tajik SSR issues orders.

"Deputies of the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Tajik SSR carry out certain functions delegated to them by the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Tajik SSR and act in behalf of the chairman in his absence or when it is impossible for him to carry out his responsibilities";

8. To delete Article 110;

9. To adopt the following wording for the second part of Article 112:

"Officials are appointed, elected and approved, and the most important republic programs prepared by the government for the republic's economic and social development and the state budget of the Tajik SSR are approved, in the presence of the conclusions of the appropriate committees and permanent commissions of the Supreme Soviet of the Tajik SSR";

10. To adopt the following wording for the first part of Article 113:

"During sessions of the Supreme Soviet of the Tajik SSR, a people's deputy of the Tajik SSR has the right to make inquiries of the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Tajik SSR, the President of the Tajik SSR, directors of bodies organized or elected by the Supreme Soviet of the Tajik SSR, and directors of associations, enterprises and union-subordinated organizations located on the territory of the Tajik SSR in regard to matters within the competency of the Tajik SSR";

11. To supplement the second part of Article 115, following the words "Supreme Soviet of the Tajik SSR", with the words "President of the Tajik SSR"; to replace the word "directs" by the word "direct";

12. To adopt the following wording for Chapter 13:

"Chapter 13. President of the Tajik SSR. Cabinet of Ministers of the Tajik SSR.

"Article 117. The President of the Tajik SSR is the head of the Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic.

"The President of the Tajik SSR exercises supreme executive and administrative power in the Tajik SSR, and is concurrently the Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers.



"Article 118. A citizen of the Tajik SSR may be elected President of the Tajik SSR. The same person cannot be President of the Tajik SSR for more than two consecutive terms.

"The President of the Tajik SSR is elected by citizens of the Tajik SSR on the basis of a universal, equal and direct right to vote by secret ballot for a term of five years. The number of candidates for the post of President of the Tajik SSR is not limited. Tajik SSR presidential elections are said to be valid if not less than 50 percent of the voters participate in them. The candidate receiving over half of the votes of voters taking part in elections in the Tajik SSR as a whole is said to be elected.

"The procedures of Tajik SSR presidential elections are determined by legislation of the Tajik SSR.

"The President of the Tajik SSR may not be a people's deputy of the Tajik SSR and a deputy of a local soviet of people's deputies of the Tajik SSR.

"The President of the Tajik SSR may receive wages only for this position.

"Article 119. The person elected President of the Tajik SSR assumes his post not later than a month after the elections. Upon assuming his post, the President of the Tajik SSR takes the following oath at a meeting of the Supreme Soviet of the Tajik SSR:

"I solemnly vow to faithfully serve the people of the Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic, to strictly implement the Constitution of the Tajik SSR and laws of the Tajik SSR, to guarantee the rights and liberties of citizens, and to conscientiously fulfill the high responsibilities conferred upon me as President of the Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic."

"The term of the President of the Tajik SSR is reckoned from the moment he takes his oath.

"Article 120. The President of the Tajik SSR:

"1) acts as the guarantor of observance of the rights and liberties of Soviet citizens on the republic's territory, the Constitution and laws of the Tajik SSR, and the Union Agreement;

"2) implements the necessary measures to safeguard national statehood and sovereignty, security and territorial integrity of the Tajik SSR, and to ensure equal rights of citizens of all nationalities residing in the republic;

"3) represents the Tajik SSR within the country and in international relations; conducts negotiations and signs agreements with the USSR and other union republics, as well as international treaties of the Tajik SSR;

"4) supports interaction of supreme organs of power and administration of the Tajik SSR; forms and abolishes ministries of the Tajik SSR and state committees of the Tajik SSR, and subsequently submits such actions for approval to the Supreme Soviet of the Tajik SSR;

"5) submits annual reports on the state of affairs in the republic to the Supreme Soviet of the Tajik SSR; informs the Supreme Soviet of the Tajik SSR on the most important issues of domestic and international life;

"6) appoints the vice president of the Tajik SSR and the deputies of the Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers and subsequently submits them for approval to the Supreme Soviet of the Tajik SSR; submits nominations to the Supreme Soviet of the Tajik SSR for the post of chairman of the Committee for People's Control of the Tajik SSR; makes representations to the Supreme Soviet of the Tajik SSR concerning dismissal of the indicated officials;

"7) dismisses and appoints members of the Cabinet of Ministers of the Tajik SSR and subsequently submits such actions for approval to the Supreme Soviet of the Tajik SSR;

"8) signs laws of the Tajik SSR; he is entitled to return a law within 10 days' time together with his objections to the Supreme Soviet of the Tajik SSR for further discussion and another vote. If a two-thirds majority of the Supreme Soviet of the Tajik SSR confirms a decision it had made previously, the President of the Tajik SSR signs the law; suspends and repeals acts of ministers, state committees and departments when they are inconsistent with the Constitution of the Tajik SSR, laws of the Tajik SSR and ukases, decrees and orders of the President of the Tajik SSR;

"9) in the interests of maintaining the security of citizens of the Tajik SSR, provides warning of an announcement of a state of emergency on all territory or in certain locales of the Tajik SSR, and announces it when necessary, with immediate submission of the adopted decision for approval to the Supreme Soviet of the Tajik SSR. A decree of the Supreme Soviet of the Tajik SSR on this matter is adopted by a majority of not less than two-thirds of the total number of people's deputies of the Tajik SSR.

"A state of emergency is regulated by legislation of the Tajik SSR;

"10) confers honorary titles of the Tajik SSR, awards state decorations of the Tajik SSR;

"11) accepts applicants for citizenship to the Tajik SSR, and resolves the question of granting asylum; pardons citizens convicted by courts of the Tajik SSR;

"12) appoints and recalls diplomatic and consulate representatives of the Tajik SSR in foreign states and international organizations, and representatives in other union republics;

"13) accepts the credentials and letters of recall of diplomatic representatives of foreign states and representatives of union republics accredited under his administration;

"14) resolves other matters placed within his competency by legislative acts.

"Article 121. The Presidential Council of the Tajik SSR, which is a consultative body, acts under the President of the Tajik SSR. The tasks of the Presidential Council are determined by the Statute on the Presidential Council.

"Members of the Presidential Council of the Tajik SSR are appointed by the President of the Tajik SSR. The Vice President of the Tajik SSR is an ex officio member of the Presidential Council of the Tajik SSR.

"The Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Tajik SSR participates in meetings of the Presidential Council of the Tajik SSR.

"Article 122. On the basis and in execution of the Constitution of the Tajik SSR and laws of the Tajik SSR, the President of the Tajik SSR publishes ukases, decrees and orders binding on all territory of the republic.

"Article 123. The President of the Tajik SSR possesses the right of immunity.

"In the event of violation of the Constitution of the Tajik SSR by the President of the Tajik SSR, the Supreme Soviet of the Tajik SSR expresses a vote of no confidence in the President of the Tajik SSR, with regard for the conclusion of the Committee for Constitutional Oversight of the Tajik SSR, and submits the matter of his removal to a popular vote. The Supreme Soviet of the Tajik SSR also expresses a vote of no confidence in the President of the Tajik SSR in the event that he violates his oath. The decision to issue a vote of no confidence in the President of the Tajik SSR is adopted by not less than two-thirds of the votes of the total number of people's deputies of the Tajik SSR. The issue of a vote of no confidence in the President of the Tajik SSR may be examined by the Supreme Soviet of the Tajik SSR at the demand of not less than a third of the total number of people's deputies of the Tajik SSR.

"Article 124. If the President of the Tajik SSR is unable to carry out his responsibilities for one reason or another, elections of a new President of the Tajik SSR must be carried out within 3 months' time. During this period the responsibilities of the President are assigned to the Vice President, and if this is impossible, to the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Tajik SSR.

"Article 125. The Cabinet of Ministers of the Tajik SSR acts under the direction of the President of the Tajik SSR; it consists of the Vice President of the Tajik SSR, deputies of the Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers, ministers of the Tajik SSR and chairmen of the state committees of the Tajik SSR.

"The Vice President of the Tajik SSR directs the Cabinet of Ministers and organizes its work on instructions from the President of the Tajik SSR.

"The powers and responsibilities of the Cabinet of Ministers of the Tajik SSR are determined by the Statute on the Cabinet of Ministers of the Tajik SSR."

14. To replace the words "Council of Ministers of the Tajik SSR" in Article 143 by the words "Cabinet of Ministers of the Tajik SSR."

15. To replace the words "Council of Ministers of the Tajik SSR" in Article 144 by the words "Cabinet of Ministers of the Tajik SSR."

16. To replace the words "Council of Ministers of the Tajik SSR" in Article 145 by the words "Cabinet of Ministers of the Tajik SSR."

17. To replace the words "Council of Ministers of the Tajik SSR" in Article 50 correspondingly by the words "Cabinet of Ministers of the Tajik SSR."

18. To adopt the following wording for Chapter 19:

"Chapter 19. The Procuracy.

"Article 165. The Procurator of the Tajik SSR and procurators subordinated to him maintain supreme oversight over the precise and uniform fulfillment of laws by all ministries, state committees and departments, enterprises, institutions and organizations, executive and administrative bodies of local soviets of people's deputies, kolkhozes, cooperative and other public organizations, officials, and citizens on the territory of the Tajik SSR.

"Article 166. The Procurator of the Tajik SSR and his deputies are nominated by the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Tajik SSR with the consent of the President of the Tajik SSR, and they are appointed by the Supreme Soviet of the Tajik SSR, to which they are responsible and accountable. The Procurator of the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast, procurators of the oblasts and the city of Dushanbe, and rayon and city procurators are appointed by the Procurator of the Tajik SSR.

"Article 167. The term of office of the Procurator of the Tajik SSR, the Procurator of the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous oblast and procurators of the oblasts, the city of Dushanbe, rayons and cities is 5 years.

"Article 168. Bodies of the Procuracy of the Tajik SSR exercise their powers independently of other organs of state power and administration and officials, being subordinate only to the Procurator of the Tajik SSR."

19. To adopt the following wording for Article 171:

"Article 171. The National Anthem of the Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic is approved by the Supreme Soviet of the Tajik SSR."

III. This law becomes effective from the moment of its adoption.

Tajik SSR President K. Makhkamov

1 December 1990, Dushanbe

### Tajik CP Central Committee Commission on Women, Youth Meets

91US0194A Dushanbe KOMMUNIST  
TADZHIKISTANA in Russian 6 Dec 90 p 2

[Unattributed report: "With Concern for the Future: Meeting of Tajik CP Central Committee Commission on Work Among Women and Youth"]

[Text] Women and youth are the two main categories of the republic's population which demand constant attention. People of the older generation remember that until quite recently there were special women's departments in party and soviet organs which gave invaluable aid in resolving questions involving social protection of women, protection of motherhood, and strengthening of the foundations of the family. Experience over time has shown that their elimination was unfounded. For under the conditions of our republic old prejudices still predominate in relation to women.

Problems of youth, who make up more than half of the republic's population, are just as critical here. Acting on that, the 21st Tajik CP Congress adopted a decision to set up a commission on work among women and youth in the structure of the party organs.

At the first meeting of the commission, its chairman, Tajik CP Central Committee Secretary B. Rakhimova, told about the priority directions of activity of the newly formed subdivision in the structure of the party organs and various forms of interaction of party organizations with organs of state power in resolving the problems being raised by the republic's women and youth.

The members of the commission who spoke following this—T. N. Nazarov, first deputy chairman of the Tajik SSR Council of Ministers and chairman of Gosplan, I. D. Davlatov, Tajik SSR minister of public education, and Sh. K. Kalandarov, Tajik SSR minister of light industry—talked about specific forms to step up the activities of party organizations among women and youth to resolve issues which affect their interests.

The following people took part in the exchange of opinions which occurred: Kh. Saidmuradov, vice-president of the Tajik SSR Academy of Sciences; A. Yakubov, Tajik CP Central Committee deputy chief of the department of agrarian policies and perestroyka of rural areas; S. A. Bazarova, deputy chairman of the governing board of the Azerbaidzhan Kolkhoz in Kuybyshevskiy Rayon; Sh. Ismailova, brigade foreman of the Kommunizm Kolkhoz in Parkharskiy Rayon; and N. Zaripova, veteran of the party and labor. The main tasks of the Tajik CP Central Committee commission on work among women and youth were defined at the meeting. They include the following:

- formulating the basic conceptual principles for resolving the entire complex of questions involving women's status in the economic, social, and political

spheres of society and further developing the women's movement in the republic focused on protecting the rights and interests of women, the family, motherhood, and childhood;

- organizing work of party organizations to analyze and forecast the political situation in the women's and youth movements and working out scientifically sound practical recommendations to party committees on work among women and youth;
- summarizing and disseminating the experience of work by party organizations among women and youth under the new conditions;
- conducting seminars of responsible workers of the party Central Committee, obkom, gorkom, and raykom apparats;
- analyzing political processes and trends arising in the women's and youth movements and coordinating and supporting those movements focused on civil peace and national harmony;
- developing forms, methods, and lines of party cooperation with the women's and youth movements;
- encouraging the advancement of women and youth to all levels of executive work and the creation of a system of training of female cadres in the republic;
- coordinating the work of commissions, departments, and other subdivisions of oblast, city, and rayon party committees working on the problems of the women's and youth movements and rendering them methodological assistance.

The powers of the commission were defined as follows:

- to present drafts of documents involving issues of the status of women and youth and protection of their rights and interests for examination by a plenum, buro, or secretariat of the Tajik CP Central Committee as well as by the republic's management and executive organs;
- to review and give its opinion on drafts of documents prepared by other commissions and departments of the Tajik CP Central Committee;
- to go to the specific local areas to study the activity of the primary party organizations and express its wishes to those organizations;
- at their meetings to listen to reports of responsible workers of party committees and other communists on issues which are under the commission's jurisdiction;
- to closely interact with commissions of the Tajik CP Central Committee as well as with commissions of local party committees;
- to utilize all information on the commission's problems which the party has at its disposal.

In order to efficiently study and review the issues, the commission is divided into two subcommissions: one on work among women and one on work among youth, both of which have working groups in their structures.

## REPUBLIC PARTY AND STATE AFFAIRS

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29 January 1991

Each group has a leader and a secretary who organize the work to study progress in meeting the challenges posed by the 21st Tajik CP Congress and plenums and aktivs of the Central Committee, to study and analyze issues envisioned by the work plan, and to prepare materials for review at meetings of the subcommission or commission of the Tajik CP Central Committee. The commission may recruit communists who are not members of the Central Committee or auditing commission of the republic's party organization for the work.

The Central Committee commission on work among women and youth carries out its work openly and informs party organizations, communists, and the broad public of its activities.

The commission ratified T. B. Karimov, who earlier worked as first deputy chief of the organizational department of the Tajik CP Central Committee, as deputy chairman of the Tajik CP Central Committee commission on work among women and youth.

### **Automated Communication System for Militia Recommended**

*91UN0741A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 11 Jan 91  
Second Edition p 6*

[Article by M. Piskunov, professor at the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs Academy: "We Drive Out to the Scene of an Accident: Does the Militia Need an Automated Command and Control System?"]

[Text] The report of a serious accident came over "hot" telephone 02 in the duty section. What must the operations duty officer do? First of all, estimate the situation, and then make a decision on the dispatch of a patrol group. A minimal amount of time is to be spent in the process. Then the duty officer assigns the task to the patrol detail, indicating the address of the accident.

And so the group drives out. The operations duty officer receives a report of its arrival on the scene. He reports to the chief of the organ on the measures that were taken... All of this takes time, which there is not enough of. And here an automated system of command and control of forces and means for ensuring public order and combating crime can come to the aid of the militia.

What does its application in practice look like? When the report of the accident comes in on 02, the exact address lights up on a screen, where it occurred, the distance of the patrol detail from the scene of the event, a recommendation on the kind of vehicle that it is necessary to dispatch, and precisely along what route. Simultaneously, the task and address of the accident is transmitted to the vehicle's display screen.

After arriving on the scene, the senior man of the patrol group, with the help of a computer, reports to the operations duty officer on the results of the accident investigation. Through the computer, he can obtain the necessary operations search and reference data for a quick disclosure of a crime.

This does not describe the most complicated situation. In practice, a far more complex operational situation can arise. And it is not always easy for the operations duty officer to analyze it. It is then that the program installed in the computer can make specific recommendations.

This is from the experience of police work in Japan: Owing to automation of the command and control of the police service, the patrol detail arrives at the scene of an accident within four minutes. In connection with this, the ability to expose crimes in Japan is from 60 percent of the more intricate crimes to 90 percent of the murders.

Statistics of police in the United States indicate: If a group arrives at the scene of an accident within five minutes, then the probability of uncovering a crime can be 50-75 percent. If the time spent on the way is 10 minutes, then this probability drops to 30 percent.

To sharply increase the efficiency of the actions of the Moscow militia to fight crime and protect public order,

in accordance with instructions of the USSR Council of Ministers, an automated system is being established to control the forces and means of the GUV D [Main Administration of Internal Affairs] of the Moscow City Ispolkom [executive committee] of the Soviet of People's Deputies. It consists of the Central Command and Control Post of the GUV D, a complex of automation means of rayon command and control, militia offices, GAI [State Automobile Inspection] departments, guard detachments and other subunits, and a mobile facility installed on patrol cars and the vehicle of operational groups. It is planned in the future to equip regiments of the patrol-post service, GAI administrations, guards, and services with similar apparatuses.

Specialists of the USSR Ministry of the Radio Industry are now installing automated systems. The Council of Ministers of the country established this year complete readiness of a leading model and conducting of tests. On the basis of the automation means of the GUV D of Moscow, model complexes for the command and control of forces and means can be established for the militia in the large cities of the country.

But what are the functions of the automated system of command and control? First, this is the collection, processing, and representation of information on collective and individual use systems concerning the operational situation in the city, rayons, and microrayons on the disposition of forces and means, their composition and location, and on the execution of tasks by patrol cars at a given minute. Second, automated analysis of information that is coming in, the selection of the optimal composition of forces and means, the assignment on high speed communications channels of tasks to specific executors who are closest to the scene of the accident. Third, automated monitoring of the progress of the execution of tasks, and the collection and processing of information on their fulfillment. Fourth, the automated implementation of model operational plans and monitoring their fulfillment. And, finally, the cooperation of forces and means of the militia with subunits of other departments according to place, time, and tasks.

The time for getting information to the executors after the installation of the automated system is 10-15 seconds (it is now 5-15 minutes). The receipt of information from the automated data bank after an inquiry is within 30-60 seconds (it is now from six hours to several days). The reduction in the time of arrival of a detail at the scene of an accident is 40-50 percent. The ability to disclose a crime hot on the trail increases by a factor of 1.5.

Up to the end of this year, automation should be put into effect in eight rayon internal affairs administration, 80 subunits at a lower echelon (militia departments, GAI departments, centralized guard posts, medical sobering up places, and others), 350 patrol cars, the central UVD command and control post, and the center for the exchange of telecoded information, and state tests should be displayed in the second stage.



Unfortunately, there is not one organ in the country today that would be engaged in all of the questions of automation of command and control of forces and means of the militia on the scale of the USSR MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs]. In general, there are no efforts in the creation and introduction of automated

systems of command and control, and the forces and means that are conducting the fight against crime and that are protecting public order in the MVD of the country are disunited. The main information center of the USSR MVD is engaged basically in the establishment of automated data banks on the disclosure of crimes.

### Homeless Living Conditions in USSR Examined

91US0202B Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA  
in Russian 19 Dec 90 Second Edition p 6

[Interview with Aleksey Lebedev, journalist, conducted by N. Bulavintsev, SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA correspondent: "[Pariahs: Journalist Aleksey Lebedev Experienced for Himself All the Charms of 'Life at the Bottom'"]

[Text] *He is not yet 40 years old, yet his name is surrounded by numerous legends filled with the most fantastic adventures. In his lifetime he has performed feats which some people call heroic, other simply crazy. But he himself knows better than anyone else why he decided to give up his comfortable, spacious apartment and good job and, after burying his passport, transform himself for several years into an... outcast.*

In that role, voluntarily subjecting himself to the constant risk and hazards which dogged virtually his every step, Cherepovets journalist Aleksey Lebedev traveled over most of the country. And not in luxury train cars, but instead under the most improbable conditions; he met thousands of people about whom for many years we have tried not to say anything at all, or else simply called them by the short but disdainful name of "bum." What he saw is not just "life at the bottom," it was, as he himself feels, a gigantic and urgent problem from which society cannot hide. Right now Aleksey is writing a book about his impressions.

[Bulavintsev] So, Aleksey, what was it that prompted you to undertake such a seemingly unlikely journey?

[Lebedev] The method of so-called "total immersion" in one milieu or another is one that has long been employed by journalists. One could probably not find a better research method. Just think of Russian reporter Vladimir Gilyarovskiy. Incidentally, he, too, was born in Vologda Guberniya and traversed it from one end to the another.

The whole world has read books by German journalist Gunther Walraff, in which he presents his studies of acute social ills. You simply cannot repress a shudder as you read some episodes, even though in his books he is not attempting to frighten society, merely to warn it.

[Bulavintsev] But why was it specifically this segment of society which became your topic of study? Are the problems of unemployment and homelessness really all that acute?

[Lebedev] It was precisely the complete disparity between real life and the images which existed in our press and literature that prompted me to undertake my "journey" through a by no means romantic world. For too long now it has been pounded into our heads that we have neither unemployed people nor homeless people in our country and that a society of universal prosperity is so close that we can almost reach out and touch it.

I traveled a lot and saw that thousands of people are living in basements and slums and at garbage dumps, that they wander around endlessly at train stations and roam from city to city. They live by their own unwritten but clearly defined laws, even though bums are considered to be outside the law in our society. In order to understand why and how a person can sink into this category, what forces them to accept this way of life, one day I decided to hop on board a train pulling out of my native Cherepovets headed for warmer climes...

[Bulavintsev] How long did your voluntary life as a bum last, a life fraught with such great and constant risk?

[Lebedev] I lived as a bum for several years and became absolutely at ease in that topsy-turvy world. Truth to tell, now and then I did send my mother a telegram from some place where I was staying. She has a very weak heart, and naturally my disappearance and the subsequent long years of wandering did not do anything to calm her down. I did not tell her what I was doing or where or under what conditions I was living. I simply reported: "Everything is fine. Am alive and healthy."

It was difficult at first, of course. Bums are people who have been around, who have seen all sorts of things and become extremely cautious and who, I repeat, live according to their own laws and rules. I had to learn those laws and rules as quickly as possible. Basically, I did not find this "science" very difficult.

Very soon I realized that in any city, even a completely unfamiliar one, a bum will seek out a bar, a liquor store, a market or a place which buys back empty bottles. There he is likely to find his own kind. Many bums "deal" in empty bottles. They can get something to eat with the money they get for bottles. It is precisely in this milieu, in these places, that you find out about the situation in the city, the addresses of places where people like yourself find shelter for the night. There you ask where and how you can earn enough money for food and booze; in short, you can find any information that interests you there. Train stations and garbage dumps are such places, in any city.

Usually bums are not very interested in who or what you are, why you are there or where you come from. Their milieu has its own language, concepts and unwritten code. It is very easy to blend in and become at home there; it is much more difficult to overcome a certain internal psychological barrier which exists.

[Bulavintsev] So what do the people we call bums live on? Many of them are hauled into court for earning their food money by illegal means. I hope that that is not their sole source of livelihood. Or is it?

[Lebedev] As for earnings, though bums' opportunities are limited they do exist. Firstly, there are the warehouses and trade-related facilities—they always need workers there. And virtually always there are tightly-knit brigades of "in-house" stevedores there. Naturally they corner all the most advantageous and best-paid work for

themselves. They have the cleaner and easier jobs where they can steal something. It was by working at warehouses that I first witnessed a paradox: there is absolutely incredible pilfering going on in this country. Yet only recently have we begun talking about the fact that people are stealing goods not only from stores, but also directly from the places where they are produced, unloaded and stored. That is truly virgin territory for our law enforcement agencies...

Bums get the dirtiest jobs. And they are paid two or three times less. The "benefactors" who give them work know that they will not complain or protest. An outcast has no rights. But the money is always enough for food and booze.

Another way of earning money is as a hired hand. This is mainly done in the Central Asian regions. I myself toiled on Asian plantations more than once. Let me tell you, that is like real slavery. People simply live like animals there; the backbreaking labor simply strips away their humanity. Outcasts are eagerly sought for those jobs: they can be exploited more and paid less, and they will not grumble. So there is plenty of suffering, but still those who can work, who have the health and strength for it, find ways to get by.

But then there are the people who are completely helpless, wretched and old. There are millions of them. Let me give you just one statistic which attests to the acuteness of this problem. At the present time there are approximately 25,000 people waiting in line for space in nursing homes in the RSFSR alone. And how many are there in the whole Union? What do many of them have left? A doorway, a train station, the life of a beggar.

And what about people who get 40-60 rubles [R] a month, people who have been forgotten by their own children? Where can they turn for help? To social security services? That is at the very least naive. So they become impoverished beggars. Incidentally, recently many of them have fallen into the hands of criminal gangs. For instance, a poor beggar might take in R100-120 a day and then have most of it taken away from him. Another kind of racket...

There is one other way to earn money: running a "flophouse." Though that probably makes it sound too grandiose. Because in this case a flophouse might be a bare basement, a heating grate or an attic. That is, those places which the militia very rarely visit. For a certain sum experienced bums will rent others like themselves, most often bums from out of town, a place to spend the night. There you can keep warm through the night by yourself, or you can bring a girlfriend there, though that will cost a bit more...

And so the lives of hundreds of thousands of people living on the "bottom" revolve in an endless circle. Only a very few of them find the strength to break out and return to a normal life. It is a savage, inhuman way of life

in which our bums exist, ruining not only their health but also deforming their personalities and their minds and crippling their souls...

[Bulavintsev] A person who has no rights, no residence permit and no job ceases to value either a stranger's life or his own life...

[Lebedev] I agree.

Bums, I should note, do have a certain sense of solidarity. But there is indeed a constant threat hanging over you. I myself was repeatedly beaten so badly that I was left barely alive; they took my money and my clothes. There is no one to complain to. No militiaman is even going to listen to you. A bum is outside the law...

[Bulavintsev] In Moscow an Association for the Study of Homelessness and Unemployment has been established, and you have been elected its president. Tell us about it, and about its goals and tasks.

[Lebedev] The temptation to immediately write a book about what I experienced was great, and I had plenty of material. But the problems of homelessness and unemployment are so great that they require serious research work. That is why our association was created. It has been in existence for a little over a year. During that time it has become international. It was actually in the West that people first took an interest in my essays and research devoted to life in the dregs of society. In our country, as usual, they were at first regarded with wariness and suspicion. But why, they asked? Is it really that serious? Who needs this? A most surprising situation, when a phenomenon has a serious effect on public life, yet at the same time seems to be nonexistent.

Ahead of us, I am convinced, lies a real upsurge in unemployment, and that will exacerbate crime-breeding circumstances to an extreme. If we do not take fundamental emergency measures then many unemployed people will likely become new initiates into the criminal world. Our association's goal is to do as much research on the problem as possible and to come up with some prescriptions for social protection.

### **Ukraine CP CC Donates 100 Million Rubles to Chernobyl Cleanup**

91US0202A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 29 Dec 90  
Second Edition p 2

[Article by M. Odinets, PRAVDA correspondent in Kiev: "With Party Money"]

[Text] The Ukrainian CP Central Committee has reported to us that the republic party organization has donated R100 million (rubles) to help clean up the effects of the Chernobyl nuclear disaster.

Part of this money will go to build five medical facilities (R49 million). There are plans to establish specialized ecological clinics in Kiev, Chernigov, Zhitomir, Rovno and Lutsk. Pediatric medical facilities in a number of

oblasts in the republic will be equipped with the latest diagnostic equipment and medications. One-fourth of the amount donated will be spent to provide a one-time assistance payment to large families, to pay for trips to sanatoriums and resorts, to provide additional paid leave time and to cover transportation costs. A total of R5 million will be spent to improve public food service for school-age and preschool-age children who live in contaminated areas. The donated funds will also finance the "Children of Chernobyl" program.

### Official Report on Disturbances at St Sofia in Kiev

91UN0552A Kiev KULTURA I ZHYTTYA  
in Ukrainian 7 Dec 90 p 7

[Report of the Commission of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR on Culture and Spiritual Revival, by L. Taniuk, chairman of the Commission, and Z. Duma, chairman of the Sub-commission on Religion and Inter-denominational Relations: "Conflict Could Have Been Avoided. . ."]

[Text] As commissioned by the session of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR, the Commission on Culture and Spiritual Revival looked into the sequence of events that took place in Kiev on October 28 of this year in relation to the celebration of a service by the Patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church, Alexei II, in St. Sofia's Cathedral and now presents its conclusions and recommendations for examination by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR.

### I. Events at Bohdan Khmelnytskyi Square of October 28 of This Year.

On this day, starting at 10 a.m., a service, with the participation of the Patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church (RPTs), Alexei II, was to be held in St. Sofia's Cathedral, which, along with the complex of monuments from the eleventh-eighteenth centuries, is a state historical-architectural preserve. According to the announcements published by the Ukrainian exarchate of the RPTs on October 26 in the newspapers PRAVDA UKRAINY and VECHIRNIY KIEV, the service was to be celebrated "on the occasion of the granting of independence to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church." The Commission cannot comment on the legal or, especially, canonical, significance of this action, but notes its directedness at confirming the leading position of the RPTs in the religious-church life of the republic, which could not fail to add tension to the religious situation in the Ukraine. The Commission's view on this is corroborated by the varied reaction to the idea of the service at St. Sofia's Cathedral on the part of believers of various denominations and citizens of the Ukraine, including some people's deputies. A large part of the public regarded this action as disregard for the sovereignty of the Ukraine, a lack of respect for the national temples of the Ukrainian people and interference by the RPTs in the internal affairs of the republic. For this reason, on the evening of October 27,

picketing of St. Sofia's Cathedral began, and from early morning on October 28, people began to gather at B. Khmelnytskyi Square. Some of them, RPTs faithful, intended to take part in the service, but a large majority had the opposite intention—to prevent the service from taking place.

At the decision of the Kiev city council, the responsibility for maintaining public order at the square was given to the Department of Internal Affairs [UVS] of the Kiev city executive committee and the Special Task Militia [ZMOP]. According to testimony given by people's deputies, there were also military units at the cathedral. Between 7 and 10 a.m., several incidents took place involving personnel of the law-maintenance bodies and people who had come to the square. These conflicts—beatings of people, including people's deputies, repeated breaches by militia members and people in civilian dress of the deputies' immunity without the provision of explanations, which actions are recorded—resulted from the militia's attempts to prevent blockage of the cathedral. However, before the start of the service, which was scheduled for 10 a.m., both the entrances to the cathedral and the square were blocked. For this reason, Patriarch Alexei II and his accompanying clergy entered the cathedral under reinforced guard by the service entrance, which elicited the indignation of the many-thousands-strong crowd in the square.

In addition, by 9 a.m., the militia had blocked off the streets adjacent to the square. A second cordon to keep out people trying to get into the square was made by Rukh activists. It was only thanks to this double blockage of the street that it was possible to prevent the crowd on the square from growing to a critical mass of people with opposing views and having scuffles break out among them. It should be pointed out that there were no conflicts on the square between RPTs and UAPT's faithful. There were discussions, arguments, but no use of force by either side. But conflicts arose as groups of people attempted to get through the cordon established by the militia and Rukh activists.

Patriarch Alexei II and the RPTs clergy were obliged after the end of the service to leave the cathedral as they had entered—through the living quarters attached to the cathedral, as the passions on the square did not die down for a long time. A group of 10 people's deputies, who were eyewitnesses to all these events and against whom physical force was applied, made a statement about the events on Ukrainian television. The following can be categorized the most unpleasant incidents:

1. The application of physical force against people trying to get through to the square. It was difficult in the complicated situation for the forces of law and order to tell exactly who and with what aim was on the square, and that is why access was blocked both for those who came to participate in the service and those taking part in the protest against the service. But one can neither explain nor justify the actions of the forces of law and order against the people's deputies, in particular the

cynical disregard for their status through the infliction of beatings, which the militia allowed to take place in spite of the fact that the deputies presented their identification.

2. The arrogance and vicious disregard for the elementary principles of democracy and glasnost manifested by Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVS) personnel towards the cameramen of "Ukrinkhronika," who were filming everything that was taking place on the square. One of them was given a blow to the head. The militia also turned off their videocamera.

3. The brutal beating by the forces maintaining law and order of two UAPTs priests at 7 a.m. at the Sofia Square. Of course, no one had explained to the militia men that in order to protect priests of the Russian church, it was not necessary to beat priests of the UAPTs.

4. Active participation in the conflict of unknown persons in civilian dress, who refused to present their documents or reveal their names at the demand of the people's deputies. One of them refused to do this even at the demand of the deputy-commander of the Kiev UVS, Comrade Shaposhnikov, about which fact the people's deputies made a written statement, providing the Commission with photographs of the unknown individual. These unknown persons were the ones who most zealously blocked access to the cathedral and refused to give their names to the deputies and MVS personnel; their actions elicited the greatest indignation among citizens.

The most reliable testimony about the incidents described above is the video recordings made by "Ukrinkhronika" operators. The violence against deputy M. Porovskyi was filmed by "Kievnaukfilm" operator Shmotolokha.

In the testimony gathered by the Commission are complaints of deputies against personnel of law-maintenance bodies: Lieutenant-Colonel Horbachevskyi, member of the service Struggle with the Theft of Socialist Property and Speculation [BRSV] ("BKhSS") Nyzhnyk and others.

Mass media personnel (including those of foreign media) became witnesses of the brutal behavior towards people's deputies.

This was, basically, the sequence of events that took place on October 28 of this year. The resistance over many hours by a huge number of people, which was accompanied by scuffles and beatings of people, the breach of the inviolability of people's deputies, the consequences of this service for religious life in the Ukraine demand that a thorough and unbiased analysis be carried out, in order to avoid similar excesses in the future and to establish new principles of state policy in the sphere of religion and church in the Ukraine.

## II. The Reasons for the Religious Conflict

The Commission finds that the conflict situation of October 28 was caused primarily by an insufficient consideration by all the organizations, institutions and individuals involved of the particular nature of religious-church life in the Ukraine, especially in Kiev. An analysis of the above-mentioned events shows that the conflict could have been avoided had a principled approach to the religious situation in Kiev and an unbiased attitude to both acting Orthodox denominations been taken by the state bodies of the republic. The course of events was stipulated primarily by the wrongful attitude of the leadership of the Russian Orthodox Church to believers of the UAPTs and their disregard of the sovereignty of the Ukraine and the state bodies of the republic. Furthermore, the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR took a strangely flippant attitude towards the October 28 actions of the RPTs and the Ukrainian RPTs exarchate, agreeing to the actions without obtaining detailed information about their purpose, general political direction and possible consequences.

The Commission makes this conclusion on the basis of the information which it has at its disposal with regard to the granting of permission for the service.

The purpose and character of the service planned for October 28 with the participation of Patriarch Alexei II in St. Sophia's Cathedral were not clearly defined in advance by the leadership of the church. And the subject of the action, the declared independence of the Ukrainian exarchate of the RPTs, is not just an internal church matter, as it touches on the spiritual life of the republic in general and has the character of a state, more specifically, political act. And it was only on October 26 that the public, including the Commission, learned about the plan of the RPTs leadership to hold the service with the participation of Alexei II, in St. Sophia's Cathedral "on the occasion of the declaration of the independence of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church."

But on October 24, the Commission, knowing only that Patriarch Alexei II intended to arrive in the Ukraine and foreseeing the possible consequences of such a visit, made some recommendations to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR, in which it stated that "the celebration of the mentioned service is not an urgent need for religious-church life in the Ukraine and in Kiev."

Having stated its reservations, the Commission accepted the possibility of the visit of Alexei II and his retinue to St. Sophia's Cathedral. This view was based on the fact that the national temple of the Ukrainian people—St. Sophia's Cathedral—is also one of the major temples of Christianity, and for that reason, to refuse to the head of any stream of Christianity the right to visit it would be wrong and would violate the principle of equal treatment by the Ukrainian state of all the denominations existing in the Ukraine.



The Commission asked that state bodies guarantee that in the celebration of the service the following conditions would be met:

- that a limited number of people be present (40-50 people);
- that it be categorically forbidden to remove the scaffolding in the cathedral for the period of the service on 28.10.90;
- that the clergy and faithful of the RPTs not be allowed to do anything directed at increasing religious tensions.

Meeting these conditions would mean allowing Patriarch Alexei to visit St. Sofia's Cathedral and hold a prayer service there, in the same way as a week earlier had been done by the UAPT's Patriarch Mstyslav, which did not cause any disagreements, conflicts or political problems.

For reasons that are not clear, the demands of the Commission were ignored. This is all the more surprising as almost simultaneously with the Commission's letter, and also following it, protests against the service were sent to the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR and the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR from community organizations, the Kiev city council, the Second All-Ukraine Assembly of Rukh, as well as a statement from the Derzhbud of the Ukrainian SSR about the inadvisability of this action; there was also a telegram from the RPTs exarch in the Ukraine, Filaret, asking for a confirmation of the granting of permission for the service.

In the view of the Commission, the only correct decision in this situation would have been to refrain from holding a mass celebration by the Patriarch in St. Sophia's Cathedral, or, failing that, to relocate the celebration of "the proclamation of the independence of the UPTs" to any one of the 23 temples in Kiev which belong to that church.

Unfortunately, this was not done. Further, as has been revealed, no institution—neither the Council of Ministers, nor the Derzhbud of the Ukrainian SSR, nor the management of the Sophia preserve—ever gave official written permission for the celebration of the service. As no conditions were placed on the applicant, that is, the Ukrainian exarchate of the RPTs, the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR in effect took onto itself all responsibility for the consequences of the celebration of the service. In this case, the Council of Ministers took a flippant attitude towards the carrying out of an act, the state and national significance of which went beyond the limits of the internal affairs of the RPTs.

It is not surprising that by the clergy and believers of Kiev, the general population of the city, delegates of the All-Ukrainian Assembly of Rukh, the claimed character of the RPTs action at St. Sophia's Cathedral was received in a variety of ways, as it went beyond being a simple visit to an Orthodox temple, which, incidentally,

is not at the present time being used as a building of worship. The action of the hierarchs of the RPTs also constituted a total disregard for the other Orthodox denomination that is active in the Ukraine, the autocephalous, and in particular, of its right to function. As everyone knows, the RPTs and its Ukrainian exarchate, recently named the "Ukrainian Orthodox Church," reject the UAPT's. Even in appeals to the Supreme Soviet and the government, RPTs activists call the believers and clergy of the UAPT's "apostates, schismatics, enemies of Orthodoxy" and the like. The now "independent" Ukrainian exarchate rejects any possibility of dialogue with fellow-believers of the autocephalous tendency. For this reason, it was not difficult to foresee what the reaction of the UAPT's to the declared "independence" of the RPTs would be. It was the predictable result of the near-sighted policy of the RPTs, of its attempts to confirm its supremacy and unique position in the religious life of the Ukraine.

The negative attitude of a significant portion of believers to the RPTs, the consequence of which were the events of October 28, was caused by the following factors:

1. In the eyes of the Ukrainian public, the RPTs remains the "official" structure and acts to prevent the republic's achievement of sovereignty. This view comes from the negative attitude of RPTs hierarchs in the Ukraine towards the Ukrainian national movement and their disregard for the Ukrainian language, the attempts by the Metropolitan Filaret to obtain for RPTs use temples which are claimed by the UAPT's (St. Andrew's Church and others). These views are propagated by UAPT's clergy, who are indignant at the lack of recognition of their church by the RPTs hierarchs.

2. The mistaken and essentially chauvinistic treatment by the RPTs synod of Orthodoxy in the Ukraine as a "daughter" church of the RPTs and the canonical subjection of church-religious life of the Ukraine to the Moscow patriarch. It is known that the Ukrainian Orthodox Church was made subject to Moscow from 1686 only thanks to the brutal coercive policy of tsarism and that the rebirth of its independence (autocephaly) after 1917 was stifled by wholesale executions of the clergy by the NKVD organs in the 1930s.

3. The attempts by the RPTs to maintain its position in the Ukraine (where until recently it held the leading position) by any means whatsoever, not excluding the persecution of progressive priests and bribery, as happened, for example, in the city of Khmelnytskyi (see KOMSOMOLSKA PRVADA, 27.10.90), the seizure of temples by force (city of Sebastopol, St. Nicholas' Church, October 2, 1990), disregard for public opinion and violation of laws regarding the protection of historical and cultural monuments (Vinnytsia, Subotov and others).

4. The near-sighted position of Deputy Savvin (Ahafan-hel), who in the eyes of believers personifies that part of the clergy of the RPTs which does not accept the new

processes of democratization and cultural-national rebirth. Even at sessions of the Supreme Soviet, he disseminates tendentious documents, directed against the UAPTs and the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church (UHKTs), as happened on October 24.

5. The double meaning of the so-called "independence" granted by the RPTs synod to the Ukrainian exarchate of this church. An independent Ukrainian church, in the view of believers, cannot be subjected to a Moscow patriarch; it should be headed by its own Ukrainian patriarch.

Also significantly affecting the course of events on October 28 was the lack of definition of property rights and rights for use of cultural buildings by the two Orthodox denominations.

Thus, for example, on October 17, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet passed a resolution "With regard to the appeal of UAPTs faithful," which foresaw returning to them St. Andrew's Church and the Metropolitan's palace at St. Sophia's Cathedral. However, the Presidium's lack of consistency in formulating and implementing this resolution resulted in its not being implemented by the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR, although believers had been informed about it by the mass media. UAPTs faithful became disillusioned about the possibility of having their legal rights recognized by state bodies and doubtful about the equal treatment by the government of all existing denominations. Given this, the RPTs service in St. Sophia's Cathedral was viewed by UAPTs faithful as confirmation of rumors that this temple would be given to the "independent" exarchate of the RPTs. This served to increase the tensions in a religious situation which was already tense. It is known that in April, 1919, one of the first UAPTs communities to be registered was at St. Sophia's Cathedral and that until 1930, this temple was the cathedral of the Primate of the UAPTs.

Finally, one more conclusion reached by the Commission, one which cannot fail to alert and concern people. The lack of actual permission for the celebration of the service, as well as the use of large forces of militia, ZMOP and people in civilian dress, who were present in the square, blocked access to the cathedral, failed to obey even the orders of representatives of the Kiev UVS command and breached the inviolability of people's deputies make it clear that the possible consequences of the service were already foreseen. The Commission has the impression that the RPTs hierarchs and the state institutions that support them decided to hold the service whatever the cost.

### III. Recommendations of the Commission

Summing up the above discussion, the Commission considers it essential to present for examination by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR the following recommendations:

1. The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet should remind the government of the Ukraine of the need for a more considered state policy with regard to religious questions, especially, inter-denominational relations, and also of the unacceptability of taking a flippant attitude towards similar cases in the future.

2. In conditions in which every religious tendency is finding its place within the new circumstances of the formation of Ukrainian statehood and cultural-national rebirth, similar unpleasant misunderstandings may occur in the future if state bodies do not take preventative measures. Among such measures, the Commission includes:

- passage of a law about freedom of conscience and religious associations in the Ukrainian SSR;
- an ultimate definition of the status and official definition of the structures of all denominations existing in Ukraine;
- consistent maintenance of the law and increased liability for exacerbating religious hostilities;
- formation of an operating state body, authorized to coordinate matters relation to religious-church life within the general national plan;
- application of measures to keep out of republican radio and television broadcasts and the printed organs of the Supreme Soviet incompetent, biased or tendentious materials, which could exacerbate religious tensions (and, simultaneously, to present clear and objective explanations of the state's position with regard to religion and the church in the new conditions);
- consistent respect of all decisions, obligations and promises of bodies of state rule towards given religious associations and communities with regard to granting them buildings for worship;
- resistance to all manifestations of clericalism, attempts of church hierarchs to put pressure on state bodies;
- in the expected legislation, to place liability on any persons who preach denominational or religious-national hostility. Recently, law-maintenance bodies have renounced this responsibility, and some (for example, the prosecutor of the city of Khmelnytskyi, B. Morozovskiy) have officially declared that "no criminal or administrative liability for such acts is foreseen by the law."

3. The Commission is particularly concerned by the position of the RPTs leadership with regard to its structure in the Ukraine. This problem cannot be solved by declarative autonomy, independence and a change of name to "Ukrainian." As is known, the RPTs has its structures in many countries—Japan, the USA and others; there they they do not name them "Japanese" or "Americian" Orthodox Churches. Furthermore, there are millions of Russians living in the Ukraine who have an

unconditional right to have their religious needs satisfied in a church that is Russian in its language and its organizational subjection to authority. As to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, it cannot under any circumstances be subjected to the Moscow patriarch; this would not be permitted by either the faithful or the clergy. For this reason, the Supreme Soviet and the government of the republic should require complete clarity and adherence to principle in this matter both from Patriarch Alexei II and Metropolitan Filaret and should also assist in the establishment of dialogue between the RPTs and the UAPT.

4. The beatings of Deputies S. Holovatyy, M. Porovskyy, S. Skoryk and S. Khmara and the breach of the inviolability of the whole group of deputies must be regarded as a separate issue. The Commission recommends that the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR pass a special resolution directed at protecting the rights and dignity of people's deputies and the punishment of those guilty, with the aim of preventing similar breaches of the law in future.

5. The chairmen of the Commission on Culture and Religious Revival, L. Taniuk, and the Commission on Law and Order and Battle against Criminality, Ia. Kondratiev, should inform the session of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR about the events of October 28 and the resolution passed by the Presidium.

Only unbiased and objective information will be capable of removing inter-denominational tensions among deputies and within the republic.

6. In order to lessen the tension in inter-denominational relations in the republic, a "Round Table" should be presented on Ukrainian television, in which would participate people's deputies, including members of the Commission and of the Presidium, and representatives of the clergy.

The Commission appends to this report a draft resolution of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR and requests that it be examined.

#### **Kazakhstan Establishes Own Muslim Spiritual Directorate**

91US0207A Tashkent KOMSOMOLES  
UZBEKISTANA in Russian 18 Sep 90 p 2

[Interview with Head Mufti Ratbek-Khazhi Nasynbay Uly by Revmira Voshchenko, IAN [IZVESTIYA AKADEMII NAUK]: "DUMK—Eparchy of Muslims in Kazakhstan" date, place not specified]

[Text] Alma-Ata. The Spiritual Directorate of the Muslims of Kazakhstan (DUMK) was formed at the beginning of the year with its center in Alma-Ata. In a brief period, the new directorate has already implemented a number of independent actions. These are described by Head Mufti Ratbek-Khazhi Nasynbay Uly.

[Nasynbay Uly] First of all, the Spiritual Directorate began to compile for publication spiritual literature for the region's Muslims. We are now compiling a spiritual calendar, which will immortalize the date of the beginning of the history of DUMK, 12 January 1990; it will come out this year. The Muslims of Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, Dagestan, and Tataria have long had such calendars. The calendar of the Kazakh faithful is being published for the first time, and of course, will have its own features associated with the history of our people. The calendar will describe the mosques that there used to be in Kazakhstan, which of them have been preserved up to now, and how many new mosques have been opened in the republic in recent years (approximately 20 mosques have opened in 17 oblasts). The calendar will reflect the most important events of this year—sending 17 representatives of Kazakhstan to Mecca for [haj]. There has not been such a quantity of pilgrims from our area over the previous 70 years.

The calendar is being published in the Kazakh language, and will thus be accessible to the broad masses of the faithful, first and foremost to those who do not know Arabic script.

In addition to the calendar, the first publication of the Koran in Kazakh is planned. The first lot comprises 500,000 copies; subsequently, the press run will reach one million.

It is comforting that our views are being met with understanding on the part of state authorities. Thus, recently, the Council for Religious Affairs under the USSR Council of Ministers adopted a resolution on opening in Alma-Ata the Islamic Institute imeni Al-Kharabi (this will be the second higher Islamic educational institution in the country, along with the Islamic Institute imeni Al-Bukhari in Tashkent). The Alma-Ata city soviet has already allocated territory for the construction of the institute building, which is now housed in the city mosque. The training of future teachers of the institute is now under way.

The city authorities have also granted space to erect a new building of the Alma-Ata mosque, the architectural draft of which was developed by the republic drafting institute, at the request of the DUMK leadership.

#### **Preparation, Enrollment of Muslim Clergy Viewed**

91US0207B Tashkent KOMSOMOLES  
UZBEKISTANA in Russian 12 Oct 90 p 2

[Report by Girey Utorbayev, IAN [IZVESTIYA AKADEMII NAUK]: "The Preparation of Muslim Clergy"]

[Text] Numerically, the followers of the teachings of Islam in our country hold second place after Orthodox Christians (at the end of 1989 751 Muslim associations were registered). At present, the number of mosque parishioners has grown; new prayer houses and mosques have opened; old buildings of worship are being restored.

**In connection with this, the demand for theologically educated clergy has grown significantly.**

Until 1989, the [madrasa] Mir-Arab in Bukhara and the Islamic Institute imeni Imam Al-Bukhari in Tashkent prepared the clergy for Muslim worship. Not only Soviet Muslims, but representatives of Afghanistan, Bulgaria, Vietnam, and Yemen were trained in these educational institutions. However, this year the number of graduates of the Bukhara [madrasa] and the Tashkent institute ceased to satisfy the growing demand of the Muslim communities. In addition, although the main part of the Muslims in the USSR confess Islam of the [Hanfi] school of the Sunni sect, there are [Shafi] Muslims in the Northern Caucasus, [Ismaili] Muslims in Tajikistan and Pamir, and in the Transcaucasus and certain regions of Turkmenia and Uzbekistan, the majority of the faithful are Shiites. All of this insistently demanded the opening of new Muslim educational institutions.

[Madrasa] opened late last year in Ufa and Baku. [Madrasa] in Grozny, Makhachkala, and Tajikistan have begun their work. The opening of Islamic institutes in Dushanbe and Alma-Ata is also planned. The material and technical base of the Bukhara [madrasa] and the

Islamic Institute in Tashkent will be improved in the near future. The contingent of trainees will also increase: up to 200 people in the [madrasa] and up to 100 in the institute. By the decisions of the Council for Religious Affairs of the USSR Council of Ministers and the Uzbek SSR Council of Ministers, land parcels have been allocated for the construction of new dormitories for the Islamic Institute in Tashkent, dormitories and classroom buildings for the [madrasa] in Bukhara, as well as funds for materials, technical equipment, furniture for these educational institutions, and apartments for teachers.

Clergy of the faith undergo theological preparation outside of our country as well. Over 50 people have studied in Muslim educational institutions of Egypt, Libya, Syria, and Jordan. Among them are current representatives of the spiritual directorates of Muslims, Mufti Mukhammad Sodik Mukhammad Yusuf, and Mufti Talgat Tadzhuiddin, Mufti Ratbek Nasynbay Uly. There are now studying in Jordan three future clergymen of mosques of the Northern Caucasus. The Spiritual Directorate of Muslims plans in the near future to send its representatives for study in Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Libya, Jordan, Egypt, and Syria.

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